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 Preface 
 
 
Funded by the European Commission’s 7th Framework Programme and coordinated by 
Technical University Dortmund, Germany, FAMILYPLATFORM gathers a consortium of 12 
partner organisations working together to articulate key questions about the family for the 
European Social Science and Humanities Research Agenda 2012-2013. 
 
There are four key stages to the project. The first is to chart and review the major trends of 
comparative family research in the EU in eight “Existential Fields” (WP1). The second is to 
critically review existing research on the family (WP2), and the third is to build on our 
understanding of existing issues affecting families and predict future conditions and challenges 
facing them (WP3). The final stage is to bring the results and findings of the previous three 
stages together, and propose key scientific research questions about families to be tackled with 
future EU research funding (WP4). 
 
This report, Research on Families and Family policies in Europe - State of the Art1, is based on 
the following Existential Field Reports written by consortium partners and the two Expert 
reports: 
 
1. Family Structures and Family Forms in the European Union 
(http://www.familyplatform.eu/en/1-major-trends/reports/1-family-structures-and-family-forms) 
Loreen Beier, Dirk Hofäcker, Elisa Marchese and Marina Rupp 
State Institute for Family Research, University of Bamberg 
 
2. Developmental Familial Processes 
(http://www.familyplatform.eu/en/1-major-trends/reports/2a-family-developmental-processes) 
Carmen Leccardi and Miriam Perego 
Department of Sociology and Social Research, University of Milan-Bicocca 
 
 3. Major Trends of State Family Policies in Europe 
(http://www.familyplatform.eu/en/1-major-trends/reports/3a-state-family-policies) 
Sonja Blum and Christiane Rille-Pfeiffer 
Austrian Institute for Family Studies, University of Vienna 
 
4. Family and Living Environment  
Part A: Economic Situation, Education levels, Employment and Physical living 
environment 
(http://www.familyplatform.eu/en/1-major-trends/reports/4a-family-living-environments) 
Epp Reiska, Ellu Saar and Karl Viilmann 
Institute of International and Social Studies, Tallinn University 
Part B: Local politics: Programs and best practice model 
(http://www.familyplatform.eu/en/1-major-trends/reports/4b-local-politics-programmes-and-
best-practice-models)  
Francesco Belletti and Lorenza Rebuzzini 
Forum delle Associazioni Familiari  
 
 
                                                 
1 Published at http://www.familyplatform.eu/en/1-major-trends/final-report-1/final-report. 
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5. Patterns and Trends of Family Management in the European Union 
(http://www.familyplatform.eu/en/1-major-trends/reports/5-family-management) 
(Zsuzsa Blaskó & Veronika Herche 
Demographic Research Institute, Budapest 
 
6. Social Care and Social Services  
(http://www.familyplatform.eu/en/1-major-trends/reports/6a-social-care-social-services) 
Marjo Kuronen, together with Kimmo Jokinen and Teppo Kröger  
Family Research Centre & Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy /Social Work, 
University of Jyväskylä 
 
7. Social Inequality and Diversity of Families  
(http://www.familyplatform.eu/en/1-major-trends/reports/7-social-inequality-and-diversity-of-
families) 
Karin Wall, Mafalda Leitão and Vasco Ramos  
with contributions from João Peixoto, Heloísa Perista, Isabel Dias, Susana Atalaia, Diogo Costa 
and Alexandra Silva  
Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon 
 
8. Media, Communication and Information Technologies in the European Family 
(http://www.familyplatform.eu/en/1-major-trends/reports/8-media-family-education) 
Sonia Livingstone and Ranjana Das  
with contributions from Myria Georgiou, Leslie Haddon, Ellen Helsper and Yinhan Wang 
London School of Economics 
 
Expert reports 
 
The Professional Standards of Care Workers: The Development of Standards for Social 
Care Services for Families  
(http://www.familyplatform.eu/en/1-major-trends/reports/6b-development-of-standards-for-
social-work-and-social-care-services) 
Prof. Dr. Aila-Leena Matthies, Kokkola University Consortium, Finland 
 
Expertise on “Transitions into Parenthood”  
(http://www.familyplatform.eu/en/1-major-trends/reports/2b-transitions-into-parenthood) 
Prof. Dr. Barbara Stauber, University of Tübingen, Germany 
 
All FAMILYPLATFORM reports are available to download from the dedicated website: 
http://www.familyplatform.eu 
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Summary 
 
 
The State of the Art of Research on Families and Family Policies in Europe is the concluding 
report of the first Work package of the FAMILYPLATFORM funded by the European 
Commission 7th Framework Programme. The work of the FAMILYPLATFORM encompasses 
four key stages, from which the first one is to chart and review the major trends of comparative 
family research within the EU. The research review provides an overview of studies on changing 
family structures, developmental processes, current social and economic conditions of European 
families, gender and generational relations within families, and on family policies in the EU 
member states from a comparative perspective. 
 
This report summarises results of eight Existential Field Reports (EFs, one of them consisting of 
two parts) and two additional Expert Reports. The partners involved have done extensive 
systematic literature reviews on European comparative research published since the mid-1990s 
in their specific field of expertise using existing scientific and statistical databases, reports from 
previous and ongoing EC funded research projects, and other relevant publications, which are 
occasionally supplemented with own analyses of data available. This concluding report draws 
together the main results, conclusions and major trends identified in these more extensive 
reports, which are all available at the FAMILYPLATFORM website2. 
 
This report is organised into four main chapters and research fields: 
 
1)  family structures, forms and demographic processes;  
2)  current conditions of European families;  
3)  genders and generations in families; and  
4)  family policies and social care policies in Europe. 
 
Concerning recent developments in family structures and family forms, the review of existing 
research and statistics speak in favour of a comparatively high dynamic of family forms within 
European countries throughout the last decades. Some major trends can be identified based on 
demographic statistics and existing research: 
 
 postponement of first childbirth and first marriage, generally decreasing number of 
children, even though fertility aspirations are still at a comparable high level; 
 increasing number of out-of-wedlock births as being married has lost its central role as a 
precondition for family formation; 
 decreasing marriage-rate, increasing divorce-rate and increasing rate of re-marriages; 
 as a consequence, notable decrease in the incidence of the “middle class nuclear 
family”, even though this model stays dominant; 
 increasing diversity of family forms and family life. 
 
The degree to which these transformations have materialised varies considerably between 
European countries. The Nordic countries represent one end of the scale, where there has been a 
considerable move away from the “traditional” family model, with late marriages, modest 
marriage rates and a high proportion of out-of-wedlock births. The other are the Southern 
European countries, where family patterns are still much in line with the traditional model; 
                                                 
2 http://www.familyplatform.eu. 
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central importance of marriage, low divorce rates, low degrees of out-of-wedlock births, little 
significance of new family forms. The former display the highest fertility levels. 
 
These developments largely rely on long-term trends. Most recent data suggest that there may be 
some signs of a “flattening out” of previous highly dynamic processes, in the move away from 
the “traditional” family model. However, data indicating this is often very recent and it is hard to 
say whether it can be indicative for a more general future trend. Even if the trend towards "new 
family forms" will halt, a return to a "nuclear family model" is unlikely. 
 
Current conditions of European families cover a variety of topics from housing and physical 
living environment into migration, from poverty into influence of media and technology in 
family life. What connects these themes is the question of social inequality, which penetrates all 
the themes. Thus, main emphasis is paid on families with children and inequalities, not only 
differences between countries but also between social groups and different families. Major trends 
based on this review can be identified as follows: 
 
 polarisation in contemporary European families is significant, in particular between 
low/highly qualified couples; male breadwinner/dual earner couples; low/high income 
families, EU/non-EU migrant families, in urban-rural dimension; 
 the persistence of poverty in some groups and types of households which continue to 
show a higher risk of exposure to poverty; 
 the extreme vulnerability of migrant families and their children, particularly of non-EU 
immigrant families in comparison with other families and EU migrant families; 
 the mismatch between the life course diversity and housing market developments; 
 new, interactive, individualised and personalised media technologies are rapidly 
contributing to a diverse media environment in Europe; 
 children’s use of the internet continues to grow. Striking recent rises are evident among 
younger children (6-11 years) and in countries which have recently entered the EU; 
 socioeconomic inequalities continue to matter with patterns of digital exclusion 
mirroring those of social exclusion. 
 
A review of existing research shows that social inequality plays a crucial role in family life and 
is related to family structure and dynamics in complex ways. Families reflect social inequalities, 
since the unequal distribution of various resources and differentiated opportunities affect the 
circumstances in which family life is built up. The formation of couples, the organisation of 
family life, the socialisation of children and parent-child relationships are all influenced by wider 
social forces and social structure. Families also reproduce inequalities, both in the short term and 
intergenerationally. Research shows that family background, life-style, and resources, including 
both material and socio-cultural advantages, tend to affect children’s lives and life chances. 
Transmission of wealth from older to younger generations and support in setting up family life 
during the transition to adulthood is significant in all European countries. In terms of 
intergenerational effects, families remain perhaps the most important mechanism for the 
transmission of unequal life chances.  
 
Gender and age are widely influencing the experiences and everyday life of family members in 
different life phases. Life-course perspective links individuals’ biographies with social and 
historical change. The approach used also involves a particular concern for the importance of 
gender differences. Within this general framework, some major trends can be identified: 
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 transition processes of young people have changed with the prolonged presence of young 
people in their family of origin and couple formation taking place later; 
 new representations of partnership and parenthood emerge among young people with 
transformations in gender roles and in male and female identities; 
 the family of today is a negotiation and affection based family; 
 the role of grandparents is important as providers of support to children and 
grandchildren; 
 the most marked change in the field of division of paid work is the increasing level of 
female employment; 
 the gender gap in unpaid domestic work has narrowed somewhat due to women reducing 
their number of hours instead of any significant changes in men’s behaviour; 
 both employed and non-employed mothers have increased their childcare time and 
fathers’ involvement in childrearing is slightly increasing; 
 the male breadwinner model is being increasingly replaced by alternative models with 
“dual earner-female carer” model becoming the most widespread in Europe; 
 family violence is still largely gender-based violence and there are specific groups at 
risk. 
 
The multiplicity of family models and family relations in Europe may be considered an 
expression of the cultural pluralism that characterises contemporary society, in which there 
coexist different ways both of giving meaning to the family and of understanding individual 
happiness and the life of the couple. There has also been a transformation in the modalities of 
passing through the various developmental processes. Co-longevity has increased the duration of 
family ties, which increases the importance of intergenerational relations within families.  
 
Even if new representations of partnership and parenthood emerge among young people, changes 
seem to be rather slow and gender divisions begin to become more traditional after the birth of 
the first child. Although cross-country (and within country) differences are remarkable and 
changes are constantly on their way, some basic patterns of family life remain intact in Europe. 
Most importantly, the division of paid and particularly unpaid work continues to be gendered. 
The dual carer-dual earner society remains a theoretical concept in most of the Europe. Women 
spend less time in the labour market, they are more likely to take part-time jobs and have more 
career breaks than men do. At the same time, they are still mainly responsible for housework as 
well as for child rearing. These gender gaps in unpaid work decrease in size but do not diminish 
when and where partners spend a similar amount of time in the labour market. This is important 
because the most marked change over the past decades in the area of work-division is the 
increasing level of female employment.  
 
The diversity of European welfare systems and family policies exceed existing country 
categories and welfare regime typologies. Most researchers today agree that the main differences 
in family policies and social care policies can be found between Southern and Northern parts of 
Europe. There is also significant national variation within these categories; even within the 
Nordic countries that are usually classified as a joint Nordic model. Furthermore, in these 
comparisons and classifications most recent EU member states are usually missing (mostly CEE 
countries). Still, there are some indicators that European countries’ social care systems and 
family policies are becoming more similar, and that their related problems are too. 
 
When it comes to family policies and social care policies in the European, national and local 
levels, some major trends can be identified: 
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 the field of family policies has gained increasing importance and expanded in recent 
years, and while traditionally only a handful of countries had explicit family policies and 
designated family ministries, there is now a trend of growing institutionalisation; 
 in terms of re- and defamilialisation in family and care policies across Europe, a mixture 
of re- and defamilialising measures can be identified; 
 leave policies have in many countries aimed at activating fathers and reaching a more 
equal share of employment and family responsibilities between both parents;  
 childcare services have been one of the most important family policy issues and reform 
areas and especially in this field the trend of “care going public”, defamilialisation, 
institutionalisation and professionalisation of care work and services will continue; 
 social care remains a combination of formal and informal care where the role of families 
and especially women in families is remarkable in providing care for children, old people 
and other dependent family members; 
 globalisation and internationalisation of care with its various forms and consequences 
will be one of the future trends e.g. care relations cross national boarders, global care 
chains and transnational care, increasing numbers of migrant care workers both in 
formal and informal care work, and international market of care services; 
 growing importance of local governments with more responsibilities and autonomy 
regarding many politically relevant issues for family policies and service provision; 
 increasing role of local NGOs and networks of different actors (e.g. public sector, NGOs, 
private companies and families themselves); 
 increasing intercultural dimension of the local communities facing the challenges linked 
to migration. 
 
The expansion of childcare facilities is high on the agenda in many European countries, and so is 
the expansion or reduction of child/family allowances and parental leave policies, often 
including elements of “active fathering”. Care issues seem to leave behind social benefits in 
family policy agenda even if those have crucial importance e.g. in reducing poverty and 
diminishing social inequalities. Even if the aging of population has been recognised as one of the 
biggest future challenges all over Europe, childcare will remain in the core of policy. The main 
emphasis has been on the coverage levels of childcare services, but there are some indications 
that the educational aims and contents of formal childcare services will gain more political and 
research interest in the future. This new kind of an interest in children and childhood can be seen 
a part of the “politicisation of childhood”, meaning increasing public interest and intervention 
into problems of children and parents, new social risks, early childhood education and care, child 
poverty, childcare as investment into future, and social capital perspective.  
 
All over Europe, the field of childcare can be described as “care going public”. This trend is less 
clear in social care for older people, where the trend seem to be more twofold: on the one hand 
privatisation and marketisation of formal, professional care, and on the other, (re-)familialisation 
of care either with or without financial compensation. These changes represent a tendency where 
the user of care services is given considerably more say on the way her/his needs are being met. 
Social care, both childcare and care for older people and other adults, remains a combination of 
formal and informal care where the role of families and especially women in families is still 
remarkable. This raises an increasing political and academic interest in different combinations of 
formal and informal care including intergenerational care relations. Several researchers have 
been interested in whether formal care replaces (crowd-out) informal care or whether those 
rather complement (crowd-in) each other. There seem to be no strong evidence for the crowding-
out hypothesis. 
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What comes to substantial gaps in existing research, the general notion is that existing research 
is rather nuclear family oriented largely ignoring the increasing diversity in family forms and 
family relations, except when studying statistically changes in family structures, and even then, 
data and research on more recent and rare family types are missing. It has concentrated on 
families with young children widely ignoring other stages of family life and the life course 
approach, which is highly important in family research. Existing research is also adult centred 
and children’s perspective into their family life, policies and services are largely missing, which 
is certainly one of the major challenges for future research. Overall, experiences of families and 
individual family members within families and as policy “targets” and service users are largely 
ignored in existing research. What is also emphasised in many of the Existential Field Reports is 
the need for more research on the changing role of men in families. Furthermore, several 
research gaps in each of the four specific research themes are identified in this report. 
 
Within the field of cross-national, comparative research, there are different methodological 
orientations. The main division goes between macro-level multi-national comparisons using 
quantitative data and micro-level, small-scale studies using qualitative or mixed methods. Most 
of the large multi-national projects have used either national statistical information, statistics 
provided by Eurostat, and/or large multinational surveys and databases. Even if the situation has 
improved in last decade, the need for comparative, harmonised, and often longitudinal data has 
been identified, as well as the need for more in-depth qualitative research that would allow 
providing more inside view of the family life, its changes, and decision-making processes. 
Small-scale qualitative comparisons can also advance theory building while large-scale 
comparisons mainly test existing theories. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
This State of the Art of Research on Families and Family Policies in Europe is the concluding 
report of the first Work package of the FAMILYPLATFORM project funded by the European 
Commission 7th Framework Programme. The work of the FAMILYPLATFORM encompasses 
four key stages, from which the first one is to chart and review the major trends of comparative 
family research within the EU.  
 
The research review provides an overview of studies on changing family structures, 
developmental processes, current social and economic conditions of European families, gender 
and generational relations within families, and on family policies in the EU member states from 
a comparative perspective. Regarding the living conditions for families there are still significant 
cross-national differences between European societies. Legal systems, welfare structures, 
education systems, health and social care service systems and economic systems and conditions 
vary from country to country. Consequently, European family structures and family forms, as 
well as respective trends and developments are quite diverse. Thus, it is crucial to generate a 
comprehensive overview of various fields of family life and family policies in order to derive 
conclusions for political practice and further research. In the end, the aim of this Social platform 
is to generate key policy questions and define fundamental research issues, both substantial and 
methodological. 
 
The main aim of this Work package (WP1) is to concentrate on reviewing the current scientific 
knowledge on family issues. It is important to reveal the major and the most common trends, 
cultural differences, specific developments of member states, and research gaps that exist in the 
field of family research with respect to the needs of families and family policies from the 
perspective of the research community, which will be then critically reviewed by the stakeholder 
representatives and other experts. Primarily, the aim of WP1 is to offer research based 
knowledge for the processes of forming functional European family policies that aim at the 
wellbeing of family. 
 
The state of our knowledge about families, on the one hand, and public policies and 
nongovernmental initiatives, on the other hand, are linked very sparsely. European policies and 
research are currently confronted with a situation, in which some aspects of family life are 
investigated rather thoroughly, while other aspects, for example more recently recognised and 
rare family types, are still largely unexplored in scientific terms – with great differences between 
European countries and regions. Thus, the first major objective of the FAMILYPLATFORM has 
to be the establishment of an empirical foundation for further work. This means working out the 
current state of family research and bringing together recent findings. It furthermore includes 
getting an overview of policies and social systems, which make up the contextual framework for 
all aspects of family life. 
 
At the final stage of the project, the FAMILYPLATFORM consortium and the stakeholder 
representatives will formulate a research agenda, which will develop the possible base for the 
European Commission Social Science and Humanities Research Agenda 2012-13. Hence, this 
report not only refers to substantial topics and regional aspects of future research, but also to 
aspects of the research design itself, as well as to methodological issues. 
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The Family Research Centre and the Unit of Social Work at the University of Jyväskylä, 
Finland, has had the coordinating overall responsibility for this first stage of the 
FAMILYPLATFORM. This concluding report has been edited by Marjo Kuronen with 
contributions from Kimmo Jokinen and Teppo Kröger. Johanna Hyväluoma has assisted in 
technical editing and proofreading. Still, it has been a joint effort of the whole Consortium. It has 
been accomplished jointly by nine partners, and summarises results of eight Existential Field 
Reports (EFs, one of them consisting on two parts) and two additional Expert Reports all listed 
in Preface. The partners involved have done extensive systematic literature reviews on European 
comparative research published since the mid-1990s in their specific field of expertise using 
existing scientific and statistical databases (e.g. Eurostat and OECD statistics), reports from 
previous and ongoing EC funded research projects, and other relevant publications, which are 
occasionally supplemented with own analyses of data available. Single-country studies have 
been excluded except in some areas where there are no cross-national studies available. This 
concluding report draws together the main results, conclusions and major trends identified in 
these more extensive reports, which are all available at the FAMILYPLATFORM website. 
 
This report is substantially divided and organised into four main chapters and research fields:  
 
1)  family structures, forms and demographic processes;  
2)  current conditions of European families;  
3)  genders and generations in families; 
4)  family policies and social care policies in Europe. 
 
Thus, it does not strictly follow the previously defined existential fields but combine and collect 
them under wider themes as many of them contribute to each other. 
 
Chapter 2 Family structures, forms and demographic processes mainly consists of EF1 Family 
Structures and Family Forms in the European Union written by Loreen Beier, Dirk Hofäcker, 
Elisa Marchese, and Marina Rupp from the State Institute for Family Research, University of 
Bamberg. Concerning conjugal instability and divorce, it has been complemented with EF2 
Developmental Familial Processes written by Carmen Leccardi and Miriam Perego from the 
Department of Sociology and Social Research, University of Milan-Bicocca. Chapter 2.2 on 
demographic impact of migration is based on a part of the EF7 titled Social Inequality and 
Diversity of Families written by Karin Wall, Mafalda Leitão and Vasco Ramos with 
contributions from João Peixoto, Heloísa Perista, Isabel Dias, Susana Atalaia, Diogo Costa and 
Alexandra Silva from the Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon. 
 
Chapter 3 Current conditions of European families covers a wide range of themes from housing 
and physical living environment into migration, from poverty into influence of media and 
technology in family life. What connects these themes is the question of social inequality, which 
is related to all of them. From EF7 Social Inequality and Diversity of Families the chapter 
includes research reviews on social inequality and poverty in families, and the situation of 
migrant families. Review on economic situation, employment, physical living environment, and 
housing is based on EF4A: Economic Situation, Education levels, Employment and Physical 
living environment written by Epp Reiska, Ellu Saar and Karl Viilmann from the Institute of 
International and Social Studies, Tallinn University. Chapter on media, communication, and 
information technologies comes from EF8 Media, communication and information technologies 
in the European family authored by Sonia Livingstone and Ranjana Das with contributions from 
Myria Georgiou, Leslie Haddon, Ellen Helsper and Yinhan Wang from the London School of 
Economics. 
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Chapter 4 Genders and generations in families is also a combination of several Existential Field 
Reports introducing the life course, generational, and gender approaches into family life. 
Discussion on transitions into adulthood is based on EF2 by Carmen Leccardi and Miriam 
Perego and the Expert report by Barbara Stauber on transitions into parenthood. Chapter on 
grandparenthood also mainly comes from EF2. Review on gender division in paid and unpaid 
work is based on EF5 Patterns and trends of Family Management in the European Union by 
Zsuzsa Blaskó and Veronika Herche from the Demographic Research Institute, Budapest. In 
addition, chapter on intergenerational relations includes some parts from EF6 Social Care and 
Social Services written by Marjo Kuronen, together with Kimmo Jokinen and Teppo Kröger 
from the Family Research Centre and the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy/Social 
Work, University of Jyväskylä. 
 
Family policies, and more recently care policies, have been studied more often in a comparative 
context than other issues related to families and family wellbeing. This is probably because of 
their increasing political and economic importance. Chapter 5 Family policies and social care 
policies in Europe is reviewing this research field. It consists of EF3 Major Trends of State 
Family Policies in Europe by Sonja Blum and Christiane Rille-Pfeiffer from the Austrian 
Institute for Family Studies, University of Vienna, and previously mentioned EF6 on Social Care 
and Social Services. In addition, the chapter on local family politics comes from EF4B Local 
politics: Programs and best practice model by Francesco Belletti and Lorenza Rebuzzini from 
the Forum delle Associazioni Familiari. 
 
At the conclusions of each main chapter, some major trends based on these extensive research 
reviews will be presented. Chapter 6 collects together major research gaps from all these fields, 
both substantial and methodological, identified in the Existential Field Reports. Concluding 
chapter (Chapter 7) is based mostly on a presentation given by Kimmo Jokinen from the Family 
Research Centre of the University of Jyväskylä, in the FAMILYPLATFORM Critical Review 
Conference at the University of Lisbon in May 2010, where he drew together some main results 
and trends based on the Existential Field Reports. 
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2. Family structures, forms, and demographic processes 
 
 
It is a well-known and documented fact that family structures and family forms have changed 
considerably throughout Europe since the 1960s and 1970s. Recent studies point out the fact that 
the idea of a standard “nuclear family model” is increasingly becoming replaced by a variety of 
different alternative family forms and lifestyles (Kapella et al., 2009).  
 
It is oversimplifying to speak about “the European family”. Instead, existing research indicates 
that there is still a large variety of different, nationally or regionally specific patterns, often 
strongly connected to different cultural backgrounds or family policy models. This chapter 
reviews these changes based on recent research and statistical information. It starts by reviewing 
the development in fertility and related demographic processes, including migration. Secondly, 
it will give an overview of the major changes in family forms with special attention to conjugal 
instability and divorce and their consequences. Thirdly, newly emerged or rarer family forms 
will be discussed, including living-apart-together family arrangements and gay and lesbian 
families. 
 
2.1. Fertility and demographic development 
Knowledge on fertility and its demographic framework conditions has been most extensive in 
terms of the availability of indicators as well as the countries and time span covered. Available 
data points to considerable shifts in demographic behaviour throughout recent decades. The 
decision to marry and form a family has shifted to later ages in virtually every European country.  
 
The medium age of women giving their first birth is lowest in Eastern Europe with average ages 
ranging between 24.9 (Bulgaria, 2006) and 26.9 years (Hungary, 2006). In contrast, highest 
average ages are observed in the UK and Switzerland where the average age of women at first 
childbirth is 29.8 (UK, 2005) and 29.5 (Switzerland, 2006) respectively. Southern European and 
German-speaking countries show similarly high ages, while only Portugal with a comparatively 
early age of 27.4 years appears to deviate from the Southern European pattern. Increases over 
time appear to have been most pronounced in Central European and Nordic countries (except 
Sweden).  
 
The medium age of first marriage of women in Europe shows a very distinct country-specific 
pattern, with women in the Nordic countries displaying the highest average age, followed by the 
central European countries, Southern European and liberal countries. Women in Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries display the comparatively lowest average ages at marriage, 
except Slovenia. The pattern in the postponement of first marriages of men is not as clear: 
whereas men in Eastern European countries again are the youngest and Sweden and Denmark 
are the oldest to marry, the pattern in the centre of Europe appears to be more mixed (OECD, 
2009a). 
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Figure 1: Average age of women at first childbirth, 1970-2005, by country 
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Figure 2: Average age of women at first marriage, 1970-2004, by country 
 
Source: OECD, 2009a 
 
Looking at both marriage and family formation trends simultaneously, data appear to indicate 
that especially in Northern Europe, marriage and family formation have increasingly decoupled, 
as a considerable share of children is born out-of-wedlock. Since the 1970s, their share first 
started to rise in France and in the Scandinavian countries, with Denmark and Sweden showing 
most pronounced increases. Since then, the trend has largely flattened out and remained at a 
largely stable level until 2006. The share of out-of-wedlock births started to increase in the 
Eastern European countries only after the 1990s. The Central and Southern European countries 
followed a development somewhat in between. Notably, the countries with a high incidence of 
out-of-wedlock births are also those with the highest fertility levels. The postponement (or even 
denial) of marriage thus cannot be seen as a major driver of declining fertility in modern 
European societies.  
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Figure 3: Share of out-of-wedlock births and total fertility rates (2005) 
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What emerges today is a change in the very concept of marriage. Marriage has increasingly 
become to be conceived as a subjective experience: choosing to marry or not to marry has 
become a fundamentally individual decision. The French sociologist Théry (1993) has called this 
phenomenon “démariage”. The traits of instability and uncertainty, which distinguish the 
transformations in the contemporary family are in line with the atmosphere that characterises 
society at large, marked by a climate of uncertainty so far as work and social stability is 
concerned, aggravated by a high level of economic instability. In this context, there is a 
perception that even creating a family becomes a “risk-bearing enterprise” (Beck & Beck-
Gernsheim, 1994: 29) in reference to the consequences of the process of individualisation. 
 
Due to the increasing postponement of family formation decisions, period-specific fertility rates3 
in all European countries have declined throughout the last decades, in some countries even at a 
rather dramatic pace. These developments have been most pronounced in the Northern and 
Central Europe where fertility fell from around three children per woman in 1965 to less than 1.8 
in the mid-1990s. Southern European countries appeared to follow this general trend with a ten-
year time lag and most pronounced falls of fertility levels in the 1980s and 1990s. In Eastern 
Europe, fertility levels started to decline after the transition from state socialism to market 
economies in the early- resp. mid-1990s. In Southern and Eastern European countries recent 
declines have resulted in very low fertility levels of less than 1.2 children per woman, that have 
made demographers describe these countries as displaying “lowest-low fertility” (Kohler, Billari 
& Ortega, 2006). In recent years, the lowering trend in fertility levels has “flattened” with only 
marginal changes since the 1990s. Some researchers even point to partial recovery in period-
specific fertility levels since the turn of the century, especially in Northern and Western Europe 
(especially France and the Netherlands). 
 
However, regarding long-term fertility developments, the period-specific fertility rates may be 
partially misleading. While women indeed are increasingly postponing family formation and the  
birth of their first child to ever later ages, it could, in principle, be assumed that women 
nonetheless are not generally reducing their overall lifetime fertility, but simply shifting their 
                                                 
3 Defined as the average number of children that would be born per woman, if all women lived to the end of their 
childbearing years and bore children according to a given fertility rate at each age (CIA World Factbook, 2010). 
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“family phase” to later stages in their life course. Cohort-specific fertility rates appear to indicate 
that the postponement of having children at younger age could be partially compensated by 
“recuperation” behaviour later (Frejka et al., 2008: 6). Given the fact, that reliable data on 
cohort-specific fertility are available only up to the birth cohort 1965, it is too early to judge 
whether this recuperation-effect will “balance out” fertility rates in the long run.  
 
A possible indicator of future fertility trends are childbearing preferences, as reflected in the 
perceived ideal number of children in a family, and the individual intention to have (further) 
children in the future. In recent years, various Europe-wide social surveys (the European Value 
Study (EVS), the European Social Survey (ESS), and the Eurobarometer) have used questions to 
reconstruct these individual preferences. The figure below, based on a Eurobarometer survey in 
2006, gives an exemplary overview of childbearing preferences by representing the average 
number of children that women generally perceive as an ideal and those that they individually 
would favour.  
 
Almost in all the European countries, both the general ideal and the personally favoured number 
of children outnumber actually realised fertility figure; a finding that recent sociological research 
(e.g. Blossfeld et al., 2005) oftentimes has interpreted to reflect personally perceived inability to 
start a family, e.g. due to rising individual uncertainties. Alternative explanations have stressed 
the role of a general value change towards more “post-material values” such as self-fulfilment, 
which have contributed to a decline in the importance of more “collectivist” family values 
(Inglehart, 1990; Lesthaeghe & van de Kaa, 1986).  
 
Figure 4: Individual estimates of the ideal number of children in general (“ideal”) and for the respondent 
(“personal”) (2006) 
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Source: Eurobarometer, 2006, own calculations 
 
Instead, the traditional view that low fertility trends are an outcome of increased female labour 
force participation can be dismissed even if this relationship is rather complex. Today, countries 
with a high share of employed women simultaneously display highest fertility rates. It is not 
employment as such but the way in which the reconciliation between work and family is 
facilitated that drive women’s childbearing considerations (D’addio & D’Ercole, 2005; also Ahn 
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& Mira, 2002: 669-670; Rindfuss et al., 2003: 411; Philipov et al., 2009: 26). Family and gender 
policies, as well as work-related institutions may contribute to explaining the extent of these 
differences (Engelhardt & Prskawetz, 2004: 55-56). A macro-level comparison shows that both 
higher fertility and female employment rates are simultaneously found in countries where 
institutional support of working parents is fairly comprehensive (Philipov et al., 2009: 27-28).  
 
Attitudinal data suggests that the future challenge will be to enable parents to fulfil their fertility 
aspirations, e.g. through well-designed family policy packages. Also an average higher fertility 
rates in the Nordic countries emphasise the role of family and gender equality policies in 
women’s/couples’ decision-making. However, data from some individual countries (Austria and 
Germany) suggest that lower fertility aspirations are increasingly diffusing within society. This 
may signal that there will only remain limited time for such measures. 
 
2.2 Demographic impact of migration  
Migration is currently an area of vast scientific research, public debate, and policy intervention 
in Europe. The reasons for the centrality of this theme are numerous. On the one hand, migratory 
movements, which were always part of European history, have become increasingly visible in all 
European countries. On the other hand, they defy some of the entrenched principles in which 
cultures and identity lie. The settlement of populations with different national backgrounds, 
cultures, religions, and values goes against the notion of ethnic homogeneity on which European 
identities have largely been (mistakenly) based. It may be argued that international flows are 
nowadays one of the biggest sources of social change in Europe. In this chapter, migration is 
discussed as a demographic issue, and later on in this report (Chapter 3.3) the social situation of 
migrant families will be studied more closely. 
 
In countries such as France, considerable inflows existed already in the first half of the 
twentieth-century. However, all developed Western countries experienced large inflows (mainly) 
after the Second World War in the framework of a solid economic expansion that lasted for 
about 30 years. Most of the immigrants were then supposed to be temporary guests, but many 
remained. From the 1970s onwards several changes occurred, including the enactment of 
restrictive policies, the changing geography of flows and new migration patterns. From the 
1980s, Southern Europe and Ireland gradually became important targets of immigration, together 
with some Scandinavian countries. More recently, after the end of the Cold War, Central and 
Eastern European countries also became objects of concern, given the importance of transit and, 
later, durable forms of immigration (Bonifazi et al., 2008; Okolski, forthcoming). During these 
decades, outflows also took place from most European countries – although always less 
researched. Many of these were intra-EU flows. At the same time, a clear policy-driven 
difference started to emerge between intra-EU flows and others involving third countries. The 
contradiction between (quasi) free circulation - successively updated with the new EU 
enlargements - and restrictions towards third-country nationals became increasingly evident. 
 
The measure of international migration is complex. As described by several sources including, 
for example, an extensive work carried out by Poulain and others (2006), the methodology and 
concepts used in this field largely differ among European countries. Recently, the EC has 
launched an initiative to carry out a harmonisation of migration statistics in the EU. Despite the 
efforts of institutions such as the OECD, in the framework of its annual International Migration 
Outlook, comparative exercises are always weak.  
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Despite the methodological problems, recent statistical data confirm the importance and wide-
spread character of immigration in Europe. The observation of net migration growth in Europe 
since the 1950s confirms several facts: the durability of inflows to the North-western countries to 
the present day; the turnaround from emigration to immigration in several countries, such as in 
Southern Europe; and the gradual advent of new immigration destinations. Furthermore, 
comparison between net migration and natural increase is a revealing indicator of how 
immigration is driving demographic growth: it is mainly migration that enables growth, and 
migration is therefore helping to ‘smooth out’ of the structural impacts of ageing. 
 
Figure 5: Contribution of net migration and natural increase to population growth (2006) 
 
 
Source: OECD Factbook, 2009 
 
Some European countries, such as Luxembourg, Switzerland, Ireland, and Austria had in 2006 a 
larger share of foreign-born population than the United States, a country in which immigration is 
‘part and parcel’ of national identity. Taking the criteria of foreign population, the same 
European countries are joined by Spain, Belgium, and Germany. When observing the rate of 
growth during recent years (1995 to 2006), both the share of foreign-born population and 
foreigners are on the rise in most European countries. The speed of growth has been higher in 
some of the recent European hosts, such as the countries of Southern Europe and Ireland, where 
the number of immigrants (or foreigners) sometimes doubled or tripled in just ten years. Spain is 
the most impressive example, having passed from a proportion of 1.6% of foreigners in the 
whole population, in 1997, to a huge 10.3%, in 2006. 
 
The legal channels, which prospective immigrants use, are diverse. In 2006, family-related 
migration, including family reunification and marriage migration (entries of fiancés or recently 
married spouses of citizens or legal foreign residents) accounted for the majority of inflows, 
approaching 44% of the total. This was followed by individuals entering in the framework of 
free movement provisions, particularly in the case of the EU, labour migration, and humanitarian 
grounds (including refugees).  
 
Demographic impact of immigration in Europe has been the object of an increasing amount of 
research. The reason for this is plain: in the face of the potential decline and structural ageing of 
the European population, the direct and indirect impact of immigration has generally been well 
received. The inputs resulting from (usually) young adult immigrants and their offspring have 
enabled increases in total population, slowed down the pace of ageing and smoothed some of its 
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consequences. On the other hand, the impossibility of replacement migration, in the sense of 
offsetting the consequences of European low fertility, has been repeatedly stated.  
 
Studies such as that by Haug et al. (2002), carried out in the framework of the Council of 
Europe, have been among the first ones to study these issues on a comparative basis. Its 
conclusions pointed to the fact that immigration has contributed significantly to the positive 
demographic growth and the slower pace of ageing in a number of European countries, mainly 
since the 1960s. This has to do with both its sheer numbers (direct impact) and its delayed 
demographic effect, given the volume of immigrants’ offspring (indirect impact). Fertility rates 
among immigrants, although varied, tended frequently to come down to host country levels. 
However, their concentration on adult fertile ages led in every case to a high proportion of births 
issuing from immigration – the actual basis of the second generation. Alternatively, their 
mortality rates were low, again a consequence of the young age structure.  
 
However, several studies, such as Lutz and Scherbov (2006) and Bijak et al. (2007) confirm that 
immigration may be, at the most, a small part of the solution to an unavoidable problem, i.e., low 
demographic growth and ageing. However, simulations of net migration rates over the next 
decades suggest that significant immigration would be beneficial in sustaining the current 
quantitative level of the workforce and the current potential support ratios in most EU countries. 
 
Further research has been conducted into the impact of immigration on fertility, family patterns, 
morbidity, and mortality. With regard to fertility, some recent studies suggest that immigrants’ 
fertility, although varied and even when declining towards host country levels, have added 
significantly to national demographic patterns. On the one hand, immigrant children account for 
a growing share of total live births in many EU countries. On the other hand, they have had an 
impact on the stabilisation or even an increase in fertility in some countries, as in some lowest-
low fertility countries, such as Spain and Italy (Billari, 2008).  
 
The importance of immigration - including national, intra-EU and third-country national 
immigrants - for the present and future of European populations is universally accepted. Indeed, 
we should recall that inflows and outflows are part of demography, at the same way as births and 
deaths. It is only the political and cultural challenges associated with foreign inflows that have 
given so much visibility to this issue, particularly where non-EU citizens are concerned. The 
extreme evaluation of immigration’s impacts is that of a British demographer Coleman (2006), 
who is known for his critical stance on inflows: although his proposal for a “third demographic 
transition” seems exaggerated, it is useful as a signal of its current significance.  
 
2.3 Development and change of family forms 
In nearly all European countries in recent decades, family forms have become more diverse, and 
the incidence of the so called “middle-class nuclear family” (i.e. a household with married 
heterosexual couple and their biological children) has been decreasing. Especially in Northern 
and Western European countries, the recent decline of the “golden age of marriage” with high 
fertility and marriage rates, low divorce rates and an early start of family formation (Peuckert, 
2008: 341), has been accompanied by an increase in less institutionalised relationships. This 
trend was largely driven by an overall decrease and/or postponement of marriage, an increasing 
number of divorces, declining fertility and the postponement of family formation, as well as a 
rising number of children born outside marriage. 
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Scholars have identified many different factors that have contributed to the crisis of matrimony 
in contemporary Europe. On the socio-economic level, the transformation of the labour market, 
with increasing labour force participation of women, have rendered the establishment of a 
marriage tie as a choice opposed to a “destiny”, a rite of passage into adulthood. On the cultural 
level, the process of secularisation (Norris & Inglehart, 2004) has contributed to the gradual 
spread and affirmation of cohabitation. Universal education and the emergence of collective 
movements such as feminism have partly played a key role in undermining the model of the 
traditional, patriarchal family. The marital tie in itself is no longer crucial but rather the 
individual sentiments that induce each of the partners autonomously seek a union (e.g. Weigel, 
2008). Paradoxically, the tendency to place love at the basis of contemporary marriage 
constitutes one of the elements of its fragility and instability. 
 
2.3.1. Decreasing marriage rates and increasing divorce rates 
 
Since the mid-1960s, marriage rates in Europe have been declining and only recently have 
stabilised. While the marriage rate was at 7.64 marriages per 1,000 persons in 1965, it has fallen 
to as low as 4.874 in 2007 (Eurostat, 2010a).  
 
When comparing European nations, some Northern European countries display high marriage 
rates (e.g. Denmark with 6.81 in 2008), following modest increases since 2003. Although 
Eastern European countries often share a similar background regarding their past political 
development, they are rather heterogeneous concerning marriage patterns (Eurostat, 2010a). A 
major reason might be that in some Eastern European countries the influence of the Catholic and 
Orthodox Church is still significant, e.g. in Poland or Romania. Since these religions advocate a 
more traditional family model, it is not surprising that their citizens show the highest marriage 
rates within Eastern Europe. Despite this, marriage rates have declined strongly between 1990 
and 1992 in all Eastern European countries (as well as in the Eastern part of Germany; see 
Eurostat, 2010a), most likely a repercussion of both rising insecurities following the break-down 
of the socialist regime, but also the discontinuation of political support for the “nuclear family” 
model (see Peuckert, 2008: 358). In most Central European countries marriage rates have been 
falling already since the early-1960s and are now slightly below the European average (ibid.). In 
most Southern European countries marriage rates also have fallen continuously and are either 
well below the European mean (e.g. Italy, Spain or Portugal), or somewhat higher. 
                                                 
4 Estimated figure. 
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Figure 6: Marriages per 1,000 persons in the EU27 countries (2008) 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010 
 
At the same time, the percentage of cohabitation families has risen over the time. Generally, 
cohabiting couples with children are most common in Northern Europe and in France, while they 
are again very rare in Southern Europe (see Kiernan, 2004). Still, cohabitation often makes up a 
“preliminary” form of partnership before getting married. This indicates that overall, getting or 
being married is still very important for most Europeans (see Kiernan, 2003; Spéder, 2005). 
Thus, the number of (long-term) cohabiting couples with children is still low, but recently has 
been increasing. In most Northern and Western European countries, except Western Germany 
and the Benelux countries, more than 40% of cohabiting couples already have children. Still, the 
percentage of first-born children of cohabiting parents is much higher than for second- or later-
born children.  
 
While marriage rates have decreased in Europe, divorce rates have been constantly on the rise, 
while they more than doubled from 0.8 (divorces per 1,000 persons) in 1965 to 2.0 in 20055. The 
highest rates are found in Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Belgium, Denmark, and Latvia. In 
Germany, Sweden and Slovakia, rates are rather moderate, whereas in Greece, Italy and Ireland, 
divorce rates are very low (Eurostat, 2010a). Taken together, there appear to be only little 
regional differences. The most obvious pattern is that the lowest rates are observed in countries 
with large catholic denominations. 
 
Divorce is more and more frequently an initiative taken by women and is often explained with 
women’s increased economic independence. However, recent research shows that the 
relationship between women’s employment and the increase in the divorce rate varies according 
to socio-cultural context. In countries with greater gender equality e.g. the Netherlands and the 
UK, the economic independence of women has a positive effect on marital stability, while in 
countries in which equality is still far from being achieved, like Italy, the increase in the presence 
of women in the workforce is accompanied with increased instability. Furthermore, it is not so 
much women’s employment as the nature of the relationship itself that generates instability in a 
marriage (Saraceno & Naldini, 2007; MacRae, 2003a). 
 
                                                 
5 No actual data available. 
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Figure 7: Divorce-rate in the EU27 countries (2008) 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010 
 
A large number of studies, both economic and social, have examined the consequences of 
divorce on men and women. Several decades ago, some sociologists argued that a marriage is 
composed of two different marriages, “his” and “her” (Bernard, 1972). Men and women not only 
had different perceptions of the way their marriage was organised, but that they would also gain 
different benefits from it. More recently, some scholars have proposed that there is also “his” and 
“her” divorce (Kalmijin & Rigt-Poortman, 2006).  
 
As far as the economic consequences of divorce are concerned, those mainly fall upon women 
(Mckeever & Wolfinger, 2001; Aassve et al., 2006). Separation and divorce also influence on 
men who, while suffering less economically, seem to suffer other negative effects, such as 
deterioration in the quality of their life style, housing and general consumption as well as 
deterioration in the quality of their relationships with family and friends. Obviously, a crucial 
role in regard to the economic and social consequences of divorce is played by the social welfare 
system and the services it offers, which differ from one European country to another (Kalmijn & 
Rigt-Poortman, 2006; Uunk, 2004). 
 
2.3.2. Re-marriage 
 
As divorce rates have risen, the relative incidence of re-marriages has also been on the rise. 
According to Kiernan (2003) “men are (…) more likely than women to remarry and are also 
more likely to remarry more quickly after a divorce”. In nearly all European countries, the 
percentage of first-matrimonies as a share of marriages in total decreased through 1960 and 
20066. Cross-national comparisons show, that the Eastern European countries had the lowest 
increase in re-marriages. In contrast, the Northern European states show increases of about 10% 
points. Central European countries are more heterogeneous: Whereas Belgium, the UK and 
Luxembourg display a high increase of re-marriages, Germany and France show very little 
differences over time. Southern countries (except Portugal with a moderate increase) as well as 
Ireland show very low respectively no differences (Eurostat, 2010a; own calculation). 
 
                                                 
6 No overall availability of data for these two points of time; most post-socialistic countries only offer data since 
1995 or later.  
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Figure 8: Share of re-marriages of divorcés as the percentage of all marriages in European countries (1960 & 
2006) 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010a, own calculations 
 
Despite the developments outlined above, the “nuclear family model” with married parents is 
still clearly dominant in all European regions. In this context, Peuckert (2008) differentiates three 
regional types with relative homogenous characteristics: the Northern European countries, where 
non-traditional styles of living are more wide-spread; the Western European states with a 
dominance of the “modern nuclear-family-model” (even though it is decreasing); and the 
Southern states including Ireland, which are still mostly traditionally oriented (ibid.: 368). As 
mentioned above, the Eastern European countries are more heterogeneous regarding the 
dominance of a specific family type, but in general seem to loose their inclination towards the 
traditional model. 
 
Figure 9: Share of family-types in the EU27 countries (2007) 
 
Source: Labor Force Survey microdata, 2007, ifb-calculations (unweighted data) 
 
The described decline in institutionalised relationships goes along with an increase in other; 
previously less wide-spread forms of family life, such as lone-parenthood, reconstituted and 
cohabiting families. 
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2.3.3. Lone-parent families 
 
During the dominance of the “nuclear family model”, lone-parenthood often resulted from the 
death of one partner, most often the husband. Today there are comparatively high percentage of 
unmarried as well as divorced (or separated) single parents (mainly mothers) who live alone with 
their children (European Commission, 2007a: 13). Since the 1980s, the share of lone-parent 
families rose from 10% to 27% in 1999 in the EU15 and was at about 21% in 2008 in the EU277. 
 
As shown in the figure 10, high shares of lone-parents actually are found a in the UK, the Central 
European countries or in Eastern European countries like Estonia, Lithuania or Latvia. Again, 
very low rates can be observed in Southern-Europe (e.g. in Cyprus or Greece), but also in 
Luxembourg (Rost, 2009: 13).  
 
Considering the composition of lone-parent families, especially Southern European countries 
show a very high share of divorced and widowed mothers. In contrast, there are only few unwed 
lone-parents. In the Central or Western European countries, e.g. France, Germany or the 
Netherlands there is a dominance of divorced lone mothers and a moderate share of single 
unmarried ones. The highest proportion of this group is observed in Denmark, the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, and in Eastern part of Germany (European Commission, 2007a: 18f.) 
 
Figure 10: Share of lone-parents on all family-households in the EU27 countries8 (2007) 
 
Source: Labor Force Survey microdata, 2007, ifb-calculations (unweighted data) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The above time series, however, need to be treated with care as data because available data is scarce. Furthermore, 
occasional evidence points to substantial variations in data on lone parenthood between different data sources. 
8 For Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Malta and Sweden there was no data available; the figures for the  
EU27 depends on the other available countries.  
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2.3.4. Reconstituted families 
 
Another important issue with regard to the rising diversity of family forms is the increase in 
reconstituted families (stepfamilies). Most recent literature distinguishes different types of them 
(see Peuckert, 2008; Steinbach, 2008): simple step-families with children from just one side 
(most common is the “stepfather family”), complex step-families with children from both sides 
or even with shared children, and multi-fragmented families with more diffuse family formations 
by multiple divorces and/or deaths of one parent. Complex stepfamilies as well as multi-
fragmented families are also called “patchwork families” (Nave-Herz, 2004: 33). Research on 
patchwork families in Europe is very rare, especially from the cross-national perspective. Most 
of the studies focus on the risk of separation and their probability for having (another) child 
together depending on whether one or both partners brought children from previous relationships 
into a new partnership or not.  
 
As comparative data show, it is not so much the sheer occurrence of reconstituted families and 
lone-parent families that is new, but rather the substantial increase of their proportion over time. 
Comparing the different countries from where data are available in the Generation and Gender 
Survey (GGS) 2005, Germany nowadays displays the comparatively highest percentage of 
reconstituted families with about 14%. On the other end, Bulgaria and the Netherlands have the 
lowest rates with about 4%. France takes an intermediate position with 8% (own calculations). 
 
Notably, reconstituted families play an important role in the context of fertility. Oftentimes, they 
are more likely to have additional children, because, on the one hand, they mostly have the 
intention of building up an own family identity (“union commitment effect”) and, on the other, 
the motivation of the childless partner to fulfil (mostly) his or her child-wish is rather high. This 
so-called “parenthood effect” positively affects the probability of having shared children 
(Prskawetz et al., 2003: 108). The magnitude of the effect varies depending on the number of 
children both spouses previously have had: in particular, the number of children who are brought 
into the relationship is crucial, with the effect of stepchildren negatively affecting the likelihood 
of further shared children by itself (see Thomson, 2004). Furthermore, women who bring their 
own biological children into the new relationship generally are more willing to have another 
shared child as compared to men. 
 
Although institutionalised relationships still make up the dominant style of living among 
households with children in Europe, it can be demonstrated that representations of the term 
“family” are getting more multi-faceted. For future research, it thus will be important to observe 
continuously the development of afore mentioned family forms, which are becoming more and 
more common. 
 
2.4 New and rare family forms 
This chapter focuses on new and rare family forms; the data available on these family forms is 
rather fragmentary. Especially cross-national comparative data for all EU-member states is very 
incomplete. What comes to more recent (or recently recognised) family forms it is important to 
consider gay and lesbian families (rainbow families) and families without common households 
as still small but increasing family forms or arrangements.  
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2.4.1. Gay and lesbian families (Rainbow families) 
 
Rainbow families are defined “by the presence of two or more people who share a same-sex 
orientation (e.g. a couple) or by the presence of at least one lesbian or gay adult rearing a child” 
(Allen & Demo, 1995: 113). There are two main types of rainbow families: those where the 
child(ren) stem(s) from previous heterosexual relationships and those where the same-sex 
couples realise the desire for a child via reproductive medicine, adoption or fostering (Wegener, 
2005: 53ff.). Exemplary data for Germany indicates that the first type is most wide-spread, but in 
recent years, also the second type to parenthood has become more and more frequent 
(Dürnberger et al., 2009: 15; Jansen, 2010). 
 
The legal recognition of same-sex couples shows a high variation between European countries. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Nordic countries were forerunners to give same-sex couples the 
opportunity to legalise their unions. A new legal term, the registered partnership, was introduced 
and first passed in Denmark in 1989. Other Nordic countries introduced this new civil status in 
the subsequent years (Norway in 1993, Sweden in 1995, Iceland in 1996), followed by a number 
of other European countries in later years9. Registered partnership does not assign all the same 
legal rights to same-sex couples as marriage provides for heterosexual partners. Depending on 
the country, the rights of same-sex registered partners do not include the opportunity to adopt a 
child, to have medically assisted insemination, defined forms of how to formalise the 
partnerships, and requirements of legal residency in the country before entering partnership. 
Other countries, such as Belgium (2000), Slovenia, the Czech Republic (2006) and Hungary 
(2009) chose a more property and inheritance orientated construction to recognise same-sex 
couples (Verschraegen, 2009: 434). In 1999, the French government chose a unique way and 
installed PACS (“Pacte civil de solidarité”) as a new social status and possibility for heterosexual 
as well homosexual cohabitees10.  
 
In 2009, Norway and Sweden completed their process of granting same-sex couples the same 
rights to marriage as to heterosexual couples. Norway and Sweden are the only states in Europe 
where fully gender-neutral marriage legislation is implemented, while other European countries 
as Italy, Ireland, and Poland still have no institution at all to legally recognise same-sex couples 
(ILGA, 2010). In twelve European countries, national statistics offices show a high variety 
concerning data collection and publication on registered partnerships and same-sex couples 
(Banens, 2010: 11), which makes cross-country comparisons very difficult.  
 
In Scandinavia, an increasing feminisation of the dynamics of same-sex marriages can be 
observed. In 2009, Sweden decided to open up marriage as a legal institution also for same-sex 
couples. There is also an increasing prevalence of childbearing and parenthood in Scandinavia 
among same-sex couples. The means by which same-sex couples realise their childbearing 
aspirations, such as adoption and the access to reproductive medicine, display a huge variation 
between countries (Verschraegen, 2009: 434). In Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, England 
and Wales, Scotland, Belgium, Iceland and Finland, same-sex couples have the right to adopt an 
unknown child, while in other countries as Germany this is not permitted. Additionally in 
Germany, France and Denmark the registered same-sex couples have the right to a so-called 
“stepchild adoption” where the (new) partner of the biological parent can “step-adopt” the child, 
                                                 
9 The Netherlands and Spain in 1998, Germany and Portugal in 2001, Finland in 2002, England, Wales and 
Luxemburg in 2004 and Austria in 2010 (Banens, 2010: 10; Biele-Woelki & Fuchs, 2002: 215ff.; Verschraegen, 
2009: 433ff.; Bundeskanzleramt, 2009; Festy, 2006: 419). 
10 This intermediate status, which is neither a union nor a contract, neither private nor public, expresses also the 
“French ambiguity of responding to increasing cohabitation” (Martin & Théry, 2001: 135). 
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once the other biological parent is known and agrees to this procedure. In Norway, same-sex 
couples additionally have access to reproductive medicine (Verschraegen, 2009: 434). 
 
Existing international research has mainly focused on legal and juridical aspects, such as the 
recognition process, the legal differences to marriage or the right to adoption (Biele-Woelki & 
Fuchs, 2002; Verschraegen, 2009; Festy, 2006). Furthermore, official statistics on rainbow 
families are based on very small case numbers so errors of estimation are very probable. The 
GGP provides data on rainbow families only for five European countries: In Bulgaria 0.1% of all 
families are rainbow families (with children), in Germany and the Netherlands 0.7%, in France 
0.5% and in Hungary only 0.02%11 (United Nations, 2005, own calculations). In Germany, even 
though registered partnership was introduced in 2001, the micro-census12 started to collect data 
on registered same-sex couples only in 2006. According to their data in 2008, there were around 
5,000 same-sex couples in Germany with children living in the same household13. At least 7200 
children lived in those “rainbow families”. However, these data have to be carefully considered 
because sexual orientation was not directly inquired. The available data thus possibly represents 
an underestimation of same-sex couples with children.  
 
In Germany, as compared to heterosexual partnerships, same-sex couples have a higher 
educational level and most of the couples share domestic and paid work more equally. These 
trends are also confirmed by the first representative German national study on registered 
partnerships with children “Children in same-sex partnerships” (Rupp, 2009). A further study 
demonstrates additionally that in Germany most of the rainbow families are composed by same-
sex orientated women and their children (Eggen & Rupp, 2010). 
 
There is almost no cross-country information about the way same-sex partners plan to have 
children, which is partly due to the afore mentioned huge cross-country differences in legal 
conditions for adoption or access to reproductive medicine. In this context, it should also be 
pointed out, that on both national and cross-national level, data and information of reproductive 
families (couples using reproductive medicine) in general are very scarce. Rare exceptions are 
studies by Golombok, Brewaeys and their colleagues, which study development, psychological 
wellbeing of children and the functioning in reproductive families in the UK, Italy, Spain and 
The Netherlands14. Their findings underline that in all four countries, parents of children 
conceived by assisted reproduction interacted more with their child and reported less stress 
associated with parenting than parents who conceived their child naturally. No group differences 
were found either for the presence of psychological disorder or for children's perceptions of the 
quality of family relationships (Golombok et al., 2002; Brewaeys et al., 1997). Furthermore, 
there are some studies that argue from a theoretical perspective that the increase of same-sex 
partnership and parenthood has to be considered as a general trend from the (biological) nuclear 
family to a “family of choice” or “community family” (Maier, 2009). 
 
Rainbow families are still a very rare phenomenon in Europe. Nevertheless, further research on 
rainbow families and a homogenised cross-national method to collect data about these families is 
crucial, because there is a lack of information concerning many important issues. How these 
                                                 
11 This accords to only one case in Hungary. In all GGP observed countries the cases of rainbow families raise only 
up to 27 cases (Germany). 
12 The German MIKROZENSUS is an annual survey of 1% of the German population. 
13 From a total of 69.600 cohabiting same-sex couples, which still should be interpreted as the minimal level due to 
underestimation because of refusals.  
14 They focused on in-vitro fertilisation and donor insemination in comparison with control groups of families with a 
naturally conceived child and adoptive families. 
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families are constituted and how multinational same-sex couples and families are (legally) 
respected in their different countries of origin (Verschraegen, 2009: 435) In addition, the 
research on rainbow families also holds a high potential for scientifically understanding families 
in general because all sex or gender related characteristics of both spouses are initially 
symmetrical in these families.  
 
2.4.2. Families without common household: Living apart together and commuter families 
 
Living apart together and commuter families are relatively new research subjects in Europe. By 
definition, a living apart together relationship is a couple which does not live in the same 
household. These people define themselves as a couple, and they perceive that their close 
surrounding personal network does so as well (Levin, 2004: 227f.). These might be also families 
with children, where one parent does not live in the same household.  
 
While the database on mobility in Europe in general can be considered extensive and based on 
numerous studies15, the data on living apart together and commuter families can only be 
described as incomplete. The data of the Gender and Generation Survey (GGS) provide a first 
database to describe, at least to some extent, this family form, even though it is not possible to 
differentiate specific details, e.g. how long the partnership lasts or how often the partner is 
commuting. Furthermore, it is not possible to identify commuter families16. Available evidence 
from GGP data shows that living apart together couples with children still are a rare 
phenomenon. Their percentage in Europe varies between 1.4% in Bulgaria and Hungary to 4.1% 
in France.  
 
This data can be supplemented by more recent data from the Job Mobilities and Family-Lives in 
Europe research project, which includes data from six European countries17 and focuses on the 
relevance and diversity of job-related spatial mobility18 (Schneider & Meil, 2008). The study 
points out that, at some point during the professional career, half or more of the population has 
faced mobility demands. Job mobility in Europe differs more among social groups than among 
countries (Meil, 2008: 305ff.). 
 
A number of results from this project appear to shed a critical light on the mobility term. While 
mobility was for a long time associated with new experiences and a promise of wealth and 
growth, Ruppenthal and Lück demonstrate that sometimes mobility is the last option to avoid a 
decline in social status (Ruppenthal & Lück, 2009: 5). They thus interpret mobility as a form of 
precarisation, a conclusion shared by Recchi, who shows that only 8,5% of respondent stepped 
into a higher-rank social class when taking up their first job after migration (Recchi, 2008: 218). 
Commuter families especially feel the burden of simultaneously organising private and 
professional life, as commuting reduces the available time for spending with the family. On the 
individual level, mobility influences the family planning, constrains the career opportunities of 
the parents and leads to a re-traditionalisation of the division of household and care tasks. 
Further, it complicates to reconcile mobility and parenthood especially for woman (Ruppenthal 
& Lück, 2009: 4f.). 
 
                                                 
15 Like the PIONEUR programme (European Commission, 2006). 
16 Recent research on commuter families follows below.  
17 In Belgium, France, Germany, Poland, Spain and Switzerland. 
18 They differentiate various forms of mobility: Residential mobility (singular (mainly job-related) relocation) and 
recurring mobility, which follows a regularly rhythm as job-related overnights away from home (Limmer & 
Schneider, 2008: 32). 
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2.5. Conclusions 
The previous analyses have given a concise overview of recent developments in family 
structures and family forms in Europe. Taken together, our results speak in favour of a 
comparatively high dynamic of family forms within European countries throughout the last 
decades. Some major trends can be identified based on demographic statistics and existing 
research: 
 
 postponement of first childbirth and first marriage, generally decreasing number of 
children, even though fertility aspirations are still at a comparable high level; 
 increasing number of out-of-wedlock births as being married has lost its central role as a 
precondition for family formation; 
 decreasing marriage-rate, increasing divorce-rate and increasing rate of re-marriages;  
 consequentially, a notable decrease in the incidence of the “middle class nuclear 
family”, even though this model remains dominant; 
 an increasing diversity of family forms and family life. 
 
However, the degree to which these transformations have materialised varies considerably 
between European countries. Opposed cases are represented by the Nordic countries (where 
there has been a considerable move away from the “traditional” family model, with late 
marriages, modest marriage rates and a high proportion of out-of-wedlock births,) and the 
Southern European countries (where family patterns are still much more in-line with the 
traditional model, i.e. central importance of marriage, low divorce rates, low degrees of out-of-
wedlock births, little significance of new family forms). It is important to underline that it is in 
those countries with the highest degree of recent “de-standardisation” that display the highest 
fertility levels. 
Outlining of the above developments largely rely on long-term trends. This was driven by the 
acknowledgement of the high degree of temporal inertia in demographic processes. Most of the 
outlined trends thus refer to developments over the last few decades. Most recent data suggest, 
however, that there may be some signs of a “flattening out” of previous highly dynamic 
processes, e.g. in the move away from the “traditional” family model or the development in 
marriage and divorce rates. However, data indicating this is often very recent and it is hard to say 
whether it can be indicative for a more general future trend. Furthermore, even though for some 
indicators, there has been a tendency to stabilise in some of the countries analysed, it can be 
assumed that in the future, a full reversal of previous developments will not occur. Similarly, 
even if the trend towards "new family forms" will halt, a return to a "nuclear family model" is 
unlikely. 
 
Both data availability and academic interest have been highest in the area of fertility research 
where a multitude of data is available (e.g. the Gender and Generation Survey, The Family and 
Fertility Survey, the Eurobarometer studies, etc.) and previous research has focused on a large 
variety of research questions, both at the national as well as at the international level. In contrast, 
regarding the development of family forms and structures, research oftentimes has shown 
difficulties to “keep up the pace” with recent developments. Especially regarding newly 
emerging family forms, European comparative evidence is either scarce or virtually non-existent. 
These new family forms make up a major area for future research, as they are the most dynamic 
field of family development in contemporary Europe. 
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3. Current conditions of European families 
 
 
This chapter concentrates on current social and economic conditions of European families. The 
focus is on some of the most crucial issues from the perspective of social inequality and families 
within and across European societies such as income, employment, poverty, physical living 
environment and housing, educational opportunities, and also the meaning of media, information 
and communication technologies in families. Social inequality shapes family life, but families 
and their members must also be seen as actors in the system of inequality (transmitting 
inequalities to subsequent generations, reproducing them within the home and through their 
networks, and resisting the effects of inequality). 
 
Research on social inequality has a long tradition in Europe and has emerged again as an 
important topic on the research agenda over the last few years. Social inequality (or inequality 
between social categories) derives from the unequal distribution of various resources (economic, 
social, political, cultural), and has been analysed in terms of poverty (Atkinson, 1998; Berthoud, 
2004), social exclusion and deprivation (cf. Paugam, 1998; Muffels et al., 2002; Gallie et al., 
2003), class structure and stratification (Esping-Andersen, 1993; Crompton, 1998; Bourdieu, 
1998; Ornstein, 2007) and educational inequalities (Duru-Bellat, 2002; Lahire, 2000).  
 
The importance of inequality in today’s research and policy agendas has various sources: the 
process and multiple effects of globalisation and international migration, an increase in 
inequality since the mid-1970s, a new conception of human rights that incorporates the need for 
minimum income, recognition of the negative effects of inequality on the social fabric, and an 
increased awareness of the effects of inequality at an individual level (Grusky & Kanbur, 2006). 
Several authors have addressed the question of inequality by emphasising its political importance 
(Therborn, 2006; Giddens, 2007; Milanovic, 2007; Grusky & Kanbur, 2006; Barry, 2005). In this 
context, the phenomenon of inequality is often analysed from the standpoint of "social justice", a 
perspective fostered by authors such as Rawls (2001) and Fraser (2008), which emphasises the 
consequences of injustice when people are prevented from fully participating in social life.  
 
3.1. Social inequalities, diversity and wellbeing of families 
3.1.1. Income inequality across and within European societies 
 
Measurement of inequalities across and within European societies relies systematically on 
comparative statistical data regarding levels of income. There are significant differences in levels 
of income across Europe. Using data on mean and ‘equivalised’ disposable incomes (in EUR) 
(Figure 11) we can see that Luxembourg, Iceland, Ireland, Denmark and Great Britain have the 
highest levels of income within the EU27, but they are closely followed by a large group of 
countries (Netherlands, Finland, Austria, Germany, Sweden, Belgium, France, Italy). Eastern 
and Southern European countries have lower levels of income. The lowest levels in the EU27 are 
in Romania and Bulgaria. 
 
Income inequality within each country is also significant. Drawing on one main indicator of 
income inequality - the ratio of total income received by the 20% of the population with the 
highest income (top quintile) to that received by the 20% of the population with the lowest 
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income (lowest quintile)19 - the countries with the highest GDP per capita are not necessarily the 
most equalitarian. Together with the Nordic countries, we find lower levels of income inequality 
in countries such as Slovenia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Austria. Income 
inequality has increased in many countries over the last decade: in Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Greece, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Finland, Denmark, and Sweden. Although 
they are amongst the most unequal societies, Italy, Portugal, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland have 
reduced their income inequalities. 
 
Figure 11: Mean and equivalised disposable incomes by country (2007) 
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Source: Eurostat, 2010b 
 
Despite remarkable differences, it has been shown that living standard, expressed as GDP per 
head, is generally lower in rural than in urban areas (European Commission, 2008c: 55). The 
available data do not permit a systematic and complete analysis of rural-urban patterns in income 
poverty in Europe. Nevertheless, some country-specific surveys show that the gap in poverty 
rates between rural and urban areas is bigger in Eastern European countries than in the Western 
countries. In Western countries, poverty is concentrated in remote regions and, in general, 
regions with accessibility problems (European Commission, 2008c: 75). 
 
Comparative datasets using the concept of class and taking up socio-professional and educational 
indicators to compare social categories across countries are more difficult to find and are not 
included systematically in the analysis of social inequality. Many authors have nevertheless 
argued that “class”, although a multi-faceted concept with a variety of different meanings, makes 
a significant contribution to understanding structured social inequality in contemporary societies 
and have even proposed new and improved approaches to the topic (Bottero, 2004 & 2005; 
                                                 
19 Income must be understood as equivalised disposable income. 
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Devine et al., 2005; Savage et al., 2005; Crompton, 1998 & 2006b). The position taken up by 
contemporary research on class is that, although there has been considerable social change in 
European societies and individuals may have more choices to make than in the recent historical 
past, class and stratification analysis is important and useful for understanding and explaining the 
complex realities of inequality in late modern societies. 
 
Ferreira de Almeida et al. (2006) applied the ACM20 social class typology (Almeida, Costa & 
Machado, 1988; Costa, 1999) to data from the 2002 European Social Survey. Overall, in 
European Societies, industrial workers and routine employees are still the most numerous 
categories. However, professionals and qualified technical employees that have a high level of 
scientific, technical and cultural resources, are the majority (or close to 30%) in several 
countries: Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The authors point 
out the relevance of the professionals and technical employees group as a distinctive indicator of 
economic modernisation and social development, mainly because its distribution across Europe 
reflects differing degrees of progress regarding the information and knowledge society (Almeida 
et al., 2006: 100). 
 
Seen from a gender perspective, in most countries the professionals and technical employees 
category consists, for the most part, of women (the female majority is more evident in Poland, 
Hungary, the Netherlands and Germany). By contrast, in the other category at the top of the class 
structure, the entrepreneurs and executives, there are always more men, a difference which is 
more significant in France, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Israel, with 
male representation being over 2.5 times higher than that of females. Usually men are also the 
majority among the self-employed. 
 
Traditionally, research and policy makers have preferred economic and social indicators of 
wellbeing, deemed more appropriate to measure the development of societies. Measures of life 
satisfaction, happiness and generally subjective indicators of wellbeing have not been widely 
used in the analysis of human welfare. So far, research on subjective wellbeing has been mostly 
concentrated in highly developed countries. Comparisons have been based on levels of 
satisfaction rather than their distribution across the population and focused on countries with 
small variance in subjective wellbeing, thus diminishing possible effects of socio-economic 
factors. More recently, a strong case has been made for the use of subjective indicators combined 
with economic variables. Synthetic indicators have been proposed (Somarriba & Pena, 2009), 
combining various objective dimensions such as income, living conditions and employment with 
subjective indicators like perception of quality of life.  
 
A relationship between income inequality and subjective and objective welfare indicators is 
defended by Wilkinson and Pickett (2009). They provide extensive proof of the relation between 
(in)equality and welfare. The association between inequality and social problems cannot be 
explained by cultural differences or population size alone. According to them, unequal societies 
tend to perform worse on objective indicators, such as life expectancy, health, crime rates, and 
on subjective indicators, such as trust in fellow citizens or life satisfaction. They also point out 
that, in the more developed countries, measures of wellbeing are no longer associated with 
economic performance, suggesting that the quest for increasing material wealth needs to be 
replaced with increased social cohesion, improved social environment and quality of life.  
Data for the European Values Study from 1999-2000 (EVS Data Files and UNDP Data) for 32 
European societies on the cognitive assessment of one’s situation combining it with average 
                                                 
20 The typology combines socio-occupational and socio-educational indicators, such as occupation, employment 
status and educational level at the individual level. 
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income (using parity GDP). It can be observed that life satisfaction seems to be related to overall 
societal economic performance as life satisfaction is higher in more affluent societies (1999-
2000 EVS Data Files and UNDP Data). Denmark, Malta, Ireland, Iceland and Austria are the top 
five countries in terms of life satisfaction (with an average score of eight or more in a 10-point 
scale). Most countries of central and northern Europe have above-average life satisfaction scores, 
also more southern countries such as Slovenia, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Croatia and Greece 
scores are average, when compared with the overall results. The bulk of countries with low life 
satisfaction scores are ex-socialistic societies. In Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia, countries outside 
the EU, citizens are most unsatisfied with their life, and the average results are lower than five. 
Overall, there is a consistent relationship between life satisfaction and GDP, i.e. more affluent 
societies tend to have more highly satisfied citizens (also Fahey & Smyth, 2004).  
 
Despite the fact that some of the richer societies in the EU are rather unequal, the level of 
comfort and material wellbeing achieved seems to mitigate the effect of social inequality. In 
poorer societies, such as those in the Eastern or Southern Europe, there seems to be a stronger 
link between social inequality and life satisfaction, suggesting the existence of a “lock-step” of 
societal well being. In other words, once a certain plateau is achieved this limits the effect of 
social inequality (i.e. low incomes and related disadvantages may have a greater impact in poorer 
countries than in rich countries, in terms of subjective wellbeing). 
 
3.1.2. Economic situation of families  
 
Since the focus is on the economic situation of families, it is meaningful to compare the incomes 
of different family types. Average annual net earnings can be presented as annual net income per 
a family member, which allows to compare different types of families and also the effect of 
family type on the income level i.e. how supportive are the monetary family policy measures of 
the state. 
 
Average annual net earnings for a single person without children across the EU were 20 208 
EUR in 2007. Average earnings were a bit higher when looking at EU15 and considerable lower 
in the new member states. The lowest annual net earnings were recorded for Bulgaria, where a 
single person without children earned annually 2 048 EUR on average. It is incredible low even 
compared to the other new member states. The annual net income was also very low in Romania 
(3 485 EUR). The only candidate country, that is included in Eurostat data on annual net 
earnings, Turkey, had also similar average income level (Eurostat, 2007). 
 
The average annual net earnings for two earner married couple with two children per a family 
member are almost everywhere about half of the income of a single person (Eurostat, 2007). The 
average net income per a family member for a one-earner family with four members is highest in 
two of the new member states, the Czech Republic and Slovenia (about 34% of the income of a 
single person). The measure is also similar in one of the wealthiest member states Luxembourg. 
The situation is hardest for such a family type in Turkey, but the average income is also quite 
low in Cyprus, Lithuania and the United Kingdom. Family poverty will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
 
3.1.3. Employment situation 
 
Employment has a crucial effect on the financial situation of families. Families with one earner 
and their children are in a relatively bad financial situation when compared to two-earner 
families. This explains the greater need for two incomes and presents a new problem for the 
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families: how to combine work and family life. Steady lifelong jobs are disappearing, making 
families confront unexpected periods of either too much or few work demands, which is 
accompanied by income insecurity. Welfare regimes have not yet found ways to cope with these 
changes. (Knijn & Smit, 2009: 8). Interrelatedness between labour market developments and 
changing family lives has two income-related dimensions: Family formation might be frustrated 
by difficulties accessing steady jobs, since childbearing as well as marriage are rather sensitive to 
financial instability. Furthermore, time to care for children is only partly compensated for by 
paid leave, and only marginally included in pensions. A career break for care purposes decreases 
one’s lifelong income substantially (Knijn & Smit, 2009: 10-11). The impact of family decisions 
is bigger for women due to the effect the different time use has on the position in the labour 
market and potential wage (Bauer, 1998: 507)21. 
 
The presence of children, especially young ones, can influence strongly if and what kind of a job 
is sought, particularly among women (Eurostat, 2009c: 17). However, changing female 
aspirations have led to increased female labour market participation in many countries - and the 
biggest change in behaviour has taken place among married mothers (OECD, 2007a: 42; 
Eurostat, 2008b: 53). Between 2000 and 2006, female employment rates increased in all but 
three member states (Romania, Slovenia and Slovak Republic). Strong increases were registered 
in a number of Mediterranean countries (Spain, Greece and Italy) and in certain new member 
states (notably in Cyprus, Latvia and Estonia) (Eurostat, 2009c: 17). Still the proportion of men 
of working age in employment exceeds that of women throughout Europe (Eurostat, 2008b: 53). 
In 2007, the employment rate for women was 58.3% in the EU27, a significantly higher than that 
recorded in 2001 (54.3%), although considerably lower than the corresponding rate for men 
(72.5%). The differences between employment rates of female and male employees are smallest 
in Sweden and Finland (Kovacheva et al., 2007: 17). 
 
Employment for men and women varies according to family type. Single persons without 
children were predominantly employed full-time, but at varying degrees (Eurostat, 2009c: 28-
29). Single parents tend to work. Working full-time is fairly wide-spread in Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovak Republic and Finland 
(with shares above 70%). In Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria and the United 
Kingdom more than 30% of single parents work part-time. More than 30% of single parents 
were unemployed in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom 
(Eurostat, 2009c: 28-29). In most couples without children both partners work full-time. With 
the exception of the Netherlands (39%), this share stood above 50% in all member states. The 
highest shares (above 70%) were observed in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic and the United Kingdom. The second most relevant pattern observed among couples 
without children was “one person working full-time and the other person not working”, with 
shares ranging from 12% in United Kingdom to 34% in Greece. The third type of employment 
pattern, with one partner working full-time and the other working part-time, was fairly common 
in Belgium, Germany and Austria, with shares of around 20%. However, this type of working 
pattern was most wide-spread in the Netherlands, with 45%. The fourth and last working pattern, 
in which both partners are unemployed, accounts for only a minor share to the overall 
distribution of couples without children (Eurostat, 2009c: 30). 
For the couples with children, the employment patterns “both working full-time” is also the most 
frequent. However, this share stood above 50% in only 14 member states. It is recalled that in 
many Eastern European member states, the dual full-time earner model was traditionally the 
norm, particularly in communist times, although it became less common in recent years. In some 
                                                 
21 Paid work of women and men will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
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countries, other employment patterns are prevalent. In Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Austria and the United Kingdom the pattern “one working full-time and other working part-
time” was the most wide-spread. In Spain, Italy and Luxembourg the situation where one person 
is employed (full-time or part-time) and the other person is not employed is the group with 
highest shares (Eurostat, 2009c: 30). The male breadwinner family runs a considerable risk of 
poverty especially if the family is headed by a low-skilled male (The Well-Being of Children: the 
Impact..., 2005: 10). Again the situation were both persons are not working is not wide-spread in 
the member states. With the exception of Slovenia, in all member states the presence of a child in 
the household leads to a decrease in the working pattern where both persons are working full-
time (Eurostat, 2009c: 30). 
 
There is evidence that poverty is much lower in countries with the earner-carer strategy, which 
emphasises policy approaches meant to balance care and employment for both men and women. 
At the same time, poverty rates are significantly higher in countries that employ the earner 
strategy, which takes a market-driven approach to care issues. Poverty rates are significantly 
higher for single mothers and particularly single mothers of young children not only in countries 
that employ the earner strategy but also in those that employ the carer strategy. Policies that 
support care outside the home reduce poverty more for single mothers than for partnered mothers 
(Misra, Moller & Budig, 2007). 
 
This study makes a plea for the importance of combining market and transfer income: employed 
women are less likely to fall into poverty, while family benefits unsurprisingly also decrease 
poverty. The findings suggest that beyond the positive impact of cash benefits paid to families 
with children, work-family policies such as childcare and short-term leaves have powerful 
effects on poverty. Yet work-family policies that encourage women to take long leaves for 
caretaking have effects that are more ambivalent. In the year 2009, unemployment was higher in 
EU15 compared to EU27, although the differences were very small. Some 3.1% of those actively 
seeking work in the EU27 in 2007 had been unemployed for more than one year and 1.8% were 
unemployed for more than two years (Eurostat, 2009a: 280).  
 
Over the period from late seventies until nineties youth unemployment has moved up 
considerably. At the same time the variation among member states has become larger (EU14 was 
looked at) (Micklewright & Stewart, 1999: 701-702). Persons under the age of 25 tend to face 
the most difficulty in securing a job. The average unemployment rate among 15 to 24 year olds 
who were actively seeking employment was 15.3% across the EU27 in 2007. The highest youth 
unemployment rate and biggest differences between generations were recorded for Greece. The 
relative difficulty facing young job seekers was also particularly high in Italy (15.4% difference), 
Romania (15.2% difference) and Sweden (14.8% difference). In contrast, youth unemployment 
rates were closest to (but never lower than) the overall unemployment rate in Germany, the 
Netherlands, Lithuania and Denmark (Eurostat, 2009a: 280).  
 
Employment stability plays an important role in decisions for home-leaving and family formation 
for young people. The importance of employment status varies across Europe. In Poland, 
Slovenia and Italy regular employment seems to be more important for couples starting to 
cohabit (in three out of four cases one of the partners was in regular employment) then in 
Germany (over 40% of cases none of the partners was in regular employment) (Job Instability..., 
2007: 238-240). Employment stability for at least one of the parents seems to be a necessary 
condition in the decision of having the first child, especially for those who are younger, do not 
have clear plans to form a family and have children or are still living in the family of origin. 
However, besides a favourable economic situation, the need for more flexible working 
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arrangements and other measures aimed at reconciling work and family are also indicated as 
relevant for family choices (Job Instability..., 2007: 248-254). 
 
In the whole EU, over 9% of children live in households where no-one works. The proportion of 
households with children without a working adult increased from 8% in 1985 to over 10% in 
1996, despite the fact that official unemployment rates were stable during that period 
(Micklewright & Stewart, 1999). The proportion of children living in jobless households in the 
EU in 2008 was largest in United Kingdom (16.4%), Hungary (14.6%) and Ireland (13.1%) and 
lowest in Slovenia (2.6%) followed by Denmark (3.3%), Luxembourg (3.6%), Greece (3.6%), 
Cyprus (3.9%) and Finland (4.1%).  
 
Figure 12:  Share of children (0-17) who are living in households where no one works (%) 
Source: Eurostat, 2008b 
 
Recent report on child poverty emphasises that lack of employment is also a major cause of child 
poverty. “For children in households at risk, earnings from employment account for a 
particularly small share of income in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Hungary 
and the UK, giving a first indication of the importance of joblessness as a factor in these 
countries. In the Southern EU countries and Poland, the share of earnings in the household 
income is much greater, suggesting that the risk of child poverty is linked to low earnings rather 
than to joblessness.” (Child poverty and child wellbeing in the European Union, 2010: 10). 
 
3.2. Families and poverty 
In 2007, around 17% of the Europeans were considered to be at risk of poverty (meaning that 
17% households in the EU27 had an equivalised disposable income that was less than 60% of the 
respective national median income). Different groups in society are more or less vulnerable to 
poverty. Women are generally at greater risk of living in a poor household. In 2007, 18% of 
women of all ages had an income below the threshold, against 16% of men. As shown earlier, 
there are considerable differences in the at-risk-of poverty rates of people according to activity 
status. The unemployed are a particularly vulnerable group: 43% of unemployed persons were 
at-risk-of-poverty in the EU27 in 2007, with higher rates in the Baltic member states. About one 
in six (17%) retired persons in the EU27 was at-risk-of-poverty in 2007; rates were much higher 
in the Baltic member states, the United Kingdom and, in particular, Cyprus. Those in 
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employment were far less likely to be at-risk-of-poverty (8% in the EU27), with relatively high 
rates in Greece (14%) and Romania (18%). The level of education attained also appears to play 
an important role in whether or not people are more vulnerable to poverty; across the EU27 in 
2007, those leaving education with no more than a lower secondary education were more than 
three times as likely to be at-risk-of-poverty than persons with a tertiary education. Children and 
the older people tend to face a higher risk of poverty than the rest of the population (even after 
social transfers). In 2007 one in every five children (20%) across the EU27 was at-risk-of-
poverty, with a slightly higher proportion (22%) recorded amongst the older people. Although 
the older people were at greater risk of poverty than the population of the EU27 as a whole, there 
was a notable difference between men and women: old women were more at-risk-of-poverty 
than old men (22% compared with 17% in 2007). This gender inequality was widest in the Baltic 
member states, Slovenia and Bulgaria, but relatively narrow in Luxembourg, France and the 
Netherlands. Malta was the only Member State where old women were less at-risk-of-poverty 
than old men. One in every five (20%) young adults aged between sixteen and 24 was at-risk-of-
poverty within the EU27 in 2007, a higher proportion than across the whole population (17%). In 
addition, the risk of poverty strongly relates to household type (Eurostat, 2010b). 
 
3.2.1. The age profile of poverty: child poverty and youth poverty  
 
Child poverty has merited increasing research interest and policy focus, in recent years. Förster 
and Mira d'Ercole (2005) are among the authors who argue that relative poverty is, in most 
countries, more common among children than among the entire population, and this increased 
further in the second half of the 1990s. While child poverty rates are lower in countries with 
higher levels of maternal employment, there is much diversity in country experiences, suggesting 
that specific factors increase the risks of destitution for children in some OECD countries. In the 
Northern European countries characterised by generally low levels of poverty, the risk of poverty 
in childhood is below average, often due to the effects of universal income maintenance 
payments to children and plentiful, subsidised childcare (Walker & Collins, 2004). 
 
The European Task Force on Child Poverty and Child Wellbeing (2008) conducted a detailed 
analysis of child poverty, following a demand made by the 2006 Spring European Council to the 
member states and the Commission to take decisive steps to eradicate poverty among children.  
The analysis that follows was largely taken from the report drafted by this Task Force 22. 
In 2005, 19 million children lived under the poverty threshold in the EU27, meaning that 19% of 
children were at risk of poverty, against 16% for the total population. In most EU countries, 
children are at greater risk of poverty than the rest of the population, except in the Nordic 
countries (where 9-10% of children live below the poverty threshold). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 There is also a more recently published extensive report on child poverty. That is why this issue is only briefly 
covered in this report. See: Child poverty and child wellbeing in the European Union. Report for the European 
Commission DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities Unit E.2. Volume I: Main report. TÁRKI 
Social Research Institute (Budapest, Hungary) & Applica (Brussels, Belgium) 2010. 
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Figure 13: The distribution of children at risk of poverty, by household type, EU25* (2007) 
 
 
Source: Child poverty and child wellbeing in the European Union, 2010 
 
In the EU, half of the poor children live in the two types of households that are most at risk of 
poverty: 23% live in lone-parent households (against 13% for all children together) and 27% in 
large families (against 21% for all children together) (see also Figure 13). However, the extent to 
which lone parent households and large families experience greater risks of poverty depends 
both on their characteristics (age, education level of parents, etc.), and on the labour market 
situation of the parents (joblessness, in-work poverty, etc.). The latter can be influenced by the 
availability of adequate support through access to enabling services such as childcare, measures 
of reconciliation of work and family life, and in-work income support. On the other hand, the 
distribution of poor children by household type varies greatly across countries. This shows that 
the member states are faced with different policy challenges in their fight against child poverty. 
 
Children in the EU, whose parents are below 30, have a significantly higher risk of poverty than 
those living with older parents. The educational level of parents is another key determinant of 
children’s current and future situation since it affects both on the current labour market and 
income situation of the parents and on the children’s own chances of doing well at school. 
Children living in a migrant household (defined as a household where at least one parent is born 
abroad) face a much higher risk of poverty than children whose parents were born in the host 
country. In most countries the risk of the poverty rate they face reaches 30% or more and is two 
to five times higher than the risk faced by children whose parents were born in the country of 
residence. 
 
In a recent article, Franzini and Raitano (2009) analyse the intergenerational transmission of 
income inequality in thirteen European countries (the EU15 countries - excluding Germany, 
Greece and Portugal - plus Norway) on the basis of information provided by the European Union 
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Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 2005 dataset. Their estimates confirm that family 
economic condition has a significant marginal negative effect on educational attainments of 
children. Moreover, they identified a specific and direct effect of economic conditions of the 
parents on the wage earned by their sons, independently of school achievements, i.e. an effect 
showing itself across individuals with the same formal education. On average, this effect over all 
countries is sizeable, but shows a large variability across countries. Results largely confirm, in 
the specific and so far unexplored field of inequality transmission, the traditional distinction of 
welfare regimes: in most Nordic countries, such effects are small while the opposite holds for 
Mediterranean countries. 
 
Whereas there is a well-developed literature on poverty among households in general, very little 
research has focused on poverty among young adults. The literature on youth poverty has only 
very recently emerged. The risk of poverty for young adults was highest in Denmark (28%), 
where, as in other Nordic member states, it was about twice the rate for the whole population. 
The fact that young individuals in Scandinavian countries face a higher poverty risk compared 
other European countries may be unexpected. With generous and universal welfare benefits, one 
would expect youth poverty to be much lower in these countries. One important answer lies in 
the very fact that compared to other countries, young Scandinavians tend to leave home at a 
much earlier age. However, the poverty experience of young Scandinavians is generally short-
lived, implying that poverty by itself may not be a good measure of youth disadvantage (Aassve 
et al., 2008). In many countries, an increasing proportion of young adults continue to live in their 
parents’ homes and are, therefore, less likely to be recorded “at-risk-of-poverty” since they share 
in their parent’s income. This does not necessarily reflect their true situation, which may often be 
characterised by a lack of access to a decent income of their own (see also Chapter 4). 
 
Young adults traditionally were at a lower risk of poverty or deprivation. Across all countries, 
unemployment, inactivity and low educational levels were highly correlated with an increased 
chance of being in and remaining in poverty. In all countries, especially those in Southern 
Europe, family support systems were likely to affect deprivation risks advantageously for young 
adults (CASP, 2000). However, parental dependency may influence youth poverty in different 
ways (Hammer, 2002). It may strengthen the process of intergenerational transmission of 
poverty in deprived areas. At the same time, parental support may be essential for the prevention 
of poverty among unemployed youth and may lessen homelessness and social exclusion, 
especially in Southern Europe. Aassve et al. (2005) claim that although there are significant 
differences across countries, living arrangements (in particular living in a single person 
household) is one of the most important predictors of youth poverty and deprivation.  
 
As to the effects of union formation and childbearing (Aassve et al., 2005), both marriage and 
cohabitation appear to protect young individuals from poverty and deprivation, though marriage 
generally has a stronger effect than cohabitation (indeed, cohabitation does not appear to protect 
against deprivation in Portugal, Spain and Italy). The effects of having children are smaller than 
the effects of marriage and cohabitation, and in the opposite direction: having children is 
associated with a general higher risk of poverty and deprivation. The exceptions are, 
interestingly, Finland and Denmark, where children do not have any influence on the likelihood 
of poverty. 
 
There are also large variations in the extent of youth poverty within countries, between what we 
might term “younger youth” (aged 16-19) and “older youth” aged (25-29). A research report 
(Aassve, Iacovou & Mencarini, 2006) argues that for individuals at the very beginning of the 
transition to adulthood, the factors associated with youth poverty are similar to the factors 
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associated with child poverty. The majority have no incomes of their own, and their risk of 
poverty is thus largely dependent on the incomes of adult members of their households (mainly, 
their parents) in relation to the size of their households. However, as young people move towards 
adulthood, the factors associated with youth poverty become more complex. Young people’s 
incomes vary widely – both between countries, and within countries. Young people may be in 
education; they may have a job (low-waged or better paid); they may be unemployed; they may 
be caring for children; or they may be out of the labour market for other reasons. Young people’s 
living arrangements also vary: many young people live with their family of origin while others 
have left home and live alone or with a partner, or with friends. Some have children of their own, 
with or without a partner. For young people with low or no earnings, living with their parents 
may protect them against poverty – although conversely, the extra burden their presence places 
on household finances may throw the whole household into poverty. Young people whose own 
earnings are relatively high may not be poor if they live apart from their families of origin, and if 
they do live at home, they may act as a resource for their families of origin, increasing household 
equivalent income to a level higher than it would otherwise have been. 
 
Parisi (2008) developed a study on the so-called Southern European countries: Italy, Spain, 
Portugal and Greece. The outcomes of this study also show that leaving home is associated with 
a higher chance of having low income. Moreover, the poorer the family of origin, the more likely 
the leaver is to be poor. On the other hand, the longer a young person delays leaving the parental 
home, the more likely the individual is not to be poor if he or she does leave. The explanation is 
straightforward: remaining in the parental home longer increases the chances of getting a higher 
educational qualification and hence a better paid job. Perhaps surprisingly, there appear to be no 
differences in these various patterns across the four southern European countries studied. 
 
Aassve et al. (2008) developed an alternative measure of young adult’s poverty experience and 
proposed as a better measure of social disadvantage among youth. Using observed poverty spells 
from the European Community Panel Survey (ECHP) a three-group classification is defined: 1) 
never poor, 2) socially vulnerable, and 3) persistently poor. The analysis shows that high rates of 
poverty do not necessarily translate into poverty that is more permanent. For instance, there is 
little evidence to suggest that people remain poor longer in Scandinavian countries, even if the 
latter have higher poverty rates. Generous welfare provision and an effective labour market are 
able to stave off youth disadvantage. On the other hand, whereas previous studies have reported 
significant gender differences in poverty rates, the analysis shows that such differences are much 
weaker when it comes to remaining poor. On the contrary, controlling for a range of background 
factors, young women are less likely to experience poverty permanence and hence youth 
disadvantage. Elsewhere, in Mediterranean countries and Liberal welfare societies, it turns out 
that gender is a significant factor, and - in particular - that being a woman is a protective factor 
against long-term poverty. The main conclusion drawn from this study is that both structural 
factors and the effect of welfare regimes play a significant and substantial role in explaining 
differences in persistent poverty levels. 
 
3.2.2. Household types and the shaping of poverty 
 
The types of household at greater risk of poverty than others are single person households, single 
parent households with dependent children and households comprising two adults with three or 
more dependent children (so-called large family households). Single parent households and large 
households have been identified as more vulnerable to poverty over the last few decades, 
whereas single person households, in particular of young adults, have emerged more recently as 
more vulnerable. 
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Single adult person households have been identified as more prone to poverty than other types of 
family (e.g. Walker & Collins, 2004). Quintano and D’Agostino (2006) carried out an analysis in 
four European countries (Italy, France, Germany and the UK) having welfare systems that 
represent Mediterranean (Italy), continental (Germany and France) and Anglo-Saxon (UK) 
regimes. The gender effect was strong in all countries, indicating that women are at a greater 
disadvantage than men in each country. The effect of age showed that women over seventy years 
of age had a much higher poverty rate everywhere.  
 
The effect of marital status was interesting; women who had never married had low median 
incomes and very high poverty rates in all countries. The same effect for divorce was observed 
except in France where the poverty rate did not change. On the contrary, in Germany and Italy, 
divorce had a strong effect on poverty rate. German divorced women had a poverty rate of 48%; 
in Italy this value was 34%. An interesting social aspect for single-person households was also 
the effect of divorce with respect to gender and age at divorce. The impact of divorce was worse 
for women than for men, and was more evident in Germany and the UK than France or Italy. 
The effect of age was also strong. Both younger and older divorced women run the risk of 
poverty in Italy and the UK; a different pattern was observed in Germany and France where the 
older cohorts were better off (see also Callens & Croux, 2009). 
 
In terms of different welfare systems, the results confirm that the Italian Mediterranean regime 
penalises younger generations which suffer from very high poverty rates and remarkable 
inequality with respect to older generations. On the other hand, the Continental and Anglo Saxon 
regimes seem to favour younger generations and to penalise the older generations (Quintano & 
D’Agostino, 2006). 
 
There is a wide consensus among researchers that lone parents, which in most cases are headed 
by a woman, are the type of household most vulnerable to poverty (e.g. Fouarge & Layte, 2005; 
Walker & Collins, 2004; Kröger, 2004). In an EU study focusing on different life-course 
transitions, conducted under the coordination of CASP (2000) showed that many lone parents 
relied on low-level social assistance to top up their low earnings, or as their only source of 
income. The position of lone mothers with non-dependent children was somewhat different. This 
was the result of household members providing an additional income, and perhaps of 
maintenance payments received from absent parents. Whereas the experience of poverty differed 
considerably between lone parent groups within the same country, there were greater similarities 
within countries with respect to necessity-deprivation. Within the family type of “lone-lone” 
parents (those who do not have informal support networks), the necessary and exclusive use of 
formal services (public or private) constitutes a special form of poverty trap, since it consumes a 
disproportionate part of their scant revenues (Kröger, 2004).  
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Table 1: At risk-of-poverty rates by household type (2007, %) (1) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2010b 
 
Lelkes and Zólyomi (2008) analysed the EU-SILC data of 2006 and concluded that the poverty 
rate of single parents reached or surpassed 30% in the majority of the countries examined. Over 
40% of single parents had incomes below the poverty line in the Czech Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Ireland, Portugal, and the UK. Contrary to these countries, the situation 
of single parents was relatively favourable in international comparison in Denmark, Finland, and 
Norway, where the poverty rate of this group is not higher than 20%. Note, however, that this 
figure was still higher than national average poverty rates in these three countries. 
 
Taking the group of Mediterranean countries, the common element in the three countries is that 
lone fathers are the type of lone-parent family with the lowest poverty risk. By contrast, when 
considering the Netherlands and Norway it is found that the least disadvantaged group is 
widows. Thus when considering the relative positions of different lone parent families, 
systematic differences seem to emerge between the Mediterranean and Northern European 
countries. In the former, lone fathers are undoubtedly advantaged when compared to all other 
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lone parent families, whereas in the latter, the biggest differences seem to be found between 
widowed lone mothers on the one hand, and divorced or single lone mothers, on the other.  
 
Large families are also among the groups more prone to poverty. Bradshaw et al. (2006) refer to 
several previous studies that evidenced this increased vulnerability of large families regarding 
poverty. Cantillon and Van den Bosch (2002) used Luxembourg Income Survey data and found 
that the poverty rate among families with three or more children was equally high as that among 
lone parent families in Belgium, Spain, Finland (although at a comparatively low level), Italy 
and the UK. The poverty risk of large families generally exceeded that of childless non-aged 
families, except in the Nordic Countries and the Netherlands. Layte and Fouarge (2004) and 
Whelan et al. (2004) examined the impact of various socio-economic factors on cross-national 
differences in deprivation using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) survey. 
Logistic regression showed that having a larger number of children (3+) tended to lead to higher 
levels of deprivation across all countries, but the effect is rather small when compared to other 
variables, such as long-term unemployment, being a young single person aged 17-24, or lone 
parenthood. The negative effect of having a large family was strongest in Italy, Portugal and the 
UK (followed by Germany and Ireland). 
 
Fouarge and Layte (2005), however, make an interesting argument about the fact that changes in 
the number of children - either more or fewer children - are both associated with an increased 
and decreased poverty risk. At first sight, this finding seems contradictory but can be explained 
through the effect that changes in household composition have on both household income and 
household needs. A tentative explanation in this context is that young children coming into the 
household induce an additional financial burden that is generally less than compensated for by 
child benefits. Children leaving the household are generally older and have their own market 
income, which may have negative consequences on the household’s income position.  
 
3.2.3. Poverty dynamics: the ins and outs of poverty 
 
Research on poverty dynamics, although crucial to an understanding of the processes shaping 
entering and exiting from poverty, was made possible only fairly recently (at least in quantitative 
terms and based on a cross-national comparative approach), with the dissemination of panel data. 
The first wave of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) dates back to 1994. 
 
CASP coordinated a project in 2000, which conducted an analysis of inter-country and inter-
group patterns of poverty and deprivation dynamics (based on ECHP data). It demonstrated the 
added risk of poverty and deprivation faced by life course and risk transition groups. Moreover, 
it highlighted two distinct clusters of risks. First, there are those who experience above average 
poverty rates but no great probability of entering or exiting poverty and deprivation. Secondly, 
there are those with below average poverty rates but also low exit rates.  
 
Jenkins and Schluter (2001) studied child poverty dynamics in the UK and Germany. Their 
results point to the importance of the welfare-state-related differences as the principal source of 
differences in child poverty rates. In particular, relative to British children, German children are 
better protected against the consequences of adverse labour market events, and positive labour 
market events are more reinforced. When experiencing a trigger event, Germany provides a 
greater cushion against adverse events and better reinforcement of positive events. Differences in 
the prevalence rates of trigger events do, of course, also play a role; a notable example being the 
greater risk of job loss in Britain compared to Western Germany. 
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The outcomes of a 2001 study conducted in France by Breuil-Genier, Ponthieux and Zoyem 
stress the importance of family-related factors regarding poverty dynamics. They show that the 
same activity profile may be associated with different poverty risks, depending on family 
configurations: two-earner couples, one-earner couples, one single full-time earner, and lone 
parent families. In particular, whatever the number of children, one non-earner partner decreases 
the probability of exiting poverty. Family-related factors thus seem to play a decisive role in 
affecting the probability of exiting poverty. 
 
Fouarge and Layte (2005) develop a detailed analysis of the effects of family-related factors on 
the probability of exiting poverty. Having a female head of household slows down exit from 
poverty significantly, as does having a head in the oldest age group (55-64). Less favourable 
employment conditions for these groups or depreciated stock of human capital are possible 
explanations for this finding. Interestingly, although being a single parent does not seem to 
impact on exit, not being married does seem to be significant and negative. Although the number 
of adults in the household has not a significant influence, each additional child slows exit. The 
effect for the number of children is not unexpected, as much work shows that in many countries 
(although France is an exception) larger numbers of children are associated with a greater 
poverty risk. It is also clear that singles, and especially single parents, are more likely to be 
persistently poor and have a lower probability of exiting poverty.  
 
A comparison between two European countries – Germany and Great Britain vs. Canada and 
USA was done by Valletta (2006). According to this study, most poverty transitions, and the 
prevalence of chronic poverty, are associated with employment instability and family dissolution 
in all four countries. However, government tax-and-transfer policies are more effective at 
reducing poverty persistence in Europe than in North America. Changes in family structure are 
frequently associated with poverty transitions, especially in Canada. In each country, divorce and 
marriage are the most common family events associated with poverty entry and exits, although 
poverty entries also are commonly associated with the formation of new families that split off 
from existing households. Among the events that are related to poverty entries, in all countries 
divorce has the largest association. In regards to more general policies aimed at alleviating 
poverty, Valletta’s (2006) findings confirm widely held beliefs about the key contributions of 
family stability and work attachment for staying out of poverty in North America and Europe. 
This suggests important roles for individual behaviour as well as public policies that strengthen 
family stability and work attachment. Childcare subsidies may be one example of such policies 
enabling cash-strapped and time-strapped parents effectively balance work and home 
commitments. 
 
Research on poverty dynamics show that different factors impact differently on men and 
women’s entry or exit from poverty. While employment-related changes are important for men 
in particular (but also for women), demographic events are only important for women. For 
women, divorce is the event that has the strongest effect on the probability of becoming poor. 
For men, on the other hand, the most important individual event associated with poverty entry is 
unemployment. As to female poverty exit, a marriage almost doubles the risk of poverty exit, 
while a divorce more than halves the risk of women’s poverty exit. For men’s poverty exit, 
finding a job increases the odds of poverty exit by 350%; whereas losing a job seems to decrease 
the odds of poverty exit by 17% (Callens & Croux, 2009). 
 
Research focusing on poverty dynamics often links this analysis to a discussion about the role of 
welfare regimes (e.g. Sainsbury & Morissens, 2002; Fouarge & Layte, 2005; Callens & Croux, 
2009; Förster & Tóth, 2001; Cerami, 2003). Some of the major outcomes of these studies point 
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to the fact that welfare regimes have an impact on the likelihood of poverty entry but not on the 
likelihood of poverty exit. In the conservative and the southern type there are fewer poverty 
dynamics (i.e. fewer entries and exits, mainly because living in poverty is more long standing, 
with some people for example being born and never exiting material deprivation). Country 
welfare regimes, on the other hand, strongly influence long run poverty, with social democratic 
countries reducing the level of persistent and recurrent poverty. Liberal and Southern European 
regime countries have both higher rates and longer durations of poverty. Despite their dissimilar 
patterns of poverty duration, European welfare states display rather similar patterns of exit from 
poverty, once we control for duration. 
 
3.3. Social conditions of migrant families 
Migrant families are a special group to consider when discussing social and economic conditions 
of European families. During the traditional period of guest worker migration, immigration was 
not supposed to lead to settlement, nor was immigrant families a challenging issue. The family 
reunification that took place at the time usually followed the male breadwinner model, thus 
pointing to a monotone type of immigrant family. In fact, family migration was neglected until 
recently, both by academics and policymakers.  
 
Available research on migrant families has addressed four main topics:  
 
1) the migration decision (insofar as migration is often an ongoing family project, 
negotiated at the family level and structured around the needs and resources of the 
households);  
2) the forms of family migration (including migration led by male or female partners and 
whole family migration);  
3) the demographic trends (mainly focussing on immigrants’ fertility);  
4) the assimilation of immigration families (studying the different modes of integration of 
family members, including the second generation) (Wall, 2007: 2253-4). 
 
Family patterns have changed substantially in Europe, sometimes leading to migration events. 
Furthermore, migration itself has changed (in addition to labour migration there are migrants 
who are refugees and asylum-seekers, clandestine entrants, skilled professionals, students, 
retirement migrants etc.), bringing with it implications for the family (King et al., 2004: 5-6). 
The increasing diversity of gender roles, migration strategies and integration outcomes, including 
independent female migration, and transnational families (Kofman & Meetoo, 2008: 154) has 
increased research interest in migrant families. 
 
It is not easy to draw up a typology of immigrant families. One was suggested by Kofman 
(2004): i) family reunification; ii) family formation or marriage migration; and iii) whole family 
migration. A second classification was suggested by King et al. (2006), who add to the former 
typology a separation between family formation and marriage migration, as well as a new 
category, split-family formation.  
 
Family reunification is the conventional form. It occurs when an immigrant, living in an host 
country for a certain period of time and with an already existing family back home, brings in 
his/her family members. Although the typical form of reunification encompasses a male 
immigrant and his family, there are more and more cases of processes led by immigrant women 
(Wall et al., 2010). Family formation or marriage migration includes two main sub-groups. “The 
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first consists of second and subsequent generations of children of migrant origin who bring in a 
fiancé(e)/spouse from their parents’ homeland or diasporic space, a particular characteristic of 
Turkish and North African immigrant populations (...) The second variant of marriage migration 
involves permanent residents or citizens bringing in a partner they have met while abroad for 
work, study or holiday” (Kofman & Meetoo, 2008: 155-156). Studies have shown that the 
volume of family formation surpassed family reunification in recent years. This was particularly 
true in countries with large settled immigrant communities (Kraler & Kofman, 2009). 
Particularly, the number of mixed marriages, or ‘bi-national’ marriages, has been rising fast. A 
particular case is arranged marriages where the most usual pattern involves males from 
developed countries and women from less developed countries. There is typically a short period 
of courtship and, in a growing number of cases; the internet is replacing direct contact as the 
means of personal introduction (Kofman & Meetoo, 2008: 161). Recent research has highlighted 
the growing role of women’s agency in family formation (Kofman, 2004). There are an 
increasing number of female immigrants bringing in male spouses and fiancés from the countries 
of origin. This trend is related to a more equal gender balance in the second generation and 
normative changes in the sending countries. This is the case, for example, of immigrants from 
Turkey and North African countries. At the same time, more and more marriages resulting from 
international contacts are the consequence of women travelling, studying, and working abroad. 
The third type of family migration is whole-family migration. In this case, the entire family - 
usually a nuclear family - moves at the same time. Given the legal restrictions, this case is not 
common in Europe. The major exception involves some highly skilled immigrants, including 
intra-EU ones, and refugees. In the first case, some EU countries accept that the family of 
students, work-permit holders and trainers moves along with the immigrant (see Job Mobilities 
and Family Lives in Europe). 
 
3.3.1. Gender and migration  
 
One of the most relevant points raised by the literature has to do with the impact of international 
migration on women’s roles and power, i.e., gender relations. Some studies suggest that 
immigration has beneficial effects on women and gender relations. In some situations, 
immigration and wage-earning in Europe may lead to the increasing independence of women, a 
more flexible division of labour at home, less segregation in public spaces and the increasing 
centrality of women in transnational families and networks; this helps to explain why, in some 
cases, women are more reluctant than men to return to their country of origin. Other analyses are 
more negative: gender is seen as another layer of the multiple oppression of migrant women - 
structurally discriminated against as migrants, as women (both by the host society and within 
their own ethnic group), as members of the labouring underclass, as racially stigmatised, and, 
finally, as accepting these oppressive structures. These studies underline that many migrant 
women still suffer from some specific circumstances of their community’s culture and family life 
(for example, social exclusion and enslavement), which tend to collide with values of the host 
country – which are usually more favourable to women’s increased autonomy and freedom. At 
this level, many findings indicate that there is a connection between violence and migration, 
namely male violent behaviour against women (spouses, sisters and daughters). Some of these 
studies explore the links between violent male behaviour and social conditions, such as the 
experience of racism or unemployment and social relegation, while others explore the connection 
between violence and different forms of social control within the migrant community (for 
example, violence against young girls from the second generation). Since some immigrant 
women create their own activist groups, this means that there is sometimes an awareness of 
women's rights within the community.  
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Furthermore, violence is a problem that goes beyond households and immigrant communities. 
The channels of “sex, marriage and maids”, as expressed by Phizacklea (1998), define some of 
the main avenues of female migration to Europe. The sex industry is largely demand-driven, 
providing opportunities for trafficking networks and prostitution, bringing in young women from 
less developed countries. Marriage, particularly arranged marriages and matchmaking, often 
links men from European host countries and women from less developed ones – as in the case of 
mail-order brides. Domestic work and caring, both in live-in and external work arrangements, 
provide numerous job opportunities for immigrant women, particularly in Southern European 
countries, where gender relations are more asymmetric (household tasks are less balanced 
between men and women) and caring is attributed to families. Many of these domestic and 
caring jobs are viewed as awkward and exploitative (King et al., 2004). 
 
In sum, statements concerning female migration strategies, independence and power in migration 
processes and in households, and overall change in gender relations as an outcome of migration, 
should be cautiously considered and in the context of the need for more empirical research. 
Supporting this approach, a large array of research has been addressing the topic of female 
migration in Europe in recent years, including various comparative projects funded by the EU23.  
 
3.3.2. Age-related migration 
 
Migration is closely related to age and the life course. Most economic migration occurs at young 
adult ages, given the larger period of return (as migration is an economic investment in human 
capital, it would not be rational to migrate in mature adult years). Studies about residential 
mobility suggested that changes in the life course are related to geographical movements.  
 
Studies on migrant children may be divided according to the framing of the migration 
movement: migrant children as refugees and asylum seekers, as victims of trafficking 
(particularly trafficking for sexual exploitation), migrant children with EU citizenship, migrant 
children of third country nationals and inter-country adoptees. Studies on student migration are 
very recent and fast growing. They stress the recent growth of these flows, reinforced by the 
incentives to mobility (such as the Erasmus and Socrates programmes at the EU level), their 
framing within the globalisation of higher education and their linkages to youth culture. Studies 
on retirement migration are also spreading. They address its multiple facets, which include, 
among others, retirement migration of wealthy North-Western Europeans to Southern Europe 
and retirement migration of former economic migrants to their countries of origin (often intra-
EU migration). Recent research has also highlighted the changing patterns of residence and 
                                                 
23 Female Migration Vision, coordinated by Rossana Trifiletti, University of Florence, Italy, 2005-2006 (see 
http://www.fondazionebrodolini.it/Kernel/Common/DocumentPage.aspx?docId=6401); GRINE – Migrant Women 
Face Increased Prejudice, coordinated by Luisa Passerini, European University Institute, Florence, Italy, 2001-2004 
(see http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/projects/055_en.html); FEMAGE - Needs for Female Immigrants 
and their Integration in Ageing Societies, coordinated by Charlotte Hoehn, Bundesinstitut fuer 
Bevolkerungsforschung, Wiesbaden, Germany, 2006-2008 (see http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-
sciences/projects/195_en.html); FEMIPOL - Integration of Female Immigrants in Labour Market and Society. 
Policy Assessment and Policy Recommendations, coordinated by Maria Kontos, Institute of Social Research at J.W. 
Goethe University, Germany, 2006-2008 (see http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/projects/196_en.html); 
GEMIC – Gender, Migration and Intercultural Interactions in the Mediterranean and South East Europe: an 
Interdisciplinary Perspective, coordinated by Maria Stratigaki, Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences, 
Athens, Greece, started in 2008 (see http://www.gemic.eu); and GEMMA – Enhancing Evidence Based Policy-
making in Gender and Migration, coordinated by Diassina Di Maggio, Agenzia per la Promozione della Ricerca 
Europea, Rome, Italy, started in 2008 (see http://www.gemmaproject.eu). The latter site also provides information 
about other research projects related with gender and migration, including some of those quoted above (see 
http://www.gemmaproject.eu/projects_static.aspx). 
 
49 
mobility: in the international sphere, as previously in the national sphere, dual residence and 
seasonal mobility is increasingly common. Given the legal framework, this is much more 
relevant in the EU than in other international contexts. 
 
All these processes are related to age but they are also related to other social variables. Some of 
them are gendered. Other processes are dependent on social status. Both student migration and 
retirement migration are clearly connected to the individuals’ social position and his/her ability 
to afford such strategies. Finally, many depend on immigration policies: the free circulation of 
EU citizens allows for easier and greater mobility than in the case of third-country nationals.  
 
3.3.3. Second generation 
 
Studies on the second generation are crucial for understanding immigrants’ integration. This 
mostly results from the time perspective that is so important in migration studies. Only a long-
term perspective can measure the success or failure of migration projects. Time is needed to pay-
off the costs of migration, to acquire new human and social capital, and to overcome obstacles to 
integration. Studies on intra-generational and, particularly, intergenerational mobility are thus 
crucial in integration processes. Moreover, second generations often may acquire the citizenship 
of the host country – which is, in many respects, the main obstacle to integration and 
participation. Hence, their success or failure is telling us about the way a society is dealing with 
its new members. Under the term “second generation” are usually subsumed the native-born 
children of immigrants (foreign-born parents) and, in some cases the children who arrived before 
primary school. Sometimes the term “1.5 generation” is also used to designate children who 
arrived very early in their lives or immediately after starting their school careers. 
 
Second generations in Europe are still recent. Taking into account the major inflows that took 
place after the 1950s, most of the immigrants’ offspring is still in an early stage of its life. The 
majority of the immigrants’ descendants attended primary school in the 1980s and secondary 
school in the 1990s, and they are now entering the labour market. This explains why most of the 
studies until now observed the educational attainment and the transition from school to work, but 
not yet the occupational trajectory. Immigrants’ offspring are increasingly a part of the European 
demography, meaning that ever-larger generations of children with an immigrant background are 
entering, year by year, into families, schools, work and public life. 
 
In general, studies have shown that in educational terms immigrants’ children perform worse 
than children with no immigrant background do, though better than foreign-born children. When 
observing their early performance in the labour market, they have lower employment rates, 
vulnerability to unemployment and lower access to skilled jobs, when compared with native 
youngsters, although again showing better indicators than foreign-born youngsters do. These 
gaps are justified by the low socio-economic background from which they come (third country 
immigrants in the EU are usually characterised by low education and/or low socio-economic 
condition), worse access to social networks in the labour market and discrimination (Castles & 
Miller, 2009: 227-229). Since many of these descendants have acquired national citizenship, the 
fact that discrimination is not only based on nationality, but also on ethnic origin, explains part 
of the problem.  
 
The situation of second generations in Europe is however more complex (Crul & Vermeulen, 
2003; King et al., 2004 & 2006). Much recent research has highlighted many differences among 
EU countries and among immigrant groups. On the one hand, national contexts explain a large 
part of the variability in integration patterns. This is less often related to immigration policies 
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than to educational and labour market national arrangements, such as type of schooling 
(vocational or non-vocational) and access to higher education. On the other hand, immigrant 
communities display heterogeneity and polarisation (even when coming from the same sending 
country), between and within EU countries. This means that one may observe a fraction of 
second-generation youngsters, for example Turks, performing well in some EU countries, and at 
risk of becoming an underclass in others. 
 
Several EU cross-national projects have been developed in recent years24. They have confirmed 
the complexity of integration patterns among the second generations; the wide variety according 
to national contexts; some contradictory situations within the same groups; differing degrees of 
ethnic closure; and even unexpected variations in time. The picture is further complicated by the 
polarisations within ethnic groups that exist in some countries. Moreover, if we view the 
development of different groups over time, we do not see a linear process (Crul & Vermeulen, 
2003: 982-983). 
 
3.4. Physical living environment and housing 
Living environment and housing are crucial aspects in wellbeing and health, affecting in many 
ways on family life. Most important characteristics that make people satisfied with their home 
and environment are nice general appearance of the neighbourhood and satisfaction with housing 
(Parkes et al., 2002: 2427; Kim et al., 2005: 1631). The existence of crime in neighbourhood as 
well as insecurity and the fear of crime are very strong predictors of neighbourhood 
dissatisfaction (Parkes et al., 2002: 2427; Pa Ke Shon, 2007: 2236). General environmental 
indicators like pure air and availability of clean water are important components of a good living 
environment. 
 
3.4.1. Natural environment 
 
Quality of air and water has substantial effects on health and wellbeing. Measurements of air 
quality show that almost 90% of the inhabitants of European cities are exposed to concentrations 
that exceed the WHO air quality guideline level (European Environment Agency, 2009: 14-15). 
The highest concentration of particulate matter was found in Bulgaria and Romania. Exposure to 
air pollution by ozone was highest for the urban populations of Italy and Greece. Both measures 
of air pollution were lowest in Finland, Sweden and the UK (Eurostat, 2009a: 422-424). 
 
The issues related to green open spaces are especially relevant because large proportion of 
Europe’s population lives in urban areas, where the contact with nature is often lacking. 
Therefore, green spaces, such as parks, are an essential constituent of urban quality of life. 
Baycant-Levant et al. (2009: 209) found, that when the indicators related to the availability of 
urban green spaces are used to determine the green performance and ranking of European cities, 
the Southern European (France, Italy, Spain) cities are in the lead. However, when the planning 
performance indicators are taken into consideration, the Northern European (Belgium, Finland, 
Germany) cities have higher scores (Baycant- Levant et al., 2009: 210). 
                                                 
24 EFFNATIS –“Effectiveness of National Integration Strategies Towards Second Generation Migrant Youth in a 
Comparative European Perspective” (1998-2000); TIES (2003), “The Integration of the European Second-
Generation”, (see http://www.tiesproject.eu/component/option,com_frontpage/Itemid,1/lang,en).(for some results 
see e.g. Crul, 2008). TRESEGY – “Toward a Social Construction of an European Youthness: Experience of 
inclusion and exclusion in the public sphere among second generation migrated teenagers” (2006-09). EU 
MARGINS – “On the Margins of the European Community - Adult Immigrants in Seven European Countries 
(Spain, UK, Italy, France, Estonia, Sweden and Norway)” (2008-2011).  
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Accessibility, possibilities for outdoor recreation, distribution and the overall design of the urban 
area are important to individual satisfaction and encourage daily physical activity such as 
walking and cycling. Access to green areas are found to be linked with several health issues like 
obesity, cardiovascular disease (European Environment Agency, 2009: 17-19; Nielsen & 
Hansen, 2007: 897) and experienced stress (Nielsen & Hansen, 2007: 894). There are significant 
differences between urban and rural areas: people living in urban areas feel less healthy (Verheij 
et al., 2008: 308). Green areas have found to be beneficial for children in various ways: children 
with good access to green open space, fewer high-rise buildings and more outdoor sports 
facilities are more physically active. School children who have access to - or even sight of - the 
natural environment show higher levels of attention than those without these benefits (European 
Environment Agency, 2009: 15-19). Neighbourhood open space (local parks, play areas, village 
greens) plays an important role also for older people in maintaining and enhancing their quality 
of life. Older people who have pleasant and safe green areas within comfortable walking distance 
are more likely to be satisfied with life. Connections were also found between the existence of 
good paths and the activity of walking even if no significant associations with health indicators 
were not found (Sugiyama et al., 2009: 3-4, 13-14). 
 
Besides the mere existence of infrastructure, it is important, that people feel safe to use these 
areas. Feeling safe in the neighbourhood is likely to increase levels of physical activity 
(European Environment Agency, 2009: 14). On average, a quarter of national populations felt 
unsafe walking alone in their area after dark, being higher Bulgaria, Poland, Greece, 
Luxembourg and Italy (over 35%) and lower in Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and 
Austria (under 20%) (Van Dijk et al., 2007: 127-131). However, fear of crime and actual 
victimisation are not strongly linked. Countries with a higher share of people reporting fear of 
crime do not experience a higher victimisation while, within countries, older and richer people 
feel more unsafe than younger and poorer people do, despite being less likely to be a victim of 
crime (Stiglitz et al., 2009: 53).  
 
Environmental and health impacts are not equally distributed throughout Europe or within cities. 
Inequalities in quality of living environment reflect inequalities in economic, social and living 
conditions. Disadvantaged groups typically inhabit the worst parts of the city, e.g. near 
contaminated sites, and are more affected by the lack of green space and public transport 
services, by noisy and dirty roads and industrial pollution. Climate change is a new and complex 
challenge for cities (European Environment Agency, 2009: 14-17). 
 
3.4.2. Neighbourhood and location of the accommodation 
 
Satisfaction with neighbourhood is dependent on the characteristics of the place of residence and 
on socio-demographic background of the inhabitants. However, socio-demographic background 
variables alone are relatively poor predictors of neighbourhood satisfaction: perceived 
neighbourhood attributes are much more useful to understand it (Parkes et al., 2002: 2434; 
Feijten & Van Ham, 2009: 2115). 
 
Economic status, length of residence, accommodation type and age (Parkes et al., 2002: 2426; 
Feijten & Van Ham, 2009: 2116) are some socio-economic factors linked with residential 
satisfaction. Most important characteristics that make people satisfied with their neighbourhood 
based on a study conducted in UK are nice general appearance of the neighbourhood and 
satisfaction with housing. Quite important is also the existence and quality of schools, friendly 
people/friendship with neighbours, community spirit and emotional roots. The existence of 
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leisure facilities and green open areas has also some importance. Crime as well as insecurity or 
fears of crime are very strong predictors of neighbourhood dissatisfaction (Parkes et al., 2002; Pa 
Ke Shon, 2007). Other things that make people dissatisfied with are noise (Parkes et al., 2002: 
2427), nuisance (Pa Ke Shon, 2007: 2236) and neighbourhood density (Kim et al., 2005: 1630). 
Besides that, lack of activity in the neighbourhood, monotony and dullness are mentioned as 
reasons for dissatisfaction, especially for young people (Pa Ke Shon, 2007: 2236). 
 
40% of Europeans are reported living in dwellings that are badly situated (Giorgi, 2003: 31), in 
areas with high levels of noise, pollution or crime (Giorgi, 2003: 31) or poor access to transport, 
opportunities and services (Cameron, 2009: 8-9). There are tendencies towards spatial 
segregation of different income groups (Czasny, 2004: 9). The distribution of low-income 
households, the older people, the unemployed and lone parents, is not even or random but 
involves significant concentrations in particular parts of cities and regions (Musterd & Murie, 
2002: 40). Groups that are especially vulnerable to spatial segregation are migrants and ethnic 
minorities. The degree of spatial segregation of immigrants across the EU varies. There are 
multiple causes for this variation, including immigrants’ income levels, discrimination in the 
housing market, public housing policies and degree of ethnic closure (Spencer & Cooper, 2007: 
36). Segregation is not just a product of inequality in incomes, which forces poorer people to 
move to specific neighbourhoods: segregation itself alters the spatial differentiation of cities, in 
particular by altering neighbourhoods where poor people are concentrated (Skifter Andersen, 
2002: 166). 
 
Education and educational standards and results of the schools in socially excluded 
neighbourhoods have been a major focus of policies. One of the earliest theories of poverty 
concentration - the concept of a “cycle of deprivation” - identified poor educational performance 
as a key mechanism in transmitting deprivation and disadvantage from one generation to the next 
(Cameron, 2009: 41-42). When comparing the long-term effects of living in good and bad 
neighbourhoods during childhood or youth Andersson (2004: 641) (study conducted in Sweden) 
found the surroundings indeed to be relevant for educational outcomes, however neighbourhood 
effects on occupational status (employed/unemployed) and income were relatively small. Gordon 
(1996: 418-419) also found major disparities in exam results between different neighbourhoods, 
which however according to him can be better explained through socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics of the areas, not the deprivation of neighbourhood.  
  
Areas, that are characterised by a concentration of low income households tend to have various 
problems which amplify each other, for example unlikely provision of market for viable 
businesses, which causes the lack of employment opportunities and makes services hard to reach, 
ill health as a consequence of long-term unemployment, low motivation and underachievement 
in schools. All these problems place pressure on family and community life. 
 
3.4.3. Housing 
 
The average number of people living in a household in the EU27 was 2.5 in 2005. It tends to be 
lower in Northern part of Europe and higher among the Mediterranean countries and those 
countries, which joined the EU since 2004 (Eurostat, 2009a: 252-253). In the actual quality of 
dwellings, there is also a clear-cut break between the former Eastern Bloc countries and the 
countries of the EU15 (Housing Statistics in the European Union, 2005/2006: 9-10).  
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Some social groups, households or individuals lack access to suitable housing, because of 
homelessness25 or the accommodation being characterised as in “bad condition” (disrepair, 
overcrowding, leaking roofs, insufficient heating) (Cameron, 2009: 9; Giorgi, 2003: 30-31). 24% 
of Europeans report living in accommodation, which is in bad condition (Giorgi, 2003: 31). 
Problems with access to suitable housing are most relevant to poorer people who have a far 
worse housing quality than other households (Czasny, 2004: 8; European Commission, 2007b: 
104-105). This is particularly the case in many of the new member states. Housing conditions in 
rural areas appear to be worse than in urban areas. The urban-rural division reflects also the 
differences according to age, income and occupational status: young people, unemployed, low-
skilled and low-income people report worst conditions. This phenomenon appears to be almost 
non-existent in Northern countries, while they are quite severe in Eastern and some Southern 
countries (namely Italy, Greece, and Portugal) (European Commission, 2008c: 9-10).  
 
Overcrowded conditions are defined as when the number of people living in their homes exceeds 
the number of rooms in the household (excluding kitchen and bathroom). The extent of crowded 
housing for children varies considerably between countries: in every country, at least one in ten 
children lives in an overcrowded home26. Children in Eastern Europe experience overcrowding 
the most and it is quite wide-spread in Italy and Greece, while children in the Netherlands and 
Spain are least likely to suffer from overcrowding (OECD, 2009b: 37-40). 
 
There are wide ranging differences across the member states as regards to housing ownership 
status (Eurostat, 2009a: 252-253; Norris & Shiels, 2004: 6-7). A phenomenon, that characterises 
Europe as a whole is the reduction in the rental housing stock. This trend may be attributed to 
two main reasons: the shift of housing support policies from rental to ownership and major sales 
of the public housing stock in Eastern countries, England and the Netherlands. Finland and 
Sweden moved against this trend and saw their rental housing stock increase because of the rise 
in the public housing stock (Housing Statistics in the European Union, 2005/2006: 10-11). 
 
Housing price index has risen more rapidly than the general price index. Regular rise has been 
recorded in the incidence of the housing price over the total household consumption in all 
countries. The proportion on household income devoted to housing costs is significantly higher 
in the long-standing 15 EU member states than in the new member states and applicant 
countries, but it seems that in terms of housing affordability, these two regions of Europe are 
converging (Norris & Shiels, 2004: 17-18). 
 
A growing mismatch between the diverse life courses of people and less diverse nature of 
housing stock can be detected. The life course of individuals and households has become more 
complex, producing an ever-greater variety of housing needs, not only at different stages in 
family life course, but also in relation to growing job insecurity regardless of the family 
situation. Simultaneously, the nature of the housing stock tends to become less diverse, with 
more and more people buying detached dwellings located in suburban areas (Bonvalet & 
Lelievre, 1997: 197-199). The current model of “every-one owning their home” is unable to 
satisfy wide-ranging housing demands. Contrary to housing market trends, the growth of small 
households resulting from the fall in the birth rate and the ageing of population, together with the 
increase in the number of single-parent families, childless couples and people living alone, point 
to the need for more rental housing (Bonvalet & Lelievre, 1997: 197-199).  
 
                                                 
25 See, for example Edgar (2009). 
26 Only members of OECD are compared. 
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Ageing of population will provoke demand for changes in the provision and design of housing 
and services such as caring and transport; it will also influence the lifestyles of citizens of all 
ages and the trajectory of urban development (OECD, 2003: 10-12). Older people are diverse in 
their purchasing power (richer and poorer) and lifestyle preferences. As a result of this diversity 
and better financial situation there is a new emphasis on freedom of choice and self- funding 
retirement housing and care that, if not carefully handled, is likely to exacerbate inequality of 
access (Ageing…, 2003: 15-19).  
 
Another expression of the diversification of living arrangements concerning younger people is 
the postponement of leaving the parental home27 (European Commission, 2008b: 9). Housing 
and fertility decisions are also related. In contexts where social and economic transformation is 
underway and the welfare state is minimal or inadequate, like in Mediterranean regions or former 
socialist countries, major ambiguities and dilemmas result from balancing the ideal of entering 
parenthood after having secured the financial and housing conditions and the opportunity to 
realise such security (Philipov et al., 2009: 48-49). It is indicated that intentions of younger 
respondents to have children are less likely to be realised, because earlier in life, respondents 
have not yet completed education, started working career and/or found convenient housing, 
which all are considered necessary preconditions (Philipov et al., 2009: 61). 
 
The differences in the handling of housing costs for poor and vulnerable households result from 
differences in the aims of general housing policy (Czasny, 2004: 91-92). Two dimensions are 
relevant: 1) the scope of state involvement, measured in terms of coverage (supporting all to the 
“right of housing”/ supporting those in need) 2) the focus of housing policy (ownership as 
ultimate form of housing security / social housing as a measure for state to fulfil its pivotal role 
in housing sector) (Giorgi, 2003: 18-19).  
 
Based on two different classifications (Giorgi, 2003: 18-19; Czasny, 2004: 91-92), which are 
largely similar in their contents four different approaches can be identified: 
 
 housing policies favouring universal coverage and placing high value on private 
ownership (Belgium and Germany): policies are aiming at rather low level of general 
housing costs through supply-sided interventions in the housing market (Sweden, 
Netherlands); 
 housing policies favouring universal coverage, yet with a strong commitment to social 
housing (Austria and Denmark); 
 housing policies favouring partial coverage and placing a high value on private 
ownership (Italy and Ireland): support is provided for those in need in a basically free 
housing market (UK, Spain and France); 
 housing policies favouring partial coverage with a commitment to supporting measures 
for those in need, including support for social housing. Other measures can be aimed at 
achieving additional price-reductions for the poor through laboured social gradations of 
housing quality via various supply- and demand-sided measures (France). 
 
According to some opinions home ownership is an important dimension of wellbeing since it 
protects owners from fluctuations in rents, ensures families a stable and safe shelter and the 
value of property represents a major source of wealth for households (OECD, 2007d: 140). 
Home ownership is supported in most of European countries (Giorgi, 2003: 20; Priemus & 
Dieleman, 2002: 192) and preferred by residents (Priemus & Dieleman, 1999: 627). Due to the 
                                                 
27 This topic is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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rising housing costs, governments are trying to provide more affordable housing (Paris, 2007: 3). 
However, social housing does not seem to be a popular solution anymore, since this sector is in 
decline practically everywhere (Giorgi, 2003: 25; Priemus & Boelhouwer, 1999: 644). There are 
also some regional differences: in the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark the social 
rented sector is in decline. In France and Sweden, the sector is stable or even slightly expanding. 
In southern Europe, the social rented sector is marginal (Priemus & Dieleman, 2002: 191).  
 
The housing sector in CEE countries is unusual because of the effect of privatisation and 
restitution (Hegedüs, 2009: 3; Buckley & Tsenkova, 2001: 276). Home ownership was perceived 
as the most desirable and efficient form of tenure and became the most important objective of 
privatisation (Pichler-Milanovich, 2001: 155). Relying on the introduction of market economy 
according to neoliberal theory, there have been hardly any restrictions on private ownership of 
economic enterprises, urban land or real estate. Due to that, most CEE countries have achieved 
high levels of homeownership (average of 80% of dwellings). Privatisation had also a regressive 
social effect: low-income households were trapped in the residual social rental sector (Hegedüs, 
2009: 3). Other kinds of problems arise when the new owners lack financial resources to 
maintain and renovate old housing stock (Pichler-Milanovich, 2001: 170). The collapse of the 
former East European housing model produced radical changes in housing finance systems. 
Subsidies for the construction of state-owned housing were largely withdrawn (Norris & Shiels, 
2007: 73; Pichler-Milanovich, 2001: 169). 
 
The switch from subsidies for dwellings to those of households has dominated policy change in 
Europe between 1980 and 2000 (Maclennan, 2008: 424; Paris, 2007: 3). The emphasis is on 
reaching the needs of vulnerable groups, not at improving the life quality of broad segments of 
the population. Housing allowances are considered a suitable and the most important measure to 
provide help with housing costs (Turner & Elsinga, 2005: 108; Priemus & Kemp, 2004: 666; 
Paris, 2007: 3; Priemus & Boelhouwer, 1999: 644). Countries are also aiming at reducing 
exclusion through housing (spatial segregation) by targeting areas of poverty concentration 
(Cameron, 2009: 10). Urban regeneration policies are a common phenomenon in western 
European countries (Kleinhans, Priemus & Engbersen, 2007: 1069). 
 
3.5. Educational level and the impacts on children 
Educational level of parents is a key determinant of children’s current and future situation since 
it has impact on both (European Commission, 2008a: 26). There are large differences between 
European countries in the distribution of population by education levels. Today, on average in 
the EU, most children are raised with at least one of their parents having fulfilled secondary 
education. However, national situations differ across the EU, since the percentage of children 
living with low skilled parents ranges from 10% or less in half of the countries (including most 
of the former socialist member states) to 30% to nearly 70% in the Southern States and Ireland 
(European Commission, 2008a: 26).  
 
The percentage of low-skilled is usually over-represented among lone parents, but not in large 
families in which parents' educational levels correspond to those of the average population. 
(European Commission, 2008a: 26). PISA results illustrate the impact that specific family 
structures can have on the performance of pupils. For instance, the 2000 and 2003 results show 
that children growing in lone parents households perform relatively lower than children from 
other families (European Commission, 2008a: 58; Ghysels & Van Vlasselaer, 2008: 294). This is 
mostly true in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden while in a number of 
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countries their performance is not significantly different from pupils growing in other families 
(European Commission, 2008a: 58). 
 
As expected, the parents’ education profile of poor children differs significantly from their peers, 
since for more than 30% of poor children none of the parents reached a secondary level of 
education, and only 16% of them have a parent with upper education. However, in most of the 
former socialist member states, where child poverty is high, the proportion of children whose 
parents are low skilled remain rather low (European Commission, 2008a: 26).  
 
People from disadvantaged families face considerable obstacles in realising their full potential 
and achieving better living standards for themselves and their children (European Commission, 
2008a: 58-59). Parental wealth reduces the importance of capital market barriers to the 
acquisition of education. Low-income parents might not invest optimally in their children’s 
human capital: poverty risks, joblessness and lack of education are therefore likely to accumulate 
and result in a larger share of individuals at risk of social exclusion (OECD, 2009b: 149-150). 
 
Educational deprivation reflects the resources available for children’s learning. Fifteen year old 
children are considered deprived when they have fewer than four of following eight basic items: 
a desk to study, a quiet place to work, a computer for schoolwork, educational software, an 
internet connection, a calculator, a dictionary and school textbooks. The variation between 
countries in terms of educational deprivation is large and does not directly reflect the income 
levels of families. Educational deprivation is smallest in Iceland and Germany. There are also 
gender differences: boys are more often educationally deprived than girls (across the OECD 
3.6% of boys are educationally deprived, compared to 3.3% of girls), with the exception of 
Denmark, Iceland and Sweden (OECD countries were compared) (OECD, 2009b: 35). 
  
The PISA 2003 data shows a strong and positive correlation between the parents' own 
educational attainment and the performance of the fifteen year old pupils in mathematics, 
reading, and science. In particular, pupils whose mothers completed only primary or lower 
secondary education score 20 points lower in average than those whose mothers completed upper 
secondary education (European Commission, 2008a: 58). Children of highly educated mothers 
more often have a better educational attainment (Ghysels & Van Vlasselaer, 2008: 294). The 
educational background of fathers is also a significant factor in many countries. The impact of 
the parents' educational level varies to some degree across countries, depending on the equity of 
the educational system (European Commission, 2008a: 58). 
 
Young people who leave school too early and with only lower secondary education are at a 
disadvantage on the labour market. Their personal and social development is in danger of being 
curtailed and they are at greater risk of poverty and social exclusion than other young people 
who continue their education and training. In 2006, 15.3% of young people aged between 18 and 
24 in the EU27 had left the education system with only lower secondary education and were not 
in further education and training. At EU level, the rate of early school leavers has improved 
slightly since 2000, reflecting an improvement in the great majority of countries. However, this 
rate varies greatly across the EU, from around 5% in Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Slovak Republic to 20% or more in Southern countries (Italia, Spain, Portugal and Malta) 
(European Commission, 2008a: 57). A number of national and international studies found 
explanative factors to be socio-economic background, ethnicity, sex, prior school achievement, 
peer pressure, motivation and truancy (European Commission, 2008a: 57). 
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Social inequality has been identified as the pathway by which childhood social disadvantage may 
lead to lower levels of educational attainment (Fergusson et al., 2008). There are different 
perspectives on this issue. The materialist or neo-materialist perspective emphasises the role of 
poverty and material resources as the primary route through which childhood social disadvantage 
is translated into educational under-achievement (Bradley & Corwyn, 2002; Ryan et al., 2006). 
The family perspective stresses the importance of family processes (such as parental educational 
aspirations, differences in language use, etc.) and childhood socialisation, which place children 
born in low socio-economic status families at a disadvantage at school (Linver et al., 1999; 
Walker et al., 1994; Singly, 2006; Déchaux, 2007). Furthermore, the cognitive ability 
perspective links the origins of socio-economic differences in educational achievement with 
underlying socio-economic differences in childhood intelligence (Jensen, 1996; Teasdale & 
Owen, 1986). The school perspective focuses on the role of educational institutions. This 
approach sees disadvantaged children as being exposed more often to school contexts that do not 
encourage their educational performance. 
 
From the point of view of the transmission of childhood social advantage and disadvantage via 
the family, existing research focuses on two main strands of transmission, material and cultural. 
First, income differences between families mean that not only do some children grow up in more 
affluent circumstances, but they will also inherit economic capital – that is, material advantage 
may be directly passed on (Crompton, 2006b). Regarding the cultural dimension, a review of the 
research shows that there are empirically established class differences in the way children are 
socialised, and the extent to which parents invest time and resources in children’s acquisition of 
social, cognitive and educational skills (Kellerhals & Montandon, 1991; Laureau, 2003; Reay & 
Lucey, 2003; Déchaux, 2007; Singly, 2006). 
 
In this context, recent research carried out on intergenerational mobility in OECD countries also 
provides important findings (OECD, 2007b). It shows that education is a major contributor to 
intergenerational income mobility and that educational differences tend to persist across 
generations. In relation to childhood social disadvantage, the report argues that early and 
sustained investment in children can help, as a key role is played by early childhood education, 
care and health. On the other hand, economic transfers and in-kind services to parents also 
emerge as important, as they provide families with the resources to better rear and care for their 
children. The report concludes that, “overall, a strategy based on a greater investment in children 
holds the promise of breaking the cycle of intergenerational disadvantages because of its effects 
in reducing child poverty and contributing to child development”. However, as other reviews 
argue, the issue of childhood social disadvantage cannot only be addressed in the context of 
poverty, since research findings underline the family, both economically and culturally, as the 
main transmission belt of disadvantage. For Esping-Andersen (2003), this implies addressing not 
only the question of poverty, but also the issue of the parental division of labour, in particular of 
maternal employment, and the related issue of childcare. 
 
3.6. Media, communication and information technologies in families 
In 2007, for the first time, a majority (54%) of households in the EU27 had internet access, and 
the main location for accessing the internet was the home (Eurostat, 2009a). The proliferation of 
communication and information technologies has placed media and digital literacies at the centre 
of policy priorities (cf. the EC’s Digital Agenda, launched in March 2010), as well as high on the 
research agenda. For most families in Europe, the media have shifted in status from a merely 
incidental, if desirable, element of private life and leisure to becoming thoroughly embedded in 
 
58 
families’ everyday life, providing the indispensible infrastructure for domestic space, daily 
timetables and, in consequence, a taken-for-granted mediator of social relations within and 
beyond the home. 
 
Media is here articulated both as object - items in the household, whose location, access, 
gendered usage, use for facilitating work at home or care and support for older people and the 
infirm have significance for the timetable, spatial arrangements and social relations of family 
life, and as text - where the content and reception of media messages, the ways in which they 
represent dis/advantaged groups, and the symbolic (and material) risks as well as opportunities 
they pose influence people’s perceptions of the wider world and of their place within it. 
 
In addition to transformations in the media environment, some important social trends shape the 
family context within which media are accorded a place in the household (Livingstone, 2002 & 
2009). As children remain dependent on their parents for longer, their teenage and young adult 
years are spent in the family home, creating a demand for multiple personalised media goods to 
accommodate competing leisure interests. With the rise of consumerism, commerce is targeting 
ever-younger children, expanding the commercial value of the child market and creating new 
markets for many forms of interactive or mass media. As the number of children in each family 
declines, parents are able to spend more on each child, such expenditure typically including 
media goods, digital toys, heavily advertised fashion items and media-related bedroom décor, 
sometimes with consequences for parental authority and values. In some countries (especially the 
UK and US), parental fears regarding the safety of their children in public places, encourages a 
tendency to equip the home as a place of leisure entertainment to compensate for declining 
public provision. As the period of education extends through the late teens, and as competitive 
pressures to gain workplace skills increase, parents are under social and financial pressure to 
provide household goods, technologies and toys to support informal learning at home.  
 
As the means of communication changes, requiring updated provision and new digital skills, 
adults too must engage in a continual process of learning – to use the technology in its own right 
and to use it to compete in a more flexible labour market. For diverse reasons, from the growth 
of an elderly population, increased migration, limits on state welfare provision and more 
diversity in family structures, family communication must extend over time and place, 
positioning communication technologies as increasingly valuable. Finally, the shift from top-
down state provision to a consumer-led model of governance places more emphasis on informed 
choice and varieties of technological mediation, this requiring in turn the accessible provision of 
information, choice and networking opportunities for connecting within and beyond 
communities. 
 
3.6.1. The changing place of media in the European home 
 
Research shows a range of functions performed by media in household and familial spaces, 
including provision of a common focus for leisure and conversation, provision of symbolic 
resources for family myths and narratives, the regulation of family time and space and a means 
of separating or connecting family subsystems within and beyond the home. On the one hand, 
media experience still tends to be shared with other family members. On the other hand, media 
are becoming more personalised, used in private spaces, mobile phones enabling more personal 
communication and the diversification of media goods and services supporting individualised 
taste cultures and lifestyles within the family. 
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Ever since it was first introduced into the family home from the 1950s onwards, television 
rapidly became children’s main leisure activity. The idea of media budgets (Roberts et al., 1999 
& 2005) stresses that time for other activities decreases when that spent on media-related 
activities increases; however, they also found that heavy users of one medium are also heavy 
users of others. Indeed, young people seem to be multitasking and using a variety of media 
simultaneously. Reporting from the comparative project, Children and their Changing Media 
Environments, Johnsson-Smaragdi (2003: 193) found that simple media displacement is rare, 
given specialised media use, reallocation of media time and additive media use. Television 
displacing reading time has been a worry, but one without conclusive findings. Johnsson-
Smaragdi’s (2002: 45) findings reveal that the habitual time spent before the television screen 
has increased during the past 15 years with differences at the gender and social background 
interact, where boys from low SES families spend the most time before the screen, and girls 
from high SES families the least. 
 
As television has been increasingly complemented, if surprisingly little displaced, by the use of 
new interactive technologies within the home, a new body of research developed, following 
Silverstone’s (2006) concept of domestication of new technologies in the 1990s. The argument 
was that even once technologies had been purchased by the household, the process of rendering 
them meaningful, finding them both space and time in the life of the family, is an unfolding 
process of interpretation and adjustment (Silverstone, 2006), “ongoing processes rather than 
being a one-off event” (Haddon, 2006: 196). 
 
Despite rapid increases in internet access over the past decade, household access and use of the 
internet still varies widely across Europe, ranging from 25% in Bulgaria to 86% in the 
Netherlands (Eurostat, 2008a). Gender differences in internet and computer use remain 
inconsistent, although present, across Europe. Seybert (2007: 1) reveals that “the difference 
between the proportion of young women (62%) and young men (67%) in the EU25 using 
computers daily in 2006 was relatively small [...], slightly more young men (53%) than young 
women (48%) used the internet daily”. While parental education and income both have a part to 
play, their effects may be opposed, and it is certainly not simply the more affluent who have 
more. Family type also matters: while two-parent households (and households with working 
mothers) are much more likely to provide a media-rich home, reflecting their considerably 
higher incomes, single parents are just as likely to provide media-rich bedrooms for their 
children.  
 
For children and young people, one of the most important contributions of research has been to 
challenge the moral panics that commonly associate youthful media use with fears regarding 
their vulnerability and victimisation or, on the other hand, their engagement with new forms of 
mediated “hooliganism”. A good example of this sensibility is research on the emergence of a 
media-rich bedroom culture for children (Livingstone, 2009). This could be framed in terms of 
children’s isolation from family life and their consequent vulnerability to commercial, violent, or 
other media messages. Although children are hardly immune to such messages, qualitative 
research influenced by domestication theory adds a different understanding. 
 
The rise of a media-rich bedroom culture suggests several consequences for the family. Children 
spend time in highly individualised, consumerist, and usually strongly gendered spaces. 
Children’s media use may be more extensive, continually in the background if not also the 
foreground, and relatively unsupervised or unmediated by parents; the family’s leisure time is 
more compartmentalised (Rompaey, 2001), with families “living together separately” (Flichy, 
1995), and with time spent together “as a family” something that requires deliberate 
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arrangement. Even when children are in the home, not physically co-located with friends, their 
leisure time may be spent in a peer context, in touch with peers as much or more than with 
parents (Ito et al., 2009; Livingstone, 2009). Age makes a difference. Generally, older children 
and boys have more media goods in their bedroom, particularly screen entertainment media. 
Livingstone (2002) notes that families with sons place computers in bedrooms more often; those 
with daughters place them in a common space (see also Johnsson-Smaragdi et al., 1998). 
 
Considerable cultural differences in bedroom culture are evidenced cross-nationally. The 
Children and their Changing Media Environment project, which surveyed children in 12 
countries in 1997-98, found differences. A “screen entertainment culture” is particularly strong 
in the UK, with Denmark following close. Households in the Nordic countries and the 
Netherlands are “pioneers” of new technologies, including for children. In Spain, both boys and 
girls are particularly likely to spend time with the family and to spend comparatively less time in 
the bedroom, while Swedish and Finnish teenagers are overwhelmingly more likely to spend 
their free time with a group of friends, also spending a smaller proportion of their free time in 
their own room. Indeed, Swiss teenagers spend a more than average proportion of their time in 
their own rooms, while Finnish teenagers spend less than average, even though Swiss children 
own fewer televisions or computers and spend less time on these media while for Finnish 
children the opposite is the case (Bovill & Livingstone, 2001: 196). 
 
For parents, media pose considerable challenges regarding values, competences and authority. 
They also bring considerable advantages in terms of leisure, shared interests, and pleasures. 
  
3.6.2. Digital and interactive media technologies and associated risks 
 
With 75% of European children using the internet, a figure that continues to rise although it may 
soon plateau, societal concerns regarding the associated risks also increase, raising new research 
questions with pressing policy implications.  
 
The evidence across Europe shows that, notwithstanding considerable cross-national differences 
in children’s internet use, the more parents use the internet, the more children do so also. Several 
patterns are emerging: (i) gender gaps in access diminish as home and school internet access 
becomes common; (ii) there is a growing bedroom culture for teenagers and solitary use of the 
internet is increasing, particularly for boys; and (iii) the amount of time spent by boys and girls 
online has been increasing in all countries. 
 
Giving out personal information is the most common risky behaviour at around half of online 
teenagers. Findings from the Eurobarometer survey (Livingstone & Haddon, 2009) suggest that, 
according to their parents, children encounter more online risk through home than school use 
(although this may be because parents know little of their children’s use at school). 
 
There is evidence supporting a classification of countries based on the likelihood of children 
experiencing online risk. This classification suggests a positive correlation between use and risk. 
High use, high-risk countries are, it seems, either wealthy Northern European countries or new 
entrants to the EU. Southern European countries tend to be relatively lower in risk, partly 
because they provide fewer opportunities for use (Hasebrink et al., 2009). 
 
It seems that children’s internet-related skills increase with age. Such skills are likely to include 
children’s abilities to protect themselves from online risks although, perhaps surprisingly, this 
has been little examined. There are cross-national differences in coping, it seems. Children’s 
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perceived ability to cope with online risk reveals higher ability to cope among children in 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany and the UK, and lower ability to cope in 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Portugal and Spain (intermediate countries are the Czech Republic, 
Ireland, Poland, Slovenia and Sweden). 
 
3.6.3. Parenting, media, everyday life and socialisation 
 
Traditionally, infants and toddlers have engaged little with the media, although television, radio 
and music are often in the background. During primary school years, children are generally not 
major media users, although television and electronic games are highly popular. Over the 
teenage years, young people begin to broaden their range of media uses and tastes, often seeking 
to individuate themselves from their friends via media tastes while simultaneously being 
absorbed in the (often normative, even coercive) culture of their peer group. By their late teens 
and early twenties, young people are negotiating a wide range of information, communication 
and literacy demands as they manage the transition from school to further study and/or work. 
 
Generally, much of the available literature on media and socialisation addresses questions of 
media exposure and effects. Overall, the research literature points to a range of modest effects, 
including effects on attitudes and beliefs, effects on emotions, and, more controversially, effects 
on behaviour (or the predisposition towards certain behaviours). However, there are many 
methodological qualifications and contestations accompanying these conclusions, especially the 
critique of cause-effect assumptions in much socialisation theory, and the concern that such 
research neglects the child’s own agency. 
 
In terms of family reception of media content, and questions of values and tastes, the context of 
family viewing is a crucial determining factor in what causes offence. Research suggests that 
audience concern most often focuses on terms that stereotype or marginalise. Buckingham 
(2005) suggests that children may adopt their taste judgements from adults, including finding 
swearing, sex or violence distasteful or embarrassing. On the other hand, they also consider that 
such content in reality television, game shows and soap operas has value in offering them a kind 
of a projected adult future. Thus Buckingham and Bragg (2003 & 2004) found that children may 
value sexual material as a means of gaining information otherwise difficult to obtain or as 
providing a pretext for discussing difficult issues in the family. 
 
Parental mediation strategies for children online can be classified as active or instructive 
mediation, rule making or restrictive mediation, and parental modelling or co-viewing. Research 
on parental mediation of the internet in fact reveals that mediation is fairly widely practised, 
albeit with substantial cross-national variations. The effectiveness of time restriction in European 
countries shows that the significance of the strategy differs with the socialisation cultures of the 
countries. However, evidence of “a regulation gap”, impeding parental mediation especially for 
the internet, shows that since parents are willing and ready to mediate television more than the 
internet, even though they worry more about the internet and television, it is lack of skills rather 
than lack of concern that results in lower levels of internet mediation. Kirwil (2009: 403) 
concludes that “although parental mediation is associated with fewer number of children at risk 
from online content, the effectiveness of several strategies seems to depend on the country’s 
socialisation culture. In Europe, both restrictive and non-restrictive mediation may be effective 
in one childrearing culture, but ineffective in another one”. 
 
The economic and educational resources of the family are replicated in digital environments. To 
create societies in which all families are equal, it is important to understand how we can break 
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this vicious cycle for disadvantaged families so that access to services, social relationships, 
education and information is not limited by cultural, social or economic background. 
The use of ICT in education and learning at school and at home is the site of attention and action 
at the policy level as the use of ICT for positive impacts on learning outcomes, achieving 
potentials, acquiring job skills and enhancing lifelong learning is indicated. In terms of utilising 
full benefits of ICT in education and learning, Livingstone (2009: 64) identifies two hurdles: 
“one is attitudinal, for parents must share this educational and technological vision for their 
child; the other is material, for parents must possess the resources (time, space, knowledge and 
money) to implement this vision”. Recently, there has been optimism that mobile phones may 
help to overcome digital divides between learners with home broadband access and does 
without, or that it may improve feedback from teachers. However, mobile learning necessitates a 
good amount of technical training, preparation and planning, production of learning material and 
a sequence of other many time-consuming activities. It must be admitted that, as with ICT and 
education, the advantages of this are still unclear, and as always, these are bound to vary by 
demographic factors. 
 
3.7. Conclusions  
This chapter has covered a wide range of themes influencing current conditions and everyday 
life of European families including economic situation, housing and environment, education, and 
media. Main emphasis has been paid on families with children and inequalities, not only 
differences between countries but also between social groups and different families. Major trends 
based on this review can be identified as follows: 
 
 polarisation in contemporary European families is significant, in particular between 
low/highly qualified couples; male breadwinner/dual earner couples; low/high income 
families, EU/non-EU migrant families, in urban-rural dimension; 
 the persistence of poverty in some groups and types of households which continue to 
show a higher risk of exposure to poverty; 
 the extreme vulnerability of migrant families and their children, particularly of non-EU 
immigrant families in comparison with other families and EU migrant families; 
 the mismatch between the life course diversity and housing market developments; 
 new, interactive, individualised and personalised media technologies are rapidly 
contributing to a diverse media environment in Europe; 
 children’s use of the internet continues to grow. Striking recent rises are evident among 
younger children (6-11 years) and in countries which have recently entered the EU; 
 socio-economic inequalities continue to matter with patterns of digital exclusion 
mirroring those of social exclusion. 
 
A review of existing research shows that social inequality plays a crucial role in family life and 
is related to family structure and dynamics in complex ways (e.g. Langman, 1988; Singly, 1987 
& 1993; Kaufmann, 1993; Lahire, 1995; Paugam & Zoyem, 1997; Allan & Crow, 2001; Attias-
Donfut et al., 2002; Cohen, 2004; Segalen, 2006; Kellerhals et al., 2004; Wall, 2005; Crompton, 
2006a; Aboim, 2006; Déchaux, 2007). Family forms, events and relationships may be the 
consequence, or the cause, of various forms of social inequality. In poverty and hardship, some 
families may be able to activate extended support networks and serve as resource pools to protect 
against scarcity (of income, lodgings, care, and even technology), while others are socially 
isolated. For the affluent, families are conduits for the intergenerational transmission of wealth, 
status and social capital, usually promoting educational achievement and social mobility for all 
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members of the family; for others, low income or the burden of caring for dependent persons 
may impose gender differentiation or impediments to social and professional mobility.  
 
Two main interrelated trends in the relationship between social inequality and families can be 
identified. First, families reflect social inequalities, since the unequal distribution of various 
resources (economic, educational, social, cultural) and differential opportunities affect the 
circumstances in which family life is built up and access to certain types of family forms, 
divisions of work, services or life-styles. Research shows that the tendency of individuals and 
couples in late modernity to organise family life and intimacy in plural ways and with more 
freedom, beyond the external constraints of normative context and social control, does not mean 
that social determinants have disappeared. The formation of couples, the organisation of family 
life, the socialisation of children and parent-child relationships are all influenced by wider social 
forces and social structure. In sociology since the 1990s, some of the existing research on 
families, largely single country research, has systematically searched for the impact and effects 
of social differentiation on family forms and relationships (Van Zanten, 2001; McRae, 2003b; 
Kellerhals et al., 2004; Widmer et al., 2004; Devine, 2004; Widmer et al., 2006; Duncan, 2005; 
Wall, 2005; Bozon & Héran, 2006; Aboim, 2006; Lyonette et al., 2007; Crompton et al., 2006).  
 
Secondly, families reproduce inequalities, both in the short term and intergenerationally. 
Research shows that family background, life-style, and resources, including both material and 
socio-cultural advantages, tend to affect children’s lives and life chances. Transmission of wealth 
from older to younger generations and support in setting up family life during the transition to 
adulthood is significant in all European countries, with more affluent families being able to 
transfer more material and cultural resources. In other words, conjugal and family life seems to 
foster and reaffirm social and gender orders. In terms of intergenerational effects, families 
remain perhaps the most important mechanism for the transmission of unequal life chances.  
 
One central characteristic of EU countries is the value given to social equality and solidarity. In 
spite of growing doubts created by ethnicity, changes in class-consciousness, and a stronger 
belief in the values of freedom and self-determination, public opinion in the EU considers that 
social equality is a major value, and that it is not automatically obtained through market forces. It 
is part of the government’s responsibility and is considered as a marker of the European social 
model. Thus, social inequalities and their development play a major role, politically and socially, 
not only in EU member states’ thinking and policy agenda but also in the feelings of justice and 
wellbeing of EU citizens and families. 
 
From the point of view of European research, we can say that analysis of social structure, with its 
inherent consideration of economic, social, cultural, and educational inequalities, goes back to 
the founding fathers of sociological theory and thought, largely stimulated by the ways in which 
capitalist societies were generating differentiated groupings and new forms of social advantage 
and disadvantage. The predominant analytical frameworks for late modern societies have found 
it more fruitful to consider social classes and social inequalities as no longer (or less) useful and 
to focus, instead, on paradigms highlighting the concepts of agency, individualisation, choice 
and biographical diversity. The gradual erosion of the divisions, which had long split society into 
three fairly homogeneous and antagonistic classes - the middle class, the working class and the 
peasantry - and the move toward a looser social fabric, with the majority of Europeans 
concurring in their tendency to increase the relative share of the same consumer goods, has also 
encouraged research to pinpoint preferences, attitudes and choices rather than social constraints 
and determination.  
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The fact that the classic tripartite social structure has given way to a looser setup does not mean 
that the social fabric of European societies is becoming increasingly uniform or that inequality, 
based on existing research using indicators of income inequality, is decreasing. Although 
research acknowledges the emergence of a new complex social structure, concern and analysis 
has tended to focus on high-risk and excluded social groups, such as immigrants, the 
unemployed, the poor, rather than on a broader perspective of social inequality and its 
reproduction. The focus on social exclusion and poverty tends to be accounted for on the basis of 
two seemingly conflicting trends affecting “post-modern” societies. On the one hand, there is the 
gradual uniformisation of life-styles and, on the other hand, the emergence of a “dual” society, 
characterised by a professionally mobile and qualified “superclass” surrounded by a fairly 
homogeneous collection of intermediate socio-professional groupings, and a poorly integrated 
“underclass” with a disproportionate number of immigrants, unemployed and unskilled people. 
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4. Genders and generations in families 
 
 
In this chapter, the developmental processes of families are reviewed with particular emphasis on 
gender and generational relations in families: on parent-child relationship, the process of 
transition to adulthood, relationship between partners, women and men, as spouses and parents, 
and between older generation, their adult children and grandchildren. In the research of the 
developmental processes of the family, the factor of age is certainly an important point of 
reference. In this respect, an approach involving the conception of the life course, which is 
founded on age, may well constitute a useful perspective.  
 
Subjects of different ages tend to relate to each other and to the social world in different ways; in 
particular, relationships with the family and within the family undergo change in accordance 
with changes in age. Age regulates entries into and exits from various life worlds together with 
forms of action – for example, when it is appropriate to marry, have children, not have children, 
enter the world of work or exit from it (Elder, 1975; Elder & O’Rand, 1995). Nonetheless, today 
it is necessary to consider this with a critical eye. In the new century this markedly age-related 
intersection of multiple choices and trajectories, has undergone some relevant changes, related to 
the decreasing normative strength of age itself. From this perspective, it should be kept in mind 
that in contemporary society biological age and social age tend to be separated: the former is no 
longer an obligatory reference point for the definition of the latter. It is possible, for example, to 
be a child yet already have the status of an autonomous consumer or, alternatively, to be 
categorised in the so-called “third age” - biological age that would qualify one as elderly - yet 
socially play important social roles. Youth and adulthood exemplify the progressively 
autonomous nature of the relationship between biological age and social age. On a formal level, 
becoming an adult implies a series of changes in status and assumptions of roles that lead to a 
progressive independence, accompanied by a growing social responsibilities. However, today 
this construction appears to be somewhat artificial (Modell et al., 1976).  
 
The sequences that mark the passages from one social age to another are weaker than some 
decades ago. Thus, for example, today the adult is no longer defined through a substantial 
existential stability (in the family, in work, in his/her personal relations) but rather to a 
considerable degree through his/her subjective capacity to dominate the continuous flow of 
changes (Saraceno, 1983). In the climate of uncertainty that characterises contemporary societies 
(Giddens, 1990; Beck, 1994; Bauman, 1999), it is less and less feasible to construct biographical 
trajectories based on age that are consolidated and socially structured. 
 
Socio-cultural processes that contribute to weakening the life-course approach are first, the 
process of individualisation, and secondly, the process of the transformation of cultural norms, 
in particular in the direction of their increasing subjectivisation (Bozon, 2004). Individualisation 
is a process where individuals take upon themselves the onus of making choices and existential 
decisions. The dynamics of individualisation tend to “liberate” men and women from the 
traditional ties of gender and from familiar role models (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 1995). What 
has been defined as the “subjectivisation of norms” (Bozon, 2004) has a deep impact on family 
life, for example, on sexual morality, Thus, for example, the norms that regulate cohabitation and 
sexual relations can be manipulated by individuals, thereby being transformed into an instrument 
for evaluating and negotiating the relationship. In addition, the application of norms has to be 
continually justified. There is also a widening distinction between principles and practical 
situations, between principles and everyday life. Norms tend to be transformed from “social” to 
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“private” norms. The moral codes relating to the life of the couple and the family are not 
dissolved but rather progressively pluralised and individualised (Leccardi, 2009b). 
 
4.1. Transition to adulthood  
Transitions that young people go through in late modern societies are interrelated and 
intertwined. So-called “yo-yo” transitions (EGRIS, 2001) are potentially reversible transitions 
that unfold in respect of the multiplicity of interlacing “strands” that in late modernity constitute 
the path to adulthood. Today young people find themselves having to negotiate transitional 
processes that are made up of a highly complex mixture of dependence and autonomy, not the 
least problematic aspect of which is a pervasive, underlying, ineluctable tendency for the 
processes themselves to be subject to reversal. This reversibility is characteristic for all the 
various aspects of the condition of young people: their transition from school to work (see 
Walther et al., 2006), their relations with their family of origin (Biggart & Walther, 2006; 
Stauber & du Bois-Reymond, 2006), also with regard of leaving or (ever longer) staying (see 
Buber & Neuwirth, 2009), the development of their life styles, their emotional life and, last but 
not least, their life plans and their own family-building.  
 
Figure 14: Different transitions into adulthood 
 
Source: Walther et al., 2006 
 
The nature of the relations that young people have with their family of origin, moving out from 
the family home, and their couple formation has changed. Today this delicate passage takes 
place later than in the past, especially in the countries of central and southern Europe28.  
 
Table 2 shows the age at which young people, women and men, leave their family of origin in 
the various European countries (Eurostat, 2009a). Of particular note is the advanced age at which 
young people leave their family of origin in Belgium, Italy, Slovakia and Malta, where on 
average they continue to live in their parents’ home beyond the age of 28. Young women leave 
                                                 
28 See also Chapter 2. 
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home earlier compared with young men. In Greece, Romania and Slovenia too, young people 
leave their family of origin at a relatively advanced age. The European country, in which young 
people leave home earliest, is Finland, where on average young women and young men become 
independent at the ages of 22 and 23 respectively. 
 
Table 2: Average age of young women and young men leaving their family of origin (2007) 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2009a 
 
This has a significant impact on the process whereby young people enter into adult life. Two 
distinct sets of factors and conditions contribute to this phenomenon: on the one hand, the 
temporal extension of educational/work training paths and the concrete difficulties of entering 
the workforce that, to an ever-increasing extent, lead young people, in particular women, into 
high level of precariousness. On the other, there is the emergence of emotionally closer and more 
supportive relations between the generations. The family of today is a negotiation and affection 
based family. The passage from the rule-governed family to the family based on sentiment 
makes way for the emergence of a picture of the family in which affection becomes the core of 
the experience. This family then tends to be represented as a place dedicated to caring and 
protection, the principle purpose of which is to provide love and security to children, satisfying 
their economic, social, and affective needs. This can lead to ambivalent consequences: on the 
one hand, a more open and richer affective relationship between parents and children but on the 
other, a more marked and prolonged dependence of children on parents.  
 
Research dealing with transition processes has revealed a marked variability in the life 
trajectories of different individuals (Arnett, 2004 & 2006; Coté, 2000; Leccardi & Ruspini, 
2006). The traditionally and socially structured sequence of events once typical of the transition 
to adult life no longer constitutes the norm. Life trajectories, which for previous generations 
were more standardised, have become increasingly fragmented, without clearly identifiable 
connections between one phase and another; indeed, at times the phases can even be inverted. 
This process has been referred to as the destandardisation of life courses (see Walther & Stauber, 
2002) and it manifests itself in what has been called choice biography (Furlong & Cartmel, 1997; 
du Bois-Reymond, 1998), characterised by a marked individualisation and an accentuation of 
traits of risk; related especially to social inequalities. Transition to parenthood, in contrast to 
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other transitional processes such as those relating to work, personal relationships, housing etc., is 
distinguished by an indisputable irreversibility: becoming a mother or father inevitably involves 
becoming a parent until the end of one’s life (even after one’s child has her/himself become a 
parent). This characteristic as such plays a fundamental role not just in the construction of 
identities but also in the construction of representations of reality and societal images of (good) 
parenthood. Thus, the link between reversibility (of life choices) and irreversibility (of 
parenthood) generates a considerable amount of ambivalence that young people in becoming 
parents have to cope with. In investigating the ramifications of this ambivalence, it is important 
that young people themselves are considered as agents who not only react to social expectations 
and pressures but who also respond to them in an active and engaged way. It is in their agency, 
i.e. in the strategies and solutions that they themselves generate, that we expect to identify 
instances of social change, phenomena that might then be analysed in terms of cultural practices 
and representations as well as (new) learning obligations. 
 
Becoming a parent involves an extremely profound change not just in the life course of 
individuals but also in the nature of the relations within the couple. It is for this reason that 
couples today, whether married or not, tend to evaluate and weigh up ever more carefully a 
series of circumstances, both present and future, before committing them to bring a child into the 
world. Right from the 1990s, decisions relating to parenthood began to be influenced by a series 
of new considerations (Hobcraft & Kiernan, 1995): 1) having a partner: although an increasing 
number of children are born outside marriage, the majority are still born to a mother and father 
that live together in a married couple, 2) completing education and work training: the majority of 
young Europeans do not become parents before completing their studies, 3) having a job that 
guarantees an adequate income: changes in the labour market have led to an increase in and 
prolongation of the financial dependence of young people on their families, young people, both 
men and women, have to evaluate whether it is economically feasible for them to become 
parents, 4) having a house of one’s own, and 5) having a “sense of future”: apart from the 
concrete factors discussed above, having a child also demands being able to anticipate events at 
least over the medium-term period. 
 
An especially important thematic strand for decision-making processes towards parenthood is the 
timing of becoming parent(s) – i.e. the postponement of parenthood on the one hand and the 
decision for early parenthood on the other, as the two “extremes” in terms of results of decision-
making. The tendency to evaluate rationally the timing and the conditions involved in the 
creation of a stable union and the process of becoming a parent are an expression of the degree 
of insecurity that young people experience today. The implications of becoming a parent are 
perceived and felt differently by men and women. It is necessary to view the two facets of 
parenthood - maternity and paternity - in relation to the other social roles that parents have (for 
example, professional roles). The potential contradiction in identity that derives from the 
multiplicity of roles that young people, particularly women, are required to cover today 
(including being a mother and a worker at one and the same time) can manifest itself in an inner 
and/or social conflict. 
 
After a period of moral panics on the topic of teenage pregnancy, the current discourse - at least 
on a scientific level - now seems to focus on resources related with an early entry into 
parenthood (e.g. Phoenix, 1991; Arai, 2009). Teenage parenting may be more of an opportunity 
than a catastrophe, and often makes sense in the life worlds inhabited by young mothers. Recent 
studies have mostly ignored those young mother and fathers who intentionally and very 
consciously have become parents (Coleman & Cater, 2006). Coleman and Cater show that a part 
of their interviewed young fathers and mothers clearly relate parenthood with an idea of “leading 
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a different life”, with different ways of fathering and mothering as have experienced in their 
families of origin. 
 
The birth of a baby significantly changes the existence of parents, influencing not only the 
identity of the young parents but also the organisation of the family as a whole, its times and its 
rhythms. Women very often engage in a radical review and readjustment of their career 
ambitions. Men, on the other hand, tend to apply themselves to work even more energetically to 
satisfy the needs of the new family, working harder and even seeking additional jobs to increase 
the family income. Moreover, if on the one hand the role of parent reinforces one’s self-esteem 
and helps to establish one’s identity, on the other hand it can provoke a considerable amount of 
tension between private life and work, especially if, as often happens, the work in question is not 
stable. Often such contradictions remain unresolved and the negative consequences generally 
end up falling on the shoulders of women. 
 
It seems possible to identify certain common traits among the representations of the maternity 
and paternity of young Europeans today (Walther et al., 2009: Up2Youth project). A first point 
to note is the discrepancy between the ideas expressed by young women and young men and the 
actual practices put into action in family life. While there is a tendency to aspire to more equal 
and balanced relations within the couple, it seems that in everyday life these aspirations do not 
find expression in terms of the actual distribution of domestic work, which still penalises the 
maternal figure as a different national time-budgets show. Alongside traditional visions of 
parenthood, some new models of parenthood are beginning to emerge in Europe, which make 
provision for changing gender roles, obligations and a reallocation of tasks within the family. 
 
Studying negotiation and decision-making on transitions into parenthood reveals that it cannot be 
characterised just as choices resulting from values and attitudes nor as mere strategies for coping 
with structural conditions but rather have to be regarded as young women’s and men’s complex 
engagement in shaping of their lives (see Burkart, 2002). Issues to be confronted here most often 
deal with questions of “doing gender”: the need to cope with gender-specific, existential 
demands; the invention of femininities and masculinities, motherhoods and fatherhoods; and the 
construction of family life from a subjective point of view. 
 
One general insight of European research on transitions into adulthood is that young people 
depend to a large extent on facilitating structures, such as socio-economic resources and 
opportunity spaces, in order to negotiate, shape and cope with uncertain transitions to family, 
work and citizenship, especially where they are structured by precariousness. However, the 
success of these facilitating structures in turn cannot secure predictable trajectories. Policies are 
required, which let young people perceive such structures as accessible, relevant and manageable 
and in consequence accept and use them.  
 
This implies that measures and policies (national and local) need to allow for individual ways of 
using them according to subjective needs and priorities. Research on this issue (see Walther et 
al., 2009: Up2Youth; Walther et al., 2002: Misleading Trajectories; Walther et al., 2006: Youth 
Policy and Participation) brought up the concept of integrated transitions policies (López-Blasco 
et al., 2003), which are characterised by coordinating different policies affecting young people’s 
lives starting from their biographical perspective. Especially, analysis of research on young 
parenthood has revealed that this is not yet the case for many young women and men in terms of 
a lack of resources and opportunities needed to reconcile work, studies and family. 
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4.2. Gender, parenthood, paid and unpaid work  
One of the most studied family research areas today is the labour market participation of women, 
especially of mothers with young children, and thus the reconciliation of family life, parenthood 
and paid work, and gendered structures and processes related to it. In this chapter, paid and 
unpaid work are differentiated and - within the latter category - distinction is made between 
household duties and childrearing and how these activities are shared by household members 
focusing on heterosexual couples with children. The three domains - paid work, household duties 
and childrearing - are strongly interrelated. This is not only so because the amount of time spent 
on one of these tasks will inevitably restrict the amount of time available for the others, but also 
because they are all underpinned by very similar factors: beliefs and values regarding gender 
roles, the structural environment of the families and individual characteristics.  
 
Work-family balance and reconciliation of work and family life have been in the focus of 
scholars as well as European policy-makers for decades, and they are attached to a series of 
policy aims including gender equality, fertility rates, prevention of loss of human capital and 
(consequently) economic growth (Knijn & Smit, 2009). Work-life balance (or reconciliation) 
perspective focuses on state-policies as well as employers’ measures to facilitate employment of 
individuals (especially women) with family commitments29. Besides the policy and labour 
market constraints, we take cultural aspects and individual preferences into account. 
Furthermore, we do not consider women’s employment normatively but as one possible way of 
coping with families’ needs, constraints and opportunities. 
 
Figure 15: Composite indicator of working time in hours, by country group and gender (2005) 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2009a 
 
                                                 
29 Family and social care policy issues related to work and family reconciliation is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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There is a strong gender aspect involved in this topic. Paid as well as unpaid work is unequally 
distributed between men and women in each European society – although the extent of the 
differences varies considerably. Cultural traditions and social norms relating to gender roles 
shape individual attitudes. Despite the efforts taken by several European societies to create a 
policy environment that conform men and women equally, gender remains a substantial factor of 
the work-distributing behaviour in the labour market as well as in the household (see figure 15).  
 
4.2.1. Main trends and cross-national (dis)similarities in the division of paid work 
 
The most marked change over the past decades in the area of work-division is the increasing 
level of female employment that - on the household-level - has led to the expansion of the two-
earner model. Female participation in the labour force across the EU is constantly increasing in 
virtually all member states. Consequently, the gender-gap in the level of labour market activity is 
on a decrease – falling from 18.6% in 1997 to 13.7% in 2008 in the EU27 countries (Eurostat, 
2009a). A slight break in this falling tendency and in the rate of decrease was provoked when 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, with their remarkably different past entered the 
Union. During their socialist decades, most of these countries achieved a female employment 
rate close to full employment. The high level of female activity dropped radically (most often 
together with men’s employment) after the economic collapse in the early-1990s. In the 
following decade, it had its ‘ups and downs’ in the region (with varying size and varying patterns 
in the various countries) and only since the mid-2000s has a slightly increasing trend been 
observed in the CEE countries (E.g. Scharle, 2007). 
 
Since men’s labour market activity has remained largely stable during the last couple of decades, 
it is the change of female employment that has been provoking most of the changes. As an 
obvious consequence, household employment patterns have changed. The male breadwinner 
model is now being increasingly replaced by alternative models. Among these, however, the dual 
full-time earner is not the dominant one in most of the member states and so far, there is little 
evidence that it would take over the male-breadwinner model (Lewis et al., 2008). Instead, a 
great variety of coexisting models can be observed with variations not only between but also 
within countries and within the life cycle of individual families. Overall, the presence of small 
children greatly increases the more gender-traditional arrangements. Various forms of the 
modified male breadwinner model exist, where one of the partners (typically the woman) works 
in a more limited number of hours. In the less affluent countries, even the female-breadwinner 
pattern is well known, supposedly due to severe labour market difficulties. The dual earner-dual 
carer model is a minority model even in countries (Scandinavia, for example) where citizens are 
highly supporting this normative pattern (Aboim, 2010: 101). The dual earner-highly unequal 
pattern is prevalent in many post-socialist countries (such as Hungary and Slovakia). In 
Switzerland, Western Germany and Spain the more traditional male earner-female carer model is 
the prevalent model. The so-called one and half earner model appears well above average in 
Switzerland, Belgium (Flanders), Western Germany, the UK, and Sweden, mostly countries 
where part-time female employment is more frequent.  
 
4.2.2. Key factors affecting the gender division of paid work  
 
Choices between the possible models of employment are determined by a range of country-
specific but also individual factors. The linkage between female employment and division of 
paid work between couples is obvious although there is no parity between the two. Four main 
sets of factors can be identified that are closely linked to women’s employment rates and to 
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couples’ strategies. These key sets of elements can be labelled as structural, cultural, economic, 
and individual factors (e.g. Haas et al., 2006).  
 
Structural factors include institutional arrangements that support or hinder female employment. 
Usually either the general welfare setting in a given country, or more specifically the impact of 
some public institutions, such as childcare facilities, parental leave system, financial support 
towards children etc. are considered (e.g. Gornick et al., 1997; Szeleva & Polakowski, 2008; 
Van der Lippe & Van Dijk, 2002). Less attention has been paid to labour market institutions 
such as availability of part-time work, flexible working time arrangements, distance work etc. 
Among structural factors sometimes also economic determinants, such as national income and 
unemployment are included. Concerning economic affluence or income - measured either on the 
individual or on the national level - two competing arguments appear. The lack of sufficient 
income might force women to take up paid employment even if it is against their preferences or 
if other structural constraints are present – e.g. available childcare institutions are missing. This 
is called the economic need hypothesis. On the other hand, affluent countries are more likely to 
provide generous provisions for working mothers, and therefore we might expect women in such 
countries to be more active in the labour market (e.g. Van der Lippe, 2001; Uunk et al., 2005). 
Available empirical evidence provides no clear conclusion on the role of economic affluence. 
 
The set of cultural factors often appears as a set of influences competing with structural effects. 
Those include individual attitudes on the micro level or social norms and traditions on the macro 
level. Cross-national comparisons and country typologies that emphasise structural influences on 
gendered employment are contrasted with culturalist approaches that give foremost importance 
to “social values, norms and preferences that go hand in hand with a gender-specific division of 
labour” (Haas, 2005: 490). Cultural explanations can appear on either the micro or the macro 
level. In the first case a direct causality between an individual’s attitudes and preferences on the 
one hand and her behaviour on the other is assumed and it is expected that women with more 
traditional gender roles are less likely to re-enter the labour market after her child is born (Uunk 
et al., 2005). In a macro-level approach, it is expected that women’s behaviour is influenced by 
the social norms and values shared in her wider social surrounding. Hakim’s preference theory 
(2003) explicitly states that attitudinal factors, such as motivations, aspirations and preferences 
regarding work and family are more influential in shaping women’s employment behaviour, than 
institutional factors. Hakim differentiates between work-centred, home-centred and adaptive 
women. While women belonging to one or the other extreme group give clear preference either 
to work or to family and let the other domain remain subordinated in her life, adaptive women - 
who in fact form the majority - adjust their strategies to the actual situation more flexibly. 
Consequently, this latter group of women can be expected to react to (changes in) public policy. 
Hakim has been widely criticised for underscoring the importance of structural constraints and 
for giving too much emphasis to the heterogeneity of female preferences. Nevertheless, her 
theory has remained highly influential and probed in several empirical studies.  
 
In the most recent cross-sectional studies, structuralist and culturalist explanations tend to appear 
together as two competing but also complementing sets of influences that shape women’s 
employment patterns. The direction of causality between the domains is however not clear. A 
stronger version of the culturalist approach would suggest that public policy is a reaction to 
public norms and values, since governments tend to respond to the expectations of the people 
and provide better support to reconcile work and childrearing if there is an explicit need for it. 
The other possibility would be that social norms and values respond to public policies and 
institutional arrangements influence people’s views and attitudes (see e.g. Uunk et al., 2005). 
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Finally, also a range of individual characteristics of the actor has to be taken into consideration. 
Most relevant are number and age of children. Labour supply theory suggests that out of the two 
parents the one with the higher earning potential - usually the male partner - will specialise in 
paid work. Consequently, usually the woman reduces the number of hours spent on paid work. 
Looking at it from a different angle, children raise the value of women’s time spent away from 
paid work and lower the effective market wages since her decision to take up paid work would 
imply additional costs to be paid for alternative childcare (e.g. Gornick et al., 1997). The 
resulting division of paid work between genders is then also reinforced by cultural norms that 
expect women, rather than men to take care of the children and men to support the family. There 
is a consensus in the literature that national variations in the extent to which a woman will reduce 
her involvement in paid work after childbirth is responsible for most of the cross-country 
variation of household employment patterns (Stier et al., 2001). A range of studies has shown the 
tendency that mothers are less likely to participate in the labour market and even if they do so, 
they tend to work shorter hours than childless women do (Van der Lippe, 2001; Uunk et al., 
2005; Kangas & Rostgaard, 2007). In addition, other demographic and social characteristics of 
the individual (especially education) might play a role in shaping decision on labour market 
activity. While structural, cultural and economic influences are often considered as factors 
responsible for variations between the countries, individual influences are associated more with 
within-country variation in the gendered employment practices.  
 
Possibilities of policy-makers to influence the gender division of paid work are limited by 
cultural factors as well as economic constraints and individual characteristics. In countries with a 
high level of policy support towards female employment, typically also social norms favour less 
traditional gender roles. Therefore, it is often not possible to tell whether policy changes could 
also be effective in a less supporting cultural environment. Economic constraints - most 
markedly in some of the CEE countries - do not only limit the resources available for supporting 
work-family balance but they might also restrict employment opportunities and therefore 
negatively influence female employment (Scharle, 2007). At the same time however, economic 
necessity might also force women to take up paid work – and this way improving female 
employment also against the individual preferences (Van der Lippe, 2001; Uunk et al., 2005). 
Other individual characteristics also operate unrelated from policy interventions. In almost any 
policy setting, women with a higher education and better earning potential are more likely to 
take up paid jobs and also to make shorter career breaks when they have children than less 
educated women do (e.g. Vlasblom & Schippers, 2006; Kangas & Rostgaard, 2007).  
 
4.2.3. The division of unpaid work 
 
Changes in the family structures and in the labour force participation described above present a 
serious challenge to conventional family management, domestic task allocation and the 
wellbeing of children. Women’s increased labour force participation decrease their time to 
perform domestic work and put pressure on men to take on greater responsibilities in the 
household. The scale of these changes has however remained limited (e.g. Margherita, 
O’Dorchai & Bosch, 2009). 
 
Although the gap in the number of hours men and women spend on domestic work has narrowed 
in the past decades, this is more due to women reducing their number of hours spent on such 
activities than to any significant changes in men’s behaviour (Burchell et al., 2007; Bianchi et 
al., 2000; Fuwa, 2004; Vannoy et al., 1999). On average, women out of the eighteen European 
countries analysed in the Eurostat report (Aliaga, 2006) perform 66% of all domestic work. 
Employed women do less housework than non-employed women, but they still do household 
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work on a daily basis and they continue to take the (remarkably) bigger share of domestic work 
even in dual-earner families. There is consistent evidence across several studies for the gender 
division of household labour and for the gender segregation of domestic tasks. Studies also find 
cross-national proof of the gender segregation of domestic tasks. Men and women do different 
housework tasks inside the home, with women usually doing the routine chores (cleaning, 
laundry, ironing, washing) that typically cannot be postponed, and men more intermittent ones 
(cooking, childcare, car maintenance or repairs, emptying the trash) (Coltrane, 2000; Gaspar & 
Klinke, 2009; Eurostat, 2004; Fuwa, 2004). Some studies argue that each specific task is sex-
typed (Gaspar & Klinke, 2009; Work changes gender, 2007).  
 
Alongside the cross-national similarities in the gender distribution of domestic tasks, there are 
also considerable cross-national dissimilarities. The relative size of gender inequalities in the 
distribution of household tasks as well as the amount of change occurred during the last decades 
differs. Also, factors that affect the division of household labour vary across countries. 
 
A substantial part of unpaid working hours is spent on childcare. There is a clear tendency for an 
increase of domestic working hours if women have children, particularly when the children are 
small (Aliaga & Winqvist, 2003; Eurostat, 2003). According to European Working Conditions 
Survey (EWCS) data, women do the lion’s share of childcare tasks in all countries considered 
(Eurostat, 2004 & 2009). The division of time spent on caring for children between men and 
women tends to be most equal in the Netherlands, Nordic countries (and also Switzerland), 
where women spend twice as much time on childcare tasks (around sixteen hours per week) 
compared to men (seven to eight hours per week). In all other country groups, men spend on 
average only four to five hours with their children. The largest gender gap in time spent on 
caring for children was noted in the Anglo-Saxon countries, with a difference of ten hours per 
week between women’s (14.2 hours) and men’s (4.1 hours) time spent on childcare tasks 
(Eurostat, 2009b). 
 
However, dominant trends in the area of childcare seem to be remarkably different. Although 
employed women (obviously) spend less time with their children than housewives do, existing 
(but limited) research suggests that both employed and non-employed mothers have increased 
their childcare time during the past four decades (OECD, 2006). The literature provides evidence 
that fathers are more involved in childcare when mothers are employed, although mothers still 
provide more of the care. Furthermore, fathers’ involvement in childrearing is slightly increasing 
– but it reaches highly varying degrees in the various countries as well as in different types of 
families (Fisher, McCulloch & Gershuny, 1999; Gauthier, Smeedeng & Furstenberg, 2004).  
 
4.2.4. Key factors affecting the gender division of domestic and parenting work 
 
Unlike in the area of paid work and female employment, when determinants of the gender 
division of unpaid work are investigated theorists and empirical analysts put a greater emphasis 
on individual level explanations than on macro-level ones. Although structural factors are 
discussed, they are considered to impact by modifying the influence of individual factors.  
 
While no one disputes that women generally do more housework than men, there are diverging 
views on the reasons behind this. There are three dominating individual-level theories on the 
division of household labour. The time availability argument states that the partner with the most 
available time will participate most in housework and childcare. This argument is based on the 
assumption that housework allocation is rationally made in accordance with time commitments 
of each partner (e.g. Becker, 1981). Accordingly, the partner with more demanding occupation 
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and higher number of paid work hours spends less time in household and on childcare tasks. 
Empirical results provide mixed support for this perspective (Burchell et al., 2007; Gauthier et 
al., 2004).  
 
The resource-power perspective assumes that women’s influence on family decision-making is 
limited by their usually lower resources. Since individuals within the family have conflicting 
interests, couples try to negotiate the allocation of time within the household to make the best 
deal based on self-interest (Brines, 1993). The person with more income and higher status will 
spend less time on housework and childcare (Coltrane, 2000). This approach focuses on the type 
and amount of economic and social resources - educational attainments, income, age and 
occupational status - that each person brings to the marriage or affiliation. The partner with more 
resources, higher income and level of education will bargain liberation from domestic chore 
responsibilities (Gaspar & Klinke, 2009) and will spend less time in housework and childcare. 
Empirical studies show that the division of household labour seems to be more equal when the 
gap between the relative socio-economic status of spouses narrows, because it increases 
women’s comparative advantage in the market (Gaspar & Klinke, 2009; González et al., 2009). 
The gender gap in incomes seems to be a contributing factor to the imbalance in the division of 
domestic labour. Studies find that a smaller gap between wife’s and husband’s earnings tends to 
balance the performance of housework (Gaspar & Klinke, 2009). Batalova and Cohen (2002) 
show that men do more domestic tasks in families where wives earn more than husbands do. 
Drobnič and Treas (2006) found that the theory is not supported for all income ranges, indicating 
that factors other than relative resources must also be taken into account. As for the share of 
childcare tasks, findings provide less support for the relative resources theory (Coverman, 1985). 
 
Several studies find that better educated men do more domestic work, while better-educated 
women do less (Batalova & Cohen, 2002; Gaspar & Klinke, 2009; Pittman & Blanchard, 1996). 
The educational level of the husband however is not as important as that of the wife in 
determining the probability of more equal gender division of domestic work. The reason for this 
is that more educated wives spend less time doing housework, not because their husbands 
participate more in the domestic responsibilities (Ramos, 2005; Work changes gender, 2007). 
Several studies show (Gauthier et al., 2004; Gronau, 1977; Leibowitz, 1974) that better educated 
parents tend to devote more time to childcare. Other studies find less support for the explanation 
power of the educational factor.  
 
An important theoretical perspective is that of the socialisation and gender role attitude 
explanation, which suggests that husbands and wives perform household labour according to 
adopted values and beliefs about gender norms (Hiller, 1984; Fenstermaker & West, 2002). This 
theory suggests that housework allocation is a result of the symbolic differentials in gender 
relations (West & Zimmerman, 1987). Couples with egalitarian gender attitudes are expected to 
have more equal division of labour, while traditional couples would have a more gendered 
division of domestic work. According to the gender perspective, domestic work is “a symbolic 
enactment of gender relations" (Bianchi et al., 2000: 194), rather than a trade off between time 
spent in unpaid and paid labour or a rational choice due to the maximisation of family utility. 
The doing gender approach states that the division of household labour in families involves the 
production and maintenance of gender itself (Berk, 1985; Ferree, 1990; West & Zimmerman, 
1987). Many empirical studies from the last decades have found both men’s and women’s gender 
role attitudes as a predictor of the division of domestic labour in various countries (Coltrane, 
2000; Davis & Greenstein, 2004; Shelton & John, 1996). Men with less traditional gender 
ideologies do a greater share of the household labour. These findings are confirmed in samples 
from Germany (Lavee & Katz, 2002), Sweden (Nordenmark & Nyman, 2003), Great Britain 
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(Kan, 2008) as well as in several cross-national studies (Batalova & Cohen, 2002; Davis, 
Greenstein & Marks, 2007; Fuwa, 2004).  
 
Recent research suggests that the division of household labour depends on many interacting 
factors on different levels. According to the integrative perspective, individual behaviours can’t 
be separated from the surrounding context and treated in isolation. More complex concepts 
should involve psychological, interpersonal, institutional, cultural and economic aspects. Despite 
the detailed arguments that have been presented, none of the explanations are strong enough to 
become an exclusive, determinable theory. Nevertheless, since contextual variables shape 
individual behaviours, a holistic approach taking the broader socio-economic and policy context 
into account, might contribute to the explanation of the management patterns of domestic work. 
State policies, economic development, the level of gender equality and characteristics of the 
welfare regime can all influence the division of housework (Batalova & Cohen, 2002; Hook, 
2006; Fuwa, 2004; Stier & Lewin-Epstein, 2007).  
 
However, the division of unpaid work seems to be even more resistant to policy-interventions. 
Through the level of female employment, policy might have some influence on the gender 
distribution of housework. Policy interventions that promote gender equality in the labour market 
also increase gender equality within the household. Individual characteristics however play a 
decisive role in this process. Research has shown that only women with strong individual 
bargaining power and with modern gender attitudes can benefit from egalitarian welfare policies 
also within their families (Fuwa, 2004). Bargaining power in the negotiation process over 
household duties of a woman will be the greater, the higher her (relative) education and 
occupational prestige, and the smaller the gap between the income of herself and her partner (e.g. 
Coltrane, 2000). 
 
4.2.5. Country characteristics in gender division of paid and unpaid work 
 
Despite the numerous criticisms it has provoked, the welfare regime typology of Esping-
Andersen (1990, see also Chapter 5) remains the single most often applied starting point for 
empirical analysts when it comes to linking empirical evidence to country characteristics and 
identifying clusters across Europe. Several studies have shown that the classic trichotomy of 
social democratic, liberal, and conservative welfare regimes is efficient in explaining some of the 
between-country variations in the level of female employment as well as in the patterns of 
division of unpaid work. However, “exceptions” are numerous and additional explanations are 
needed in several cases.  
 
As expected based on their gender equality policies that accommodate women’s participation in 
paid work, social democratic countries in Europe (Sweden, Denmark and Finland) are indeed 
characterised by high level of female labour market participation together with a moderate child 
effect on women’s participation rates. In these member states, the dual full-time earner model 
remains the most prevalent form of household strategies even when there are children in the 
family (Lewis, Campbell & Huerta, 2008). Wide spread support for reconciling work and family 
life include high level of childcare provision, a generous parental leave system – both of which 
promote female employment (e.g. Gupta, Smith & Verner, 2008; Haas, Steiber, Hartel & 
Wallace, 2006). Gender equality is integrated into family, social and labour market policy. 
Empirical studies find the availability of childcare particularly important in boosting female 
employment in the Nordic countries (e.g. Pettit & Hook, 2005; Uunk et al., 2005). The (relative) 
gender-equality in the labour market is accompanied by relatively low inequality also in the 
division of unpaid work (Fuwa, 2004; Geist, 2005). This is not only because women in these 
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countries spend less time on domestic work, but also because their male partner takes a 
significant share – especially in childrearing. The Netherlands is remarkably different from other 
countries in this cluster. Full-time employment of mothers receives little institutional support 
here but part-time employment (of women and also men) is exceptionally frequent. These have 
clear consequences on female employment in general but also on mothers’ employment in 
particular. After childbirth, not only a move towards part-time employment (and thus towards the 
modified male breadwinner model) but also to the traditional male breadwinner model is rather 
frequent – together resulting in a high level of child effect on female employment (Haas et al., 
2006; Lewis et al., 2008; Uunk et al., 2005). 
 
The only liberal country in the EU is the UK. Not surprisingly, child-effect on women’ 
employment is strong – even if major changes have taken place in the last decade. After 
childbirth a move not only towards the male breadwinner, but - with equal probability - also to 
the modified breadwinner model can be seen, and this latter affect remains pronounced even 
when children are school aged (Pettit & Hook, 2005). In the UK, gender-gap in unpaid work 
confirms the European average – shaping a category in-between the social-democratic and the 
conservative welfare regimes (Fuwa, 2004). 
 
Greatest heterogeneity in household management patterns can be found within the cluster of 
conservative regimes. One would expect low level of female employment with a marked child-
effect and the dominance of the male breadwinner model in these countries, combined with a 
markedly unequal division of household labour. Although these tendencies seem to hold when 
broad categories are discussed (e.g. Fuwa, 2004; Geist, 2005; Van der Lippe & Van Dijk, 2002), 
cross-country variations are remarkable. Most importantly, Portugal marks out with a high level 
of (full-time) female employment that hardly falls back with the presence of children in the 
family. Across the EU15, Portugal is the only country outside the Northern region where the dual 
full-time earner model remains in the majority among parents (Lewis et al., 2008). Uunk et al. 
(2005) suggest that the small child effect in Portugal is likely to be due to the economic pressure 
on women to have a paid job, while others refer to the existence of a rudimentary welfare state, 
where female employment is considered to be the norm (Plantenga, Van Doorne & Huskies, 
1992 cited by Van der Lippe & Van Dijk, 2002: 230). At the same time however, division of 
unpaid work is more in line with the conservative pattern in Portugal (Fuwa & Cohen, 2007; also 
Voicu, Voicu & Strapcova, 2009). 
 
In other Southern European countries such as Italy, Greece and Spain female employment is 
lower and (in Greece and Spain) only around one third of couple-parents follow the dual full-
time model (Lewis et al., 2008). Clearly, these countries fit the conservative model better than 
Portugal. Findings on the division of domestic tasks also show rather traditional patterns (Aliaga, 
2006; Fisher & Robinson, 2009; González, Jurado-Guerrero & Naldini, 2009; Voicu et al., 
2009). Still, variations between but also within countries are notable. Stier, Lewin-Epstein and 
Braun (2001) describe Italy as a conservative country with a high level of support towards 
mothers’ employment where both a high level of continuous full-time employment and frequent 
long-term withdrawal from market work are present.  
 
In Germany and Austria - conservative countries with an intermediate support towards women’s 
employment (Stier et al., 2001) - female employment is considerably higher and division of 
household duties is more equal than in the South European conservative countries, but size of the 
child effect is similarly large. This latter can be lead back to the (lack of) childcare institution 
(Jönsson & Letablier, 2005), but also to the economic affluence. Child effect is also relatively 
small in Belgium, which again is not unrelated to the wide-spread provision of childcare (Uunk 
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et al., 2005). Extensive parental leave coupled by nearly universal childcare availability in 
France resulted in a modest child-effect (Pettit & Hook, 2005) – atypical for a conservative 
regime, but not surprising given the high level of support towards maternal work. Still, France 
seems to remain traditional in the division of household labour according to Crompton (2006a).  
 
Central and Eastern European countries are not included in the classic typologies of welfare 
regimes. A widely used strategy in the empirical literature is to include CEE or post-socialist 
countries as a separate (fourth) cluster (see e.g. Fuwa, 2004; Van der Lippe, 2001). The post-
socialist nature of these countries, together with certain similarities of the transition period do 
indeed make CEE countries a region very distinct from the group of the old member states. A 
long-tradition of full-time work for men and women, underpinned by the “official” socialist 
ideology as well as the economic necessity of the families to rely on two incomes might form the 
base of argument for clustering these countries together. Detailed analyses however point 
towards substantial between-country differences in the region as far as gendered behaviour 
patterns but also underlying structural and also cultural factors are concerned (Szeleva & 
Polakowski, 2008). Szeleva and Polakowski (2008) identified four distinct types of childcare 
policies (labelled as implicit familialist, explicit familialist, comprehensive support or female 
mobilising) across eight countries in the region taking the system of childcare provision as well 
as the parental leave system into account. The emerging description of the region shows not only 
diversity across the four regime types but also intense changes over time between the regimes 
within some of the countries. Studies in the division of unpaid work also point towards some 
dissimilarity within the region – although coherent consequences are difficult to draw. 
Nevertheless, most studies describe the region with a medium to relatively low level of gender-
inequality in the field of household work (Fuwa, 2004; Fuwa & Cohen, 2007; Voicu et al., 2009) 
– although the overall amount of time spent on such duties is big.  
 
So far, no coherent typology of countries that would adequately reflect such diversity and would 
also help to reduce the complexity has emerged. Despite the lack of information on some 
particular member states and the limitations of exploring precise tendencies, we can conclude 
that there is notable diversity across Europe and it is most likely to be increasing. As far as the 
division of paid work is concerned, the dominance of the male-breadwinner solution has 
diminished but no prevailing model has emerged so far. Instead, a series of coexisting models are 
present with the rather heterogeneous set of dual-earner solutions being the most frequent, as the 
tendency of women’s increasing labour market participation is likely to continue. Moreover, the 
distribution of unpaid work only loosely correlates with the distribution of paid work and this 
leads to further variations in the possible models followed.  
 
Furthermore, families do not make their choices for a lifetime but instead, they adapt their actual 
behaviour to their situation in the various phases of their life course. Variations are therefore 
numerous not only between but also within the individual countries of the EU. Nevertheless, 
since women continue to do the lion’s share of unpaid work and in the majority of the cases both 
partners do paid work, we can conclude that the dual earner-female carer model is the most 
common one across Europe. 
 
4.3. Intergenerational relations in families  
Existing (comparative) research has mostly ignored multigenerational relations in families and 
concentrated on couple relations and relationship between parents and (young) children. 
Concerning generational relations, existing research has focused more on intergenerational 
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support patterns than on multi-generation households. Most of these studies are concentrating on 
intergenerational transfers of time and money and the existing differences between welfare 
regimes (e.g. Albertini, Kohli & Vogel, 2007). In social care research, there has been recent 
interest in studying how care and help are distributed within families between generations. 
Mainly informal help and care provided by adult children towards their old parents has been 
studied, but also to some extent the role of grandparents in providing care for their 
grandchildren, and help and financial assistance they provide for their adult children. Research 
results point to substantial difference between European countries. 
 
Research on multi-generation households in Europe is not extensive, the database is mostly 
country-specific and varies in the extent of countries, and the time span considered. Even though 
many European research projects on intergenerational transfers and support exist, the knowledge 
about multi-generation households as families is rather scarce. One major finding so far is that 
European countries differ in the degree to which the “nuclearisation” of the family has occurred, 
i.e. the degree to which the older people live by themselves either as a couple or alone. The 
European Quality of Life Survey, conducted in 28 European countries in 2003, found that in 
Italy 25% of all people over the age of 65 still lived in a household with a child while more than 
30% did so in Malta and Poland. In Hungary, Spain, Slovenia and Cyprus and Greece, still 20% 
of the older people were living in these family arrangements. In contrast, in Denmark, Sweden, 
France and Germany those households represent only less than 5% (Saraceno et al., 2005: 17). 
Kalmijn and Saraceno (2008) point out that the presence of children in the household is not per 
se an indicator of care provided by the adult children. On the contrary, adult children may still be 
living in the parental household in order to receive financial and even caring support from their 
parents (Rossi 2009, 383). Undoubtedly, as parents get older, the balance at least in care giving 
may shift within the household (Kalmijn & Saraceno, 2008: 482).  
 
Notably, only a small part of multi-generational households is due to the incidence of extended 
or multiple households, where more than one couple lives under the same roof. This incidence is 
minimal (around 2%) in “old EU15” countries, and only slightly higher in the Central and 
Southern European countries, where it lies around 10% (Kalmijn & Saraceno, 2008: 482). The 
studies at hand show that the attention focuses much more on intergenerational exchange 
relations between family members, who do not share a common household. In contrast, there is 
only little information on multi-generation households and the motives for this way of live on a 
European-wide level. 
 
4.3.1. Intergenerational family obligations and care relations 
 
Today, researchers are more and more interested in the division of care responsibilities/ 
provision between family generations. Most often studied question is related to care for older 
people; how and to what extent adult children provide care for their old parents, but increasingly 
how grandparents/-mothers provide care for their grandchildren. Researchers have recognised 
that care relations exist both ways (also old parents can take care of their adult children) and can 
be mutual and mixed and related to the provision of formal care services.  
 
SOCCARE project (see Kröger, 2004; also Kröger & Sipilä, 2005) studied social care 
arrangements in five different socio-economic and cultural environments that represented the 
variety of European welfare states (Finland, France, Italy, Portugal, and the UK). In relation to 
multi-generational, so-called “double front carer” families - that is families that face special 
challenges in confronting care responsibilities simultaneously of both children and of elderly 
relatives - the results showed that the emphasis is on the care for older family members, whereas 
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the care of children is generally described as less problematic and more “natural” (Kröger, 2004: 
72-86). Families in Finland, France, and the UK used most often combinations of informal care 
and publicly provided formal care. Only Portuguese and Italian families used mostly third sector 
and private care facilities. The informal non-professional paid sector was found to be wide and 
varied in Italy, France, and Portugal, offering a range of types of assistance. In concerning the 
general organisation and control of the care arrangement, the family and in particular the main 
caregiver remains everywhere the most important resource. Sipilä and Kröger (2004) conclude 
that the results affirm the common belief that European social care cultures are diverse, but, on 
the other hand, they are not completely different.  
 
According to Saraceno and Keck (2008), a number of studies have found, contrary to many 
stereotypes and common sense discourses, that intergenerational solidarity is alive and strongly 
reciprocal in all countries, both at the two and at the three generational level, with the middle 
generation in the “Janus position” (Hagestad & Herlofson, 2007) of redistributing both upwards 
(mostly care) and downwards (care and income). Both long-standing family cultures and welfare 
state arrangements affect the shape of this solidarity, as well as the overall social care package as 
a mix of family, volunteer, and public provisions available. However, Hagestad and Herlofson 
(2007: 345) have reminded that in fact cases of coinciding responsibilities for older parents and 
children at the same time are relatively rare. They refer to Dykstra’s (1997) overview of twelve 
European Union countries, showing that only 4% of men and 10% of women had overlapping 
responsibilities for young children and old parents who required care. In general, by the time 
parents are frail and need help, children have grown up. If competing needs arise, it is more 
likely to be between grandchildren and own old parents. 
 
Corinne Igel et al. (2009) have studied what they define as intergenerational time transfers (or 
intergenerational solidarity patterns and support types between family members including 
provision of grandchild care by their grandparents) in 11 Western European countries. The 
authors make a distinction between help and care. They conclude that norms of responsibility 
and the institutional context are closely related to family support levels. In countries where 
support is seen as family responsibility, intergenerational help levels are low but care levels are 
high. Instead, in countries with developed social care sector help levels are high but care levels 
are low (also Brandt et al., 2009). 
 
Motel-Klingebiel et al. (2005) have studied whether formal services provided by the state 
“crowd out” (diminish) family care, encourages it, or create a mixed responsibility. The 
researchers (Motel-Klingebiel et al., 2005) found no evidence of a substantial “crowding out” of 
family help. Instead, the results support the hypothesis of “mixed responsibility”, and suggest 
that in societies with well-developed service infrastructures, help from families and welfare state 
services act accumulatively, but that in familistic welfare regimes, similar combinations do not 
occur (ibid.: 863). This result, which is supported by some other studies on intergenerational care 
relations, could be seen as rather surprising and unexpected against the trend of “care going 
public” identified by many researchers (e.g. Anttonen et al., 2003: 171-172). However, it 
becomes more understandable when different forms of care and its intensity are specified. In a 
case of more regular and demanding care services, “care going public”, its professionalisation 
and institutionalisation, seems to take place in the care for older people.  
 
According to Hagestad and Herlofson (2007) co-longevity has greatly increased the duration of 
family ties. The parent-child relationship may last 6-7 decades and the grandparent-grandchild 
bond, 3-4 decades (ibid.: 341). According to them, there are two contrasting contexts to interpret 
differences between societies in intergenerational care relations (e.g. differences found between 
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Southern European and Nordic countries): culture and social policy. The culture argument refers 
to differences in family types and in the level of familism in countries, whereas the social policy 
argument concentrates on the interrelations between formal and informal care provision, 
differences in generosity of public provision and between the welfare state regimes. They (ibid.: 
350) also criticise the current family research and policy of neglecting the fact that in today’s 
ageing societies; adults typically spend decades when they are both parents and children. This 
separation of young and old families reflects institutional age segregation related to modern life-
course organisation. 
 
4.3.2. The role of grandparents 
 
In our societies, where life expectancy is extending and the health conditions of people have 
significantly improved, the figure of the grandparent is becoming more important for a range of 
reasons. Grandmothers and grandfathers are a resource for their children and their children’s 
families (Walther et al., 2009: Up2Youth project; Kröger, 2004). 
 
In general terms, and more particularly in the context of the formation of new families, it is 
necessary to stress the role played in the majority of European countries by grandmothers (and 
grandfathers) as a support in the care of children, for example in the case of sickness or where 
public services are limited and where the economic resources available are not sufficient to pay 
for external services. Hank and Buber (2009) have investigated cross-national variations in 
grandparent-provided childcare as well as differences in characteristics of the providers and 
recipients of care in ten continental European countries. Across all countries, 58% of 
grandmothers and 49% of grandfathers provided some kind of care for a grandchild aged fifteen 
or younger during the last 12-month period. The lowest shares were found in Spain, Italy, and 
Switzerland, whereas the highest prevalence was in Sweden, France, the Netherlands, and 
Denmark. However, the order of countries changed remarkably, when the researchers made a 
distinction between regular care (almost weekly or more often) and occasional care. Sweden, 
Denmark, and France, had below-average levels of regular childcare by grandparents, whereas 
the respective share in Greece, Italy, and Spain was almost twice as high as in the Scandinavian 
countries. Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland had an average position. Among 
regular carers, the gender division of carers also changed with grandmothers having a more 
intensive involvement. In searching for explanations for the national differences in regular and 
occasional care, the authors suggest that the variation of childcare and female/maternal 
employment regimes offer as the most prominent explanation combined with cultural differences 
(ibid.: 60-69.). 
 
However, older people are not only grandparents of their grandchildren but they themselves are 
choosing ever more frequently (health permitting) to become active subjects in their own life, 
deciding autonomously how to spend their free time (now more abundant) and how to spend 
their money. In this new role, which involves a social and cultural re-engagement, grandparents 
are also capable of undertaking new projects (Leccardi, 2009a) even though quite clearly it is 
only possible when certain economic and cultural conditions are met to innovatively reorient the 
phase of life that opens up around the age of sixty (Friedan, 1993). Older people’s projects 
and/or plans often revolve around travel and the possibility of discovering new places and 
cultures (Pronovost, 1992). That might involve the possibility of taking up again cultural and/or 
social interests that in previous years it was not possible to cultivate – for example, voluntary or 
charity work (Verbrugge et al., 1996; Bickel & Lalive d’Epinay, 2001). Finally, in more extreme 
cases some of these “young oldies” actually decide to construct a new life for themselves, in 
spite of the presence of their children and grandchildren. In this case, the present becomes the 
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dimension of time to be invented, an extended present open to novelty and to the unexpected, 
which manifests itself in an authentic restructuring of people’s biography (Facchini & Rampazi, 
2009). 
 
As pointed out by Facchini and Rampazi (2009), these subjects in the final phase of adult life 
live a further important phase of transition, marked essentially by a quest to bring to a 
completion their overall life project. While some have the opportunity to plan and to “invent a 
future”, others essentially submit to the consequences of so-called “reflected uncertainty”, 
namely that situation in which the effects of the biographical uncertainty of young people 
impacts on the life prospects of older people. In this case, old age does not represent so much a 
phase of potential new planning as a time for waiting in an uncertain social horizon. The first 
type of process, the commitment to bring to a completion one’s overall life project, is founded on 
the increase in life expectancy. The second type of process relates above all to the prolonged 
period of transition from youth to adult life of their grandchildren (in some specific cases even of 
their children), which impact on the level of certainty of the grandparents. 
 
4.4. Genders, generations and family violence 
Violence in families is first of all a gender issue but also a generational issue (child abuse, 
elderly abuse). Violence within the family has been a concern over the last few decades in many 
areas of civil society and has become an important public concern of contemporary societies. 
Several International bodies (e.g. the European Commission, the United Nations, the World 
Health Organisation) have taken up the fight against violence to children, women and the elderly 
as one of the priorities of the international political agenda, leading several countries to 
implement legislation protecting victims of domestic violence and their fundamental rights. 
 
Although systematic efforts have been made to identify and analyse violence in the family, it has 
been difficult to reach consensus regarding its definitions and theoretical boundaries. Several 
researchers have attempted to clarify definitions and operationalise concepts, but it has not been 
easy to obtain simple, organised, and clear results. The conceptual diversity of this field is a 
significant obstacle to comparisons, thereby resulting in substantially diverse perspectives, 
terminologies, methodologies, instruments and, most importantly, in different conclusions and 
subsequent actions. Another empirical problem is underreporting of violence. Estimates are often 
based on official reports, which tend to present lower numbers than real values (Knickerbocker 
& Heyman, 2007). 
 
The majority of existing studies have focused on violence against women but also on violence 
against children and youth. Less research has been carried out on violence against men, elderly 
people, homosexuals and bisexuals, people with disabilities, and immigrant and minority 
women. Most of the research has been done at the national level reporting the incidence of 
violence but also policy measures taken in different countries. This chapter, however, is mainly 
based on studies with a comparative European perspective, which seem to be rather rare. 
McQuigg (2007) has written a report on family violence in different European countries from a 
human rights perspective analysing domestic violence situation in eleven Western European 
countries (Luxembourg, Sweden, The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Germany, 
Belgium, Spain, Ireland and Italy). He concluded that in general, the eleven countries in this 
survey had displayed mixed responses to the recommendations of the UN CEDAW Committee 
in relation to the issue of domestic violence. Certain countries, such as Luxembourg, Sweden and 
the Netherlands, appear to have adopted particularly positive approaches to solve the domestic 
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violence problem. However, the author also notes that it cannot be assumed that the measures 
taken by these countries were necessarily prompted by international human rights standards.  
 
The report State of European Research on the Prevalence of Interpersonal Violence and its 
impact on Health and Human Rights (Martinez & Schrottle, 2006) compiles the findings of 
studies on interpersonal violence. The report is divided into five main topics: prevalence studies; 
assessment of the impact of interpersonal violence on the victim’s health, interpersonal violence 
and violation of human rights, and future analyses of prevalence and health impact data.   
 
The prevalence surveys reveal - across gender, age, race, socio-economic class, and cultural 
factors - high levels of physical, sexual and psychological interpersonal violence in all countries 
where such surveys have been conducted. However, the results of this analysis indicate that, at 
present, it is difficult to compare the prevalence rates of specific forms of interpersonal violence 
between different European countries as the existing studies have many important 
methodological differences. 
 
The “gender violence” paradigm has dominated research on violence against women. It reduces 
all violence to two fundamentals: male abuse is used to maintain power over women, and female 
violence is defensive and used only for women’s own protection. More recently, violence studies 
against women have mainly been based on two analytical models and measures. The first 
involves analysing solely violence perpetrated by males against females. This is the so-called 
unidirectional model, and has been adopted by important national and international organisations 
(e.g. the WHO, and countries such as Spain, France and Germany). It is a model, which assesses 
only violence against women. The second model (bidirectional), assesses violence perpetrated 
both by male against female and by female against male. Particularly from the mid-1990s, 
studies have begun to include other contexts where violence is also perpetrated against women 
(e.g. public space, workplace), and other types of perpetrators, beyond intimate partners (e.g. 
other relatives, acquaintances) (Martinez & Schrottle, 2006). However, most studies collect 
information on violence perpetrated by an intimate partner against the woman. Findings show 
physical, psychological and sexual violence prevalence in different contexts (but mainly in the 
domestic sphere) and in several countries. In some studies on violence against women, some data 
on violence against elder women, migrants, and ethnic minorities has been obtained. The 
majority of studies assess physical and sexual violence. Others include assessment of 
psychological violence, sexual harassment, and bullying. Psychological violence, until recently, 
was not a current research topic. This situation has changed, and several studies have become 
concerned about gathering information on the impact of this type of violence on the health and 
quality of life of victims. Researchers have also begun to explore the relation between different 
forms of victimisation over the life course, particularly regarding domestic violence and violence 
experienced in other relationships or contexts (e.g. work, school). Prevalence studies on a 
national level have been carried out in many EU countries. 
 
Female violence against men remains a neglected area of study in the field of social sciences. A 
number of important questions regarding female violence remain unaddressed. Prevalence 
studies of violence against men in Europe are very scarce. Those that do exist focus on two basic 
lines of research: sexual violence perpetrated by women against men (Krahé, Scheinberger & 
Bieneck, 2003); and the way violence against men is socially represented, perceived and 
researched (Research Group et al., 2004). More recent studies within the bidirectional model 
tend to develop longitudinal approaches (Archer, 2000 & 2002). Violence also occurs in 
homosexual couples; some studies show that it is as frequent as heterosexual violence (Krahé, 
2000). 
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Since the 1990s, there have been a considerable number of prevalence studies on violence 
against children and young people. They focus mostly on sexual abuse, sexual harassment, 
parental violence and bullying in school. Despite the methodological differences between the 
several studies (study design, types and definitions of violence assessed, contexts where violence 
occurs), they all reveal relatively high prevalence rates of child abuse. However, prevalence is 
higher among girls than among boys, except for bullying.  
 
Velleman et al. (2008) have studied domestic violence experienced by young people living in 
families with alcohol problems. The study was part of the European DAPHNE project. It 
involved ten EU countries (Germany, Austria, England, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland and Spain). The project was partly designed to collect information from a 
variety of European countries. Children affected by parental alcohol problems report having 
often lived under considerable stress for long periods, having to deal with family and parental 
environments where there was serious alcohol misuse, and serious domestic abuse, frequently 
moving into family violence. They experienced considerable levels of violence and aggression, 
including psychological aggression, which, as previous research has shown, can be as damaging 
to emotional development as physical violence. Findings show a complex interaction between 
gender, alcohol problems and child/spousal abuse.  
 
Bussmann, Erthal and Schroth (2010) have accomplished a cross-national research project (five 
nation comparison) on the effect of banning corporal punishment in Europe. Several 
international studies have revealed that the prohibition of corporal punishment has contributed to 
the reduction of parental violence, greatly influencing the attitudes and behaviours of parents. 
Parents, who have been more exposed to parental violence themselves, used more violence on 
their children. This exposure is higher in countries where there was no prohibition of parental 
violence, such as France. This shows that existing conjugal violence is a risk factor for the 
adoption of violent educational styles. In countries where corporal punishment has been 
accompanied by formative and informational campaigns and long-term measures, the violence 
levels tend to be lower. Despite the differences between the analysed countries, a large majority 
of parents rejects violence and supports the idea that children should be educated without the use 
of corporal punishment.  
 
There are very few studies on the prevalence of violence against the older people in Europe. 
Most of the existing research was carried out during the 1990s.This phenomenon was identified 
in late-1970s and early-1980s, mostly by health-care and social professionals. Research in this 
domain has focused on identifying risk factors for elder abuse. Research reveals that elder abuse 
by relatives exists, but its prevalence is relatively low (less than 11%) compared with other types 
of victimisation. Institutional abuse is even less known and assessed. This type of abuse 
benefited from some broader awareness because of UN’s recognition of the problem as a Human 
Rights concern (United Nations, 2002). 
 
To conclude, family violence can take on a number of forms: psychological, physical, economic 
and sexual. Family violence is still largely gender-based violence and there are specific groups at 
risk, such as low income and low educational households, children in large families and in 
families with alcohol problems, unemployed women with employed partner, women with higher 
educational levels than their spouse, women in the process of separating, pregnant women, 
immigrant women of uncertain legal status, families with alcohol problems, young women 
seeking abortion. A considerable number of prevalence studies reveal that domestic violence 
continues to be significant and still largely gender-based (mainly between conjugal partners but 
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also parent-child, adult-elderly person, boy/girlfriend, etc.). However, physical and 
psychological violence may be related to a large spectrum of factors: psychological and 
personality traits; nature and dynamics of conjugality; marital satisfaction; conjugal styles; 
domestic work; stress and conflicts; partner’s (female or male) domination and control; feelings 
of insecurity or interpersonal and interrelational strategies for attracting the partner’s attention.  
 
4.5. Conclusions 
Gender and age are widely influencing the experiences and everyday life of family members in 
different life phases. This chapter is based on a life-course perspective, which enables to link 
individuals’ biographies with social and historical change. The approach adopted here also 
involves a particular concern for the importance of gender differences. Within this general 
framework, some major trends can be identified: 
 
 transition processes of young people have changed with the prolonged presence of young 
people in their family of origin and couple formation taking place later; 
 new representations of partnership and parenthood emerge among young people with 
transformations in gender roles and in male and female identities; 
 the family of today is a negotiation and affection based family; 
 the role of grandparents is important as providers of support to children and 
grandchildren; 
 the most marked change in the field of division of paid work is the increasing level of 
female employment; 
 the gender gap in unpaid domestic work has narrowed somewhat due to women reducing 
their number of hours instead of any significant changes in men’s behaviour; 
 both employed and non-employed mothers have increased their childcare time and 
fathers’ involvement in childrearing is slightly increasing; 
 the male breadwinner model is being increasingly replaced by alternative models with 
“dual earner-female carer” model becoming the most wide-spread in Europe; 
 family violence is still largely gender based violence and there are specific groups at 
risk. 
 
The growing differentiation and pluralisation of social structures, as the pluralisation of the life 
styles of individuals, impacts on the family by way of the passage from a single model of the 
family to a plurality of models. The multiplicity of family models and family relations in Europe 
may be considered an expression of the cultural pluralism that characterises contemporary 
society, in which there coexist different ways both of giving meaning to the family and of 
understanding individual happiness and the life of the couple. Consequently, the modalities of 
passing through the various developmental processes that constitute the course of family life 
have been transformed. The final picture that emerges of these changes is far more intricate, 
colourful and multi-faceted than the one that prevailed twenty or thirty years ago. This new 
reality, however, also expands the potential spheres of contradiction (and ambivalence) in family 
life.  
 
Co-longevity has greatly increased the duration of family ties (Hagestad & Herlofson, 2007), 
which increases the importance of intergenerational relations within families. In today’s ageing 
societies, adults typically spend decades when they are both parents and children. There is a 
variety of ways of spending one’s old age and family life of older people should be taken into 
account in policies and research. Separation of young and old families (and ignorance towards 
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the latter) reflects institutional age segregation related to modern life-course organisation. Future 
research should orient towards examining the various generations present on the family scene, 
the interactions they have with each other and the effects of these on the life of young adults, 
adults and old people – as well as on the family as a whole. 
 
Even if new representations of partnership and parenthood emerge among young people, in 
numerical terms, these changes seem to be rather slow and gender division turns to be more 
traditional after the birth of the first child. Research in the field would definitely benefit from a 
gender perspective analysing transition processes of women and men (e.g. transition to 
motherhood and fatherhood), especially taking the men’s perspective more into account. 
Although cross-country (and within country) differences are remarkable and changes are 
constantly on their way, some basic patterns of family life remain intact in Europe. Most 
importantly, the division of paid, but especially of unpaid work continues to be gendered. The 
dual carer-dual earner society remains a theoretical concept in most of Europe. Instead, the dual 
earner-female carer setting seems to become the modality – although with significant variations, 
especially as far as the amount of women’s paid and unpaid working hours are concerned.  
 
Generally, as shown in this review, women spend less time in the labour market, they are more 
likely to take part-time jobs and have more career breaks than men do. At the same time they still 
hold the main responsibility for housework as well as for child-rearing. These gender-gaps in 
unpaid work decrease in size but do not diminish when and where partners spend a similar 
amount of time in the labour market. This is important because the most marked change over the 
past decades in the area of work-division is the increasing level of female employment. Although 
the rate of growth was slowed down with the accession of the new member states, the main trend 
remained unchanged.  
 
In dealing with the high level of complexity, research in the field has so far been more successful 
in identifying key factors that promote certain types of arrangements within families. Both in the 
field of paid and unpaid work, three main sets of factors are discussed and tested in the relevant 
research strand. Among the structural factors, instruments of family policy - especially parental 
leave policies and the system of childcare - has been identified as having a major influence on 
female employment. Their capacity however is found to be limited by economic constraints, but 
to some extent also by cultural factors (individual attitudes and also social norms). Individual 
characteristics of the actor, most notably women’s education, and income but also her attitudes 
have been shown to be more important in shaping the gender division of unpaid work, while the 
impact of policy interventions seems to be more indirect in this area. 
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5. Family policies and social care policies in Europe 
 
 
This chapter focuses on research concerning family policies and social care policies within EU 
member states from a comparative perspective. In many European countries, these policies have 
gained increasing importance. Part of the explanation is the increased political awareness of 
challenges discussed in previous chapters: decreasing birth rates, population ageing, 
diversification of family forms, and the weakening of the male breadwinner/female carer model.  
 
Family policies are integrated within a larger social policy context (Ferrarini, 2006: 5) and 
connected with “welfare regimes”. Traditionally, this policy area is also considerably normative, 
and highly ideologised; family policies are linked to basic assumptions about the role of the 
family in society (Kaufmann, 2000: 424) and to what is defined to be or ought to be a family 
(Lüscher, 1999: 8). Family policies can be defined as an “amalgam of policies directed at 
families with children and aimed at increasing their level of wellbeing” (Gauthier, 1999). This 
definition acknowledges the fact that family policy is, like hardly any other policy, a crosscutting 
issue (Gerlach, 2010: 168), which may include “topics as varied as employment, transport, food, 
and education policies” (Gauthier, 2002: 456). It poses a challenge to international comparisons 
of family policy and amplifies the need of clear conceptualisations. When family-affecting state 
interventions are explicitly launched, they are usually driven by one or several of the following 
motives (Kaufmann, 2000: 426-428): 
 
 institutional motives: to preserve the family as an institution of its own right, often linked 
with conservative policy and a traditional family model;  
 demographic motives: gained importance in the context of demographic changes, e.g. 
measures to increase birth rates or diminish abortions;  
 economic motives: 1) to stress the family’s importance for human-capital-building and 
balance its benefits performed for society; 2) more recently also to emphasise the 
economic functionality (e.g. strengthening the workforce via childcare);  
 socio-political motives: to compensate direct and opportunity costs of family 
responsibilities (e.g. caretaking, income losses) and to fight poverty;  
 gender equality motive: to remove economic and social disadvantages esp. for women; 
more recently also measures to reach a more gender-equal share of family and 
employment tasks and set special incentives for fathers; 
 children’s welfare motive: to provide the framework for public provision of children’s 
needs (incl. socialisation inside and outside the family).  
 
Policy-makers have a range of different instruments at their disposal, which can be distinguished 
as 1) regulation, 2) information and 3) financing, including taxes, benefits in cash and in kind 
(Blum & Schubert, 2009: 85). Regulation includes family law (e.g. marriage, adoption, divorce, 
child support), job protective leaves from employment, equal opportunity laws. Information 
might mean family support programmes, benchmarking and performance indicators. Financing 
includes financing of childcare, parental leave payments, child/family allowances, social 
insurances, family taxation, and housing allowances.  
 
Social care policy is in many ways linked to family policy, but includes not only childcare but 
also care for older people and other forms of adult care. It has since the mid-1990s transformed 
from a marginal to core issue in social policy and in social research (Anttonen & Sointu, 2006: 
4). Social care has many dimensions, which makes this research field broad and complex. In this 
report, the concept of social care is adopted from the EC funded SOCCARE project, which used 
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it as an integrated concept, meaning that social care is defined as the assistance and surveillance 
provided in order to help children or adults with the activities of their daily lives. Social care can 
be paid or unpaid work provided by professionals or non-professionals, and it can take place 
within the public as well as the private sphere. Formal service provision from public, commercial 
and voluntary organisations, as well as informal care from family members, relatives and others, 
are here included within social care (Kröger, 2004: 3). In this report, existing research on social 
care and social services is reviewed from the perspective of families and family members. The 
focus is in the care needs of families and family members but also in families as care providers. 
 
Ever since the groundbreaking publication of The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism by Gøsta 
Esping-Andersen (1990), the entrenched approach of clustering welfare states in order to 
facilitate systematic comparisons, was established as the predominant strand of comparative 
social policy research. He analysed social policies in 18 countries and used the indicators de-
commodification, social stratification, and interplay of state, market, and family in social 
provision30. Esping-Andersen arrived at the well known threefold typology: the liberal, the 
conservative, and the social-democratic welfare state regime, which has since then been widely 
used also in comparing family policies in different (European) countries despite the criticism 
directed towards it. Feminist criticism has argued that this typology neglect gender-specific 
problems of the welfare states (especially social care issues) as well as the family’s role in 
welfare provision (Orloff, 1993; Daly, 1994; O’Connor, 1996). Consequently, alternative 
typologies have been developed, which focus on these issues (e.g. Lewis & Ostner, 1994). 
Esping-Andersen (1999: 51) answered to feminist critique by adding the distinction between 
familialistic and defamilialising welfare states, concepts originally developed by Lister (1994), 
defining defamilialisation as “the degree to which households’ welfare and caring 
responsibilities are relaxed either via welfare state provision or via market provision” (Esping-
Andersen, 1999: 61). The distinction will be used in this report to assess the directions of family 
policy and social care policy changes in the EU member states, even if these concepts should be 
treated with caution31. 
 
5.1. State family policies in Europe 
In many European countries, family policies have become a major area of reform. However, 
institutions, norms, and regulatory frameworks substantially limit the scope of action for policy-
makers and shape future policies. Thus in the following, the traditional characteristics of the 
different family policy systems will be shortly described, and contrasted with institutional or 
regulatory changes (see Hantrais, 2004; Cizek & Richter, 2004; Ostner & Schmitt, 2008; 
Appleton & Byrne, 2003; Saxonberg & Sirovatka, 2006; Boele-Wölki, 2007; Vlaardingerbroek, 
2002; Council of Europe Family Database, 2009; MISSOC).  
 
European Union regulations have influence on national family policies. For example, following 
the 1996 Council Directive on parental leave (96/34/EC), all member states had to change their 
existing law (Falkner et al., 2002). Vlaardingerbroek (2002) points out how common law caused 
                                                 
30 De-commodification is the extent to which individuals can maintain a normal standard of living regardless of their 
market performance (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 86), e.g. by old age pensions. Social stratification measures in how far 
the welfare state itself actively orders social relations, e.g. by income-related benefits.  
31 Empirically, it is “more a matter of degree than of an ‘either-or’” between the two (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 51). 
Furthermore, it is arguably not even desirable for a welfare system to be purely familialistic or defamilialising. This 
argument becomes clearer in consideration of the distinction between positive and negative de- or (re)familialisation 
(Ostner, 2003). While negative measures constrain the spectrum of possible ways of living, positive measures 
increase choices and reconciliation of work and family life (Leitner et al., 2004: 17). 
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a harmonisation of national family laws and a common trend towards a more flexible and open 
system of family relations. Due to its limited responsibilities, the EU mostly addresses family 
policy via the open method of coordination (OMC). While there is a growing literature analysing 
the EU reconciliation/family policy (Weiss, 2000; Lewis, 2006; Ahrens, 2008), only very few 
studies exist on the influence of the EU on national family policies (Lindén, 2009). A number of 
recent studies (e.g. Giullari & Lewis, 2005; Knijn & Smit, 2009) critically discuss an economic 
bias of EU reconciliation policies and its strong focus on defamilialisation. Many studies 
acknowledge that the OMC approach is in accordance with the high national diversity.  
 
Family policies of the Nordic countries have been heavily influenced by the Protestant church 
and left wing governments. They became gradually focused on gender equality, reconciliation, 
and female labour market integration through defamilialising policies (Ferrarini, 2003). Nordic 
family policies aim at promoting the interests of individuals rather than of families as units 
(Hantrais, 2004: 133), and have no institutionalised family policies with designated ministries 
(except in Denmark, where the “Ministry of Family and Consumer Affairs” was created in 
2004). None of the Nordic countries mentions the family in their constitutions. With regard to 
family law, the Nordic countries are particularly advanced in putting unmarried cohabiting 
couples on a par with marriage (Hantrais, 2004: 113). Legal rights of same-sex couples and their 
families have also increased in recent decade allowing them, in most respects, the same legal 
status as marriage (Eydal & Kröger, 2010: 14). They also pay particular attention to the 
wellbeing of children (Ostner & Schmitt, 2008), and e.g. early introduced joint custody after 
divorce and promote it as a rule. Legal family obligations are very weak and individual citizens 
assumed. Family allowances are tax-funded. Governmental-NGO co-operation is strong in 
Nordic family policies (Appleton & Byrne, 2003: 212). 
 
Family policies of the continental countries have been heavily influenced by the Catholic Church 
and the subsidiarity principle; also being the ideological foundation for Christian-democratic 
parties (Borchorst, 1994). Family policies are traditionally characterised by male 
breadwinner/female carer norms. In countries with Bismarckian earnings-related social security 
schemes (esp. Austria, Germany), social protection of “women and children may still be 
dependent on marriage and family relationships” (Hantrais, 2004: 117). Austria, Germany and 
Luxembourg have long-standing traditions of designated family ministries, and France and 
Belgium have maybe the most explicit and consistent family policies across Europe (Hantrais, 
2004: 138). Several continental welfare systems prescribe a state protection of the family in their 
constitutions (France, Germany, Luxembourg). Regarding family law, some countries followed 
the Nordic example regarding equal treatment of non-married couples, and the majority of 
countries introduced same-sex registration schemes (e.g. France with its 1999 pacte civil de 
solidarité) (Boele-Wölki, 2007). Family allowances are typically mixed-funded from 
contributions and taxes. Governmental-NGO co-operation is ambivalent in many continental 
countries: while the civil society sector has a strong role in policy implementation (cf. 
subsidiarity principle), its role in agenda setting and policy formulation is quite weak (Appleton 
& Byrne, 2003).  
 
The Anglo-American countries (Ireland, Malta, and the UK) share common ground in weak state 
intervention, need-oriented support, and high role of the market, but differ in others. Malta and 
Ireland have stronger familialist traditions than the UK. Ireland prescribes family protection in 
its constitution and has a designated ministry for family policies. Also with regard to family law, 
divorce was made legal in Ireland only in 1996 (Hantrais, 2004: 110), and is still illegal in Malta 
(as the only EU country). At large, family relationships are not strictly regulated in the liberal 
systems – but neither are duties of the state, leading to a heavy reliance on the private and 
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voluntary sectors (Hantrais, 2004: 129). Since social welfare is in individual responsibility and 
the benefits directed at means-tested minimum coverage, family policy is not explicit and 
comprehensive, but part of general welfare policies, like antipoverty programmes or social 
housing (Rüling & Kassner, 2007: 22). Family allowances are tax-funded in Ireland and the UK, 
while Malta, being a hybrid case in several respects, exhibits mixed-funding. Governmental-
NGO co-operation is less integrated than in the Nordic countries, but e.g. in the UK with family 
policy developing into a more specific policy in the 1990s, some civil society organisation were 
called on by the state for expertise and have since then been quite tightly integrated (Appleton & 
Byrne, 2003).  
 
The Mediterranean countries share similarities with the continental systems in male 
breadwinner/female carer traditions and Catholic influences. With regard to family law, the 
Mediterranean countries legally assign mutual obligations to the extended family, and the state 
only supports, when these sources are exhausted (Hantrais, 2004: 129). State duties to protect the 
family are prescribed in the national constitutions of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
Authority, however, is often delegated to the local and regional level, leading to regional 
discrepancies (Hantrais, 2004: 144). The overall approach is rather fragmentary; e.g. in no 
Mediterranean country a designated ministry for family policy exists, but in 2006 Italy created a 
coordinating Department for Family Policies. Spain makes a case for institutional and legal 
reforms: under the social-liberal coalition in 2005, it eased the divorce law and took the lead 
regarding civil unions (Bertelsmann, 2008). Portugal only de facto recognises same-sex 
partnerships (without registration) (Boele-Wölki, 2007). Regarding family allowances, the 
Mediterranean countries have taken different paths, but are sharing their low level. 
Governmental-NGO co-operation is weak and, in the context of a rather uncoordinated policy 
approach, NGOs do not contribute to policy formulation, with some exceptions (Appleton & 
Byrne, 2003).  
 
The post-socialist countries make most interesting cases, since they repeatedly reached 
“fundamental junctures” and implemented dramatic institutional shifts: Before WWII, the 
Central European Countries in particular were based on the conservative Bismarckian model and 
their family policies showed all signs of familialism. Then with restructuring since the 1990s, 
following an employment-centred, universal welfare provision during the socialist era, some 
features exhibit path-dependence from this time (Trumm & Ainsaar, 2009: 154), while 
predominantly there is institutional redesign. Case studies have shown that all former communist 
countries - to differing degree - quit the path of defamilialisation and “tried to reintroduce the 
traditional familisation regime […] as they move back toward the path of re-familisation” 
(Saxonberg & Sirovatka, 2006: 186; Hantrais, 2004). Some countries implemented implicit 
negative re-familialisation, others explicit positive re-familialisation. Some constitutions mention 
protection of the family (Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, and Poland). Designated ministries exist in 
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, and in Latvia (MISSOC, 2008; Cunska & Muravska, 2009). Legal 
obligations of extended families are strong, while state duties are weak and no explicit or 
coherent family policies exist. Regarding same-sex partnerships, only Slovenia, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary have such legislation (Boele-Wölki, 2007). Family allowances are tax-
funded but underfunded. Governmental-NGO co-operation is affected by the communist times, 
and by the Catholic Church often holding a monopoly over NGOs after its collapse. Co-
operation is developing, but faces obstacles as the preoccupation with economics and the “legacy 
of social dissatisfaction with state intervention in family life” (Appleton & Byrne, 2003: 217). 
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5.2. Childcare policies 
Most widely studied topic in relation to family policies and social care has been childcare 
arrangements and policies (so called policy packages, e.g. Lister et al., 2007: 119-130) including 
parental leave schemes, cash benefits, and (publicly provided) day care services. This theme 
include research concerning the division of labour and responsibilities between families 
(parents/mothers) and the state, but also gender division within families in childcare32 (e.g. 
Gerhard & Weckwert, 2001; Gerhard et al., 2005; Ellingsæter & Leira, 2006; Crompton et al., 
2007; Lister et al., 2007; Lewis et al., 2008).  
 
There are several reasons for the popularity of this topic. First, childcare and motherhood has 
been one of the main issues in feminist (social policy) research and childcare has been seen as an 
issue of gender equality. Secondly, during the 2000s increasing the employment rate of women 
and gender equality in working life have been important political aims in many European 
countries, and in the EU. This has motivated and promoted research in this topic (see e.g. 
Giullari & Lewis, 2005: 3-4; Plantenga et al., 2008; Plantenga & Remery, 2009; about gender 
equality Webster, 2007). 
 
5.2.1. Leave policies 
 
Already at the end of the ninetieth-century some European countries developed limited maternity 
leave and corresponding pay schemes (Gauthier, 2000: 3), which were intended to protect the 
health of the mother and the newborn child. A substantial improvement in the maternity leave 
systems in Europe was made during the 1960s and 1970s. The Nordic countries adopted a more 
gender egalitarian perspective and transformed maternity leave into a gender-neutral parental 
leave. The reforms in most other countries were less extensive, but included at least the 
expansion of periods of maternity leave and the increase of payment. 
 
Since the 1970s and 1980s, there has been a significant growth and diversification of leave 
policies throughout Europe. Besides maternity leave, most of the Northern and central European 
countries have adopted some system of parental leave – fostered in southern Europe one decade 
later in the 1990s (Gauthier, 1996: 77). Today, the period of maternity leave varies from 14 to 20 
weeks with earnings-related payment between 70% and 100% (Moss & Deven, 2009: 82). 
Paternity leave entitles fathers to take a short leave immediately after the birth of a child. 
Interestingly, Portugal is the only country making paternity leave obligatory. Usually, paternity 
leave periods vary from two to ten days, with earnings-related payment on the same basis as in 
maternity leave.  
 
Parental leave is available equally for mothers and fathers. It can be structured either as a non-
transferable individual right with an equal amount of leave or as a family right, which parents 
can divide between themselves. According to the EU Parental Leave Directive, all member states 
must provide at least three months parental leave per parent. This directive does not specify 
further requirements regarding payment or flexibility (Moss & Deven, 2009: 84). Concerning the 
length of parental leave, there is a wide range within Europe. Nevertheless, countries can be 
clustered into those providing about nine to fifteen months and those providing up to three years 
(Table 3). In many countries, the payment is earnings-related, pitched either at more than 50% of 
earnings or at full earnings with a maximum ceiling. By contrast, in several other countries the 
parental leave benefit is paid at flat rate, low earnings-related rate, means-tested or for only part 
of the leave period. Several countries additionally have developed childcare leaves between one 
                                                 
32 Gender division in childcare in families was discussed in Chapter 4. 
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and three years following the maternity or parental leave period. Parental and childcare leave are 
creating a continuous period, sometimes with different conditions concerning payment. 
Furthermore, nearly all European countries offer at least unpaid time off to care for a sick child. 
Referring to the EU parental leave directive as a legal basis, there is a statutory leave entitlement 
for urgent family reasons in cases of sickness or accident. In general, this type of leave is rather 
unspecified.  
 
In recent years, more academic and political attention has been paid to options that family 
policies offer for men in childcare (e.g. Ellingsæter & Leira, 2006; O’Brien, 2009; Hobson & 
Fahlén, 2009). O'Brien (2009) has compared fathers’ patterns of leave-taking across 24, mostly 
European countries between 2003 and 2007. Main dimensions used in her analysis are leave 
duration and level of income replacement. O’Brien (2009: 194) has clustered these “father-
sensitive leave models” as follows:  
 
1)  extended father-care leave with high-income replacement (Finland, Germany, Iceland, 
Norway, Portugal, Quebec, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden);  
2)  short father-leave with high-income replacement (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands);  
3)  short/minimalist father-care leave, with low/no income replacement (Australia, Austria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Poland, and United Kingdom); 
4)  no statutory father-care sensitive parental leave (United States).  
 
Her results suggest that fathers’ use of statutory leave is greatest when high-income replacement 
(50% or more) is combined with extended duration (more than fourteen days). Father-targeted 
schemes heighten usage. In the 1990s - with the Nordic countries as path-breakers - a few 
countries have adopted an extended paternity leave for fathers only (father’s quota). This was the 
policy response on the very low share of parental leave use by men, intending to increase the 
involvement of fathers in childcare and to facilitate gender equality on the labour market.  
 
At the end of the 1990s, most European countries had developed a range of different types of 
leave for working parents and others with care responsibilities. The trend of increasing leave 
time was accompanied by the expansion of part-time work. With the Nordic countries being 
pioneers again, in several countries working parents gained rights to reduce working time 
(Morgan, 2008: 3). Leave policies have been an area of great dynamics over the past decades. 
The expansion of leave arrangements in almost all European countries reflects economic and 
demographic motives of policy-makers as well as the political pressures on governments to 
support parents in balancing work and family life (Morgan, 2008). Table 3 summarises the 
existing leave entitlements within EU27 (Moss & Deven, 2009). 
 
In research on childcare and reconciliation of work and family life there has been a heavy 
emphasis on the role of the welfare state, in the options that are officially available for the 
parents. However, the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions (2007) emphasise the role of companies, employers, and organisational culture in the 
workplaces in how parents are able to use the options available. The authors conclude that the 
factors shaping the take-up patterns of parental leave include the financial and legal conditions of 
the statutory parental leave system, the prevailing gender division of labour, access to measures 
aimed at reconciling work and family life (such as the provision of public childcare services and 
opportunities for reduced working hours). Furthermore, it is also highly important whether 
parental leave is accepted and supported within the organisational culture, as well as the 
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establishment’s human resources practices, and labour market conditions with regard to wage 
levels, job security, and unemployment (European Foundation, 2007: 6). 
 
Table 3: Leave arrangements across Europe 
maternity leave paternity leave parental leave entitlement: 
Family/Individual
total post‐natal leave 
per family (months)
leave for sick 
children
Denmark +++ +++ +++ F 11 x
Finland +++ +++ +++ F 37.5 [fn] x [fn]
Norway (+++) [fn] + +++ F/I 36.5 +++   [+]
Sweden (+++) [fn] +++ +++ F/I 36.5 (16.5) [fn] +++
Austria +++ x ++ [*] F 24 +++   [+]
Belgium +++ +++ ++ I 9.5 +
France +++ +++ ++  [*][fn] F 36.5 +   [+]
Germany +++ x +++  [*] F 36 (16) +++
Luxembourg
Netherlands +++ +++ ++ I 14.5 (2.5) +++   [+]
Ireland ++ x + I 16 +++   [+]
Malta
UK ++ ++ + I 18 (9) +
Cyprus
Greece  [fn]     a ++ +++ + I 15 (8) +   [+]
b +++ x + I 48 (3) [fn] x
Italy +++ x ++ I 13,5 +
Portugal (+++) [fn] +++ ++ I 36.5 (12.5) [fn] +++   [+]
Spain   [fn] +++ +++ + I 36 (3.5) +++
Bulgaria
Czech Republic +++ x ++  [*][fn] I 36 +++
Estonia +++ +++ ++  [*] F 36.5 x
Hungary +++ +++ +++ [fn] F 36 +++
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland +++ x ++ F 36 +++   [+]
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia +++ ++ +++ I 14 (11.5) +++   [+]
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Source: Own illustration of Moss & Deven, 2009 
 
Key: 
x: not statutory entitlement;  
+: statutory entitlement, but unpaid;  
++: statutory entitlement, paid either at low flat-rate or earnings-related at less than 50% of earnings or not 
           universal or for less than the full period of leave;  
+++: statutory entitlement, paid to all parents at more than 50% of earnings;  
( ): brackets indicate that there is not a designated “maternity leave”, but leave is available for women to take 
 immediately before and after childbirth; 
*: payment is made to all parents with a young child whether or not they are taking leave; 
F: family entitlement;  
I: individual entitlement; 
F/I: some period family entitlement and some period individual entitlement;  
[+]: additional leave entitlements covering not only children but also other family members and/or situations of 
 serious illness; 
Unbracketed numbers indicate total length of leave available to a family;  
Bracketed numbers indicate length of leave that receives some payment; 
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[fn]  country footnotes: 
Czech Republic: parental leave may be taken until child is three years old – benefit is paid until child is four. 
Finland: total post-natal leave includes period of low paid childcare leave. All employees have access to leave to 
care for a sick child, with length and payment determined by collective agreements. 
France: parental leave payment to parents with one child only made until six months after the end of maternity 
leave. 
Germany: parental leave payment up to max. of 28 months; remainder of three year leave period unpaid. 
Greece: a = private sector employees; b = public sector employees. Women employees in both sectors can 
consolidate an entitlement to work reduced hours into a full-time leave of up to 3¾ months in the private sector and 
9 months in the public sector. This extra leave option is not included in the total post-natal leave shown in the Table, 
which shows leave available to two-parent family where both parents work in same sector. 
Hungary: for insured parents, leave is paid at 70% of earnings until child’s third birthday, then at flat-rate; only 
mother is entitled to use in child’s first year. Either parent in a family with three or more children may take leave 
during the period between the third and the eighth birthday of the youngest child. 
Italy: parental leave is six months per parent, but total leave per family cannot exceed ten months. 
Norway: there is no separate maternity leave; part of parental leave is reserved for women before and after birth. 
Portugal: “maternity leave” has been replaced by “initial parental leave”. Total postnatal leave includes period of 
unpaid leave after parental leave. 
Spain: women employees can consolidate an entitlement to work reduced hours into a full-time leave of up to four 
weeks. This extra leave option is not included in the total post-natal leave shown in the Table. 
Sweden: there is no separate maternity leave; part of the 480 days of paid parental leave is reserved for women. 
Each parent is entitled to take parental leave until a child is 18 months; but the 480 days of paid leave can be taken 
until a child is eight years. 
 
5.2.2. Childcare services 
 
Formal childcare has been the most crucial reform area of family policies in the EU during the 
last years, being increasingly regarded a vital work-family reconciliation element that contributes 
to multiple goals e.g. female employment, gender equality, birth rates, early education. An 
important impetus was certainly the Barcelona European Council 2002, where important targets 
for the quantitative improvement of childcare provisions were adopted33. Other drivers were the 
OECD’s research, such as PISA, Starting Strong, and Babies and Bosses, which pointed out the 
importance of early childhood education and care (ECEC).  
 
Childcare provisions in the EU countries differ substantially with regard to coverage rates, 
affordability, quality etc. (e.g. Plantenga & Remery, 2005 & 2009; Da Roit & Sabatinelli, 2007; 
OECD, 2007a; Eurostat, 2009c; Lohmann et al., 2009). In their report based on Eurostat 
statistical information and national reports, Plantenga and Remery (2009: 54-55) summarise “In 
the age category 0-2 years, the use of formal childcare arrangements varies from 73% in 
Denmark to only 2% in the Czech Republic and Poland. It appears that seven EU member states 
(Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and United Kingdom) have already 
met the Barcelona target.” The use of formal care arrangements increases with the age of 
children. The authors also emphasise quality and affordability of the services, and remind for the 
need of day care for school age children, which is something that the EU does not specifically 
target. They continue that when comparing and interpreting the national figures, the use of 
childcare facilities does not show directly whether demands are fully met.  
 
Lone mothers especially are vulnerable both financially and in combining employment and 
childcare. While the use of both formal and informal childcare is mainly driven by the available 
formal arrangements, social networks fulfil an important complementary role (Raeymaeckers et 
                                                 
33 The Barcelona summit (2002) agreed on the goals of providing, by 2010, childcare to at least 33% of children 
under 3 years of age and to at least 90% of children between 3 years old and the mandatory school age in each EU 
Member State. 
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al., 2008: 127). Formal childcare provisions have their limitations in all the countries, including 
countries that have rather generous public childcare provision (Kröger, forthcoming). 
 
Childcare services for under three year olds are particularly developed in the Nordic countries. 
Conversely, deficient formal systems with less than 10% of under three year olds can be found in 
post-socialist Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia, but also in Austria and 
Malta. Care systems for children from the age of three to mandatory school age are everywhere 
more expanded. Regarding opening hours, part-time exceeds full-time care especially in Austria, 
Germany, Netherlands, but also Ireland, Malta and UK – revealing also institutional traditions 
and cultural norms. Overall, full-time care is more common for the older age group than the 
younger one.  
 
In childcare provision, there has been a heavy emphasis on quantity, but issue that is even more 
important is the quality of childcare services. While in national studies qualitative information 
has been vital (e.g. parents’ satisfaction with services), quantifiable data like staff-child ratios or 
education of nursery school teachers has been used in international comparisons (Lohmann et al., 
2009: 72). Regarding staff-child ratios, there are again considerable differences throughout 
Europe: for the under three -group, some countries as Denmark (1:3) or UK (1:3) show an 
acknowledged staff-child ratio, while others as Italy (1:7 to 1:10) or Germany (1:6.4) exhibit 
non-favourable proportions. Similar diversity exists with regard to the educational level of 
childminders and pre-school teachers. Particularly low educational levels seem to exist in 
Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. Furthermore, they criticise the considerable 
gender imbalances in the childcare staff (see also OECD, 2006). Moreover, staff qualification 
tends to differ between different childcare institutions within countries, and private childminders 
usually have a significantly lower level of education (Plantenga & Remery, 2009: 45).  
 
Both quantity and quality of childcare relate to national policy priorities, one indicator for which 
is social expenditure on childcare (Lohmann et al., 2009: 70). While Nordic countries and the 
UK spend more on the 0-2 year olds than the three to school age group, allocation in many 
countries is the opposite (esp. Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia). Furthermore, it can be 
observed that the Nordic countries and France spending more than 0.9% of their GDP on 
childcare raise the EU27 average (0.57%), while particularly low spenders are Austria, Ireland, 
Greece and Poland. Low spenders can be found in all family policy systems and counter-
examples exist as well. 
 
From a policy process point of view, the reforms and expansionary or retrenchment measures as 
well as policy challenges conducted over the last years are important. Plantenga and Remery 
(2009) show a move to higher coverage in many European countries. They state that while the 
Nordic countries, Belgium, France, and Slovenia have a high level of availability and direct 
efforts at enhancements, the UK, the Netherlands, and Germany are clearly moving towards a 
fuller coverage of childcare services (Plantenga & Remery, 2009: 58). Thus, there is an overall 
trend of defamilialisation through formal childcare expansion, from which a number of (mainly 
CEE) countries have to be excluded. 
 
However, Central and Eastern European countries do not form a unified cluster. Szeleva and 
Polakowski (2008) have studied the patterns of childcare in the new member countries of the EU 
in Central and Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia) during the period 1989-2004. They demonstrate the existence of cross-
country variation of childcare policies within the region showing that instead of a unified 
tendency towards familialisation of policies, many of the post-communist countries followed 
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different paths of familialisation while some of them strengthened the defamilialising 
components of their policies. They distinguish between four policy-types: implicit familialism 
(Poland) and explicit familialism (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia), comprehensive 
support (Lithuania and Hungary) and female mobilising (into labour market) (Estonia and 
Latvia).  
 
The dominating trend of defamilialisation is also elsewhere accompanied by another trend, 
which Mahon (2002) detected for France and Finland and called “new familialism”. Its emphasis 
is on parental choice (Mahon, 2002: 350) and the primary policy instrument to achieve this is 
home care allowances. Both Finland and France introduced such flat-rate allowances in the mid-
1980s, Norway (1998) followed and recently Sweden (2008) and Germany (from 2013). There is 
also severe criticism towards home care allowances for preventing female employment, and 
minimising equality of educational opportunities (OECD, 2007a). Saraceno and Keck (2008: 61) 
argue that public financial support may strengthen, incentive, or allow familialisation of care 
responsibilities, and remind that the forms that public support may take are not gender neutral 
(e.g. payments for care are likely to strengthen gender divisions more than services). Still, care 
allowances could together with measures of positive defamilialisation increase parental choice. 
The challenge is how to rebalance time, money and services (Plantenga & Remery, 2009: 60) 
into a consistent system opening up different opportunities according to individual circumstances 
and preferences.  
 
Statutory entitlements to childcare get slowly but surely on national policy agendas. Finland is 
the only EU country with a legal right to all children under school age (OECD, 2007a: 160). 
Other Nordic countries, but also Germany and the UK, have followed to the same direction 
(Dörfler, 2007; Plantenga & Remery, 2009: 40). Often, however, the right is only to part-time 
care. Some countries have not only introduced a right to childcare, but also made the last pre-
school year compulsory and free of charge. This has been e.g. the case in Austria, Poland, 
Cyprus, Luxembourg and Hungary (Eurostat, 2009d).  
 
Regarding explanations for the varying childcare situations and expansions, Jensen (2009) has 
identified two different curriculum traditions and is able to show that countries belonging to the 
so-called readiness-for-school-curriculum tradition have expanded their provision considerably 
more than countries belonging to the socialpedagogical-curriculum tradition. He argues that the 
former conceptually matches the political preference for generation of human capital and 
investment in future labour force. Following the same argumentation, Lister (2008) criticises the 
new welfare policy paradigm, where children are seen as profitable investment for the future and 
in human capital. In this model, the quality of childhood itself is largely overlooked and 
childcare and education policies are more oriented towards employment priorities - current and 
future - than towards children’s wellbeing here and now. 
 
Most comparative studies on childcare concentrate on the question of reconciliation of work and 
family life, especially for mothers with young children. Plantenga et al. (2008: 42-43) make an 
important critical comment that care services are not only services for working parents but good, 
high-quality services are services for children. According to them, effective childcare strategy 
should not be about quantity but also, or even primarily, about quality of services addressing 
needs of children, parents, families, and communities. They should not just be seen from the 
economic perspective. Also in comparative childcare research, the perspective and needs of 
children should be addressed when studying childcare arrangements in different European 
countries and the EU childcare and employment policy. 
 
 
97 
5.3. Cash and tax benefits for families 
Cash and tax benefits for families primarily follow economic and socio-political family policy 
motives: families perform valuable benefits for society and have higher costs, lower earnings 
capacities (due to care obligations) and often higher poverty risks than households without 
children (Lohmann et al., 2009: 78). International comparisons of family benefits can be divided 
into expenditure-based and family-type studies (Gauthier, 1999). In general, the data basis on 
family tax benefits is poorer than that on cash benefits.  
 
Figure 16: Family spending in cash, service, and tax measures (2005) 
 
Source: OECD Family Database, 2009a; in per cent of GDP 
 
OECD (2009a) provides information on the family spending proportions of cash, services, or tax 
measures (Figure 16). Most countries spend more in cash benefits than in services or tax 
benefits; though the “growth of in-kind benefits has outpaced the growth of cash benefits in 
several countries and the role of tax benefits is growing” (Gabel & Kamerman, 2006: 261). 
Countries clearly privilege either public childcare, leave policies, or cash and tax benefits, rather 
than offer mixed support (De Henau et al., 2006). Cash benefits are in the majority of countries 
the (financially) most important family policy measures. The OECD Family Database 
distinguishes child/family allowances, parental leave payments, support for single parents, and 
public childcare support through earmarked payments to parents. Families also profit from social 
insurances or housing benefits, but these are not directly regarded as family policy measures.  
 
Child/family allowances exist in practically every EU country (Plantenga & Remery, 2005: 67), 
while their levels vary considerably. Gauthier (2005; also Gabel & Kamerman, 2006) finds that 
during the 1990s, in most countries family cash benefits expenditures as a per cent of GDP 
decreased: only Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey spent more in 
1998 than in 1993. Especially for the CEE countries, there were downward trends in the years 
immediately following the collapse of the socialist regimes, but a gradual restoration has taken 
place since then. Between 2000 and 2005, public expenditures on family cash benefits increased 
in eight countries (Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, and 
UK). In five countries, they remained rather stable (Austria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Sweden), 
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while in six countries they were retrenched (Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, France, 
Netherlands, Poland)34. 
 
In some countries, family allowances are paid as a universal benefit, in others depending on 
income, age or number of children. In five EU countries, eligibility is based on employment (and 
not residence), and thus excludes parts of the population. Nine countries grant family allowances 
only after income-testing, five of these are Mediterranean and four post-socialist countries. Bahle 
(2008: 109) concludes that in the Southern countries income testing constitutes a policy 
principle, while in the post-socialist ones it is rather because of scarce resources. Family 
allowances targeted to the number of children are present in a slight majority of 16 countries; 
among them representatives of all family policy systems. This criterion can reflect pronatalist 
motives (e.g. France), but also the fact that families with many children have higher relative 
costs. Those countries, which have benefits varying by both age and number of children, are all 
“family policy pioneers, […] have long histories of family allowances [and] except for the 
Netherlands, they are predominantly Catholic.” (Bahle, 2008: 209). In the majority of OECD 
countries, family policies target poorer families. Financial assistance for families with low 
earnings (up to 25% of average earnings) is at least twice as high a proportion of household 
income as for families at twice-average earnings (OECD, 2007a: 76).  
 
Tax credits are often not incorporated in cross-national analyses. Historically, the first forms of 
family allowances in European countries were introduced in the post-war period as so called 
“housewife bonuses” reflecting and reinforcing single-earner family norms (Dingeldey, 2001: 
656). With rising female labour market participation since the mid-1970s, separate taxation was 
introduced in some countries (e.g. Sweden), while others kept joint taxation systems (e.g. 
Germany). Nineteen OECD countries had separate income taxation of spouses in 2006, while 
joint taxation or options for it existed in eleven countries (OECD, 2008b). Child-related tax 
allowances exist in practically every EU country (Plantenga & Remery, 2005: 67), but they are 
diverse and hard to compare due to data problems.  
 
Adema (2009) points out that in most OECD countries net payments to governments are smaller 
for families with children than for similar households without children; though it ranges from 
very high differences in Austria or Hungary to quite small ones in Poland. However, this 
generosities are not necessarily reflected in positive outcomes (e.g. higher birth rates or lower 
poverty rates), for this “crucially depends on the extent to which tax/benefits systems give 
parents financial incentives to work and help them combine work and care commitments” 
(Adema, 2009: 193). Lohmann et al. (2009: 86) conclude that dual-earner couples have smaller 
tax rates in almost all EU countries – and significantly so in Austria, Finland, Greece and 
Hungary. Almost all countries either support an equal division of paid labour in families or show 
neutrality in the taxation of single-earner and dual-earner couples (Lohmann et al., 2009: 92).  
 
5.3.1. The role of social transfers in tackling poverty  
 
Several studies have developed comparative analyses on the role of welfare regimes and their 
family policies in reducing poverty35. During the 1990s, the poverty rate increased in most EU 
countries and in many instances for vulnerable groups; an exception was the older people. 
Means-tested benefits assumed growing importance in alleviating poverty, but reforms also 
produced diversity in the safety nets across Europe (Sainsbury & Morissens, 2002). 
 
                                                 
34 OECD SOCX data. 
35 See also Chapter 3 on poverty of families. 
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Fouarge and Layte (2005) argue that welfare regimes strongly influence long-term poverty. 
Overall, the countries of the social democratic type display lower rates of poverty. The next 
highest rates are found in the countries of the corporatist type. In countries belonging to the 
residual and liberal welfare regimes, poverty is not only higher but it is also recurrent and 
persistent. The performance of regimes in tackling income poverty turns out to be rather different 
from their performance in tackling resource deprivation. Looking at the difference across regime 
types it became clear that deprivation poverty tends to be more prevalent in Southern and Liberal 
regimes and less so in Corporatist and Social-Democratic regimes. Nonetheless, most of the 
variance is not explained by country or regime type differences but by common structural factors 
like the needs of the household, the human capital of its members, the turnover, and dynamics on 
the labour market and the distribution of permanent income. Particularly interesting is the large 
contribution of socio-economic status variables to explaining deprivation, which reflects the 
traditional impact of class, education, and employment status (Fouarge & Muffels, 2009). 
 
Some studies have focused on Central and Eastern European countries. Förster and Tóth (2001) 
suggest that social transfers in general, and family benefits in particular, made a significant 
contribution to reducing child poverty in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. However, 
reduction rates decreased between the early and the late-1990s. Cerami (2003) argues that 
welfare institutions have played, and will probably continue to play, a crucial role in limiting the 
negative effects of income and social inequality. They have helped to reduce not only the 
negative repercussions of the economic crisis, but have also helped to maintain a sense of public 
responsibility and solidarity, and thus reinforced social cohesion. Although access to these 
benefits is no guarantee of leaving poverty, social transfers significantly improve the economic 
conditions of families in need. Without their existence, Central and Eastern European societies 
would not only be more unequal but also more atomised and disaggregated societies. This might 
seriously damage further reforms or the democratisation process itself. 
 
The impact of welfare policies on child poverty has merited specific attention in recent research. 
Chen and Corak (2005) point out that family and demographic forces play only a limited role in 
determining changes in child poverty rates. Instead, labour market and the government sector are 
the sources of the major forces determining the direction of change in child poverty. The 
European Task-Force on Child Poverty and Child Wellbeing (2008) sought to assess the impact 
of social transfers on child poverty. The countries with the lowest child poverty rates are clearly 
those that spend most on social benefits (excluding pensions). However, a number of countries 
with similar wealth and similar shares of GDP invested in social benefits achieve very different 
child poverty rates (e.g. the UK and Belgium vs. Austria or the Netherlands). On average in the 
EU, social transfers other than pensions reduce the risk of poverty for children by 44%. The 
impact of social transfers is higher on child poverty than on overall poverty in most EU 
countries. In the Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, social transfers reduce the risk 
of poverty for children by more than 60%. Only France and Austria show similar results. The 
countries in which benefits have the strongest impact in reducing child poverty are those in 
which expenditures are specifically identified as family benefits. 
 
5.4. Social care for older people 
A large number of comparisons have been done since the 1990s in the field of social care 
services for older people (see Kröger, 2001: 11-23). However, care for older people is often 
studied in the framework of health/medical rather than of social care or family policy, or instead 
of a broader and more multidisciplinary framework. In this chapter, the focus in the care for 
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older people lays on home/family based care and services, and on the role of families as 
providers of care and support. Research concerning institutional care for older people is not 
included, if it is not referring to the role of families. 
 
One of the most extensive EC funded research projects on family care for older people is 
“Services for Supporting Family Carers of Elderly People in Europe” (EUROFAMCARE). It has 
provided a European review of the situation of family carers of older people in relation to the 
existence, familiarity, availability, use, and acceptability of supporting services (see 
EUROFAMCARE, 2006; Mestheneos & Triantafillou, 2005; also Lamura et al., 2008). 
According to its results, the reasons for family carers to provide care are most often physical 
illness, disability or other dependency of the old person. Emotional bonds constitute the principle 
motivation for providing care followed by a sense of duty, personal sense of obligation or having 
no other alternatives. The findings show that women were predominantly both the main carers 
and the main older person cared for. Nearly 50% of carers were adult children of the cared-for 
old person, although there was national variation in this. Researchers described family care as a 
dynamic but long-term commitment. What comes to financial implications, family carers had 
less than average disposable income because of caring. This is the result of co-payment for 
services and a reduction in employment (EUROFAMCARE, 2006: 4-14). 
 
The project also studied informal and formal support for family carers and the old people cared 
for. Social networks were associated with lower levels of carer stress and burden. Less than one 
third of family carers had used a support service but of the cared-for old persons, a vast majority 
(94%) used at least one care service in the previous six months, highest percentages were in 
Sweden, Italy, and Denmark, lowest in Greece. In all countries, services had problems in 
distribution, especially in rural areas, and in covering hours when carer may be working. Users 
and non-users of care services saw the bureaucratic and complex procedures to get access, high 
financial costs, lack of information on available support, low quality, inadequate coverage, and 
the refusal of the old person to accept existing services as the main barriers for service use 
(ibid.). 
 
Several researchers have studied the ways in which formal care services and informal care 
combine36. For example, Motel-Klingebiel et al., (2005) have studied whether formal services 
provided by the state “crowd out” (diminish) family care, encourage it, or create mixed 
responsibilities. They found no evidence of a substantial “crowding out” of family help. Instead, 
the results support the hypothesis of “mixed responsibility” and suggest that in societies with 
well-developed service infrastructures, help from families and welfare state services act 
accumulatively, but that in familistic welfare regimes, similar combinations do not occur (ibid.: 
863). This result, which is supported by several other studies on intergenerational care relations, 
could be seen as rather surprising and unexpected against the trend of “care going public” 
identified by many researchers (e.g. Anttonen et al., 2003: 171-172). However, it becomes more 
understandable when different forms of care and its intensity are specified. In a case of more 
regular and demanding care services, “care going public”, its professionalisation and 
institutionalisation, seems to take place in the care for older people.  
 
There are also analyses exploring changes that have taken place over time in care policies and 
provision in different countries. Simonazzi (2009) has studied how different countries have tried 
to reduce increasing social and economic costs of the care for the older people, simultaneously 
trying to ensure both the quantity and quality of care. Her starting point is four different elderly 
                                                 
36 Intergenerational care relations in families are also discussed in Chapter 4. 
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care regimes in the EU at the late-1990s, which she has named as Northern Europe Beveridge-
oriented (Sweden, UK, Ireland, Denmark, Finland), Continental Europe Bismarck-oriented 
(Germany, Austria, France, Luxembourg), Mediterranean (Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal), and 
Central-Eastern European (Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria) regimes (Table 4). 
 
In the search for cost effectiveness/reduction Simonazzi (2009) has observed a convergence in 
how the care market is organised. According to her, all countries are moving towards home care, 
private provision and cash transfers. She argues that the way in which care for older people is 
provided and financed entails considerable differences in the creation of a formal care market. 
Secondly, national employment models shape the features of the care labour market, affecting 
the quantity and quality of care labour supply, the extent of the care labour shortage, and the 
degree of dependence on migrant carers. Her comparative analysis show how these two factors 
combine to shape the characteristics of elderly care regimes, and their differing capacity to meet 
increasing demand for care either by using native workers or, alternatively, by turning to 
immigrant workers in order to cope with labour shortages. 
 
Table 4: Elderly care regimes in the EU, at the end of the 1990s 
 
Source: Simonazzi, 2009: 214 
 
Several researchers (e.g. Behning, 2005; Pavolini & Ranci, 2008) have suggested that in all over 
Europe, in spite of national differences, there are at least two similar and simultaneous trends in 
social care for older people: first, privatisation and marketisation of formal, professional care, 
and on the other hand (re-)familialisation of care either with or without financial compensation. 
Thus, the role of public provision of social care services for older people seems to be 
diminishing. 
 
One of the major issues and trends in many countries in care for old and disabled people (but 
also in childcare) has been payments for informal care, so called “cash-for-care” schemes (Evers 
et al., 1994; Ungerson, 1995). Rummery (2009) has analysed gender implications of these 
schemes; whether it means increasing care burden for women. According to her analysis, these 
schemes “… appear to fall into three groups: schemes whereby some protection against the 
potential negative gender-effects of the policy is offered by the relatively high degree of 
formalisation (France and the Netherlands); schemes whereby some degree of protection against 
abuse is offered by a degree of scrutiny and limits on paying family members, but the high 
degree of discretion and variability in operation offer the potential for some negative gendered 
impacts (the UK and the USA); and schemes whereby existing significant gender inequalities are 
likely to be exacerbated by the low levels of state governance (Austria and Italy).” (Rummery, 
2009: 646). She concludes that the most positive outcomes for women, but also for disabled and 
older people would appear to be in the most formalised schemes. 
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Based on the findings of SOCCARE project, Sipilä and Kröger (2004) conclude that European 
social care cultures are diverse but not completely different. They underline the importance of 
formal care services to needy families. They also remind that formal social care services are 
strongly intertwined with informal care. From the viewpoint of families, service organisations 
should never be isolated institutions but flexible and capable of meeting specific human needs in 
individual ways. Furthermore, the idea of quality care is immediately associated with the 
availability of sufficient time. Carers need to be able to combine working and caring, both 
simultaneously and sequentially. When neither working life nor services are flexible enough, the 
flexibility is ultimately taken from informal sources, mainly from women. Both formal and 
informal care is essential and practically always, there is a need to integrate both at the level of 
everyday family life (Sipilä & Kröger, 2004: 562-564; also Kröger, 2004: 100). 
 
To conclude, care for older people is mainly discussed in very different terms from childcare 
issues using concepts such as “integrated care” (how to combine health and social care services) 
and “long-term care” (see e.g. Huber et al., 2008). It is also analysed under the concept of 
intergenerational care relations, analysing to what extent adult children provide care and help for 
their older parents as informal care forms a crucial part in the care for older people. Usually 
social care has been studied from the perspective of the care provider, whether it is an individual 
(professional carer or family member), organisation, or the state, and the perspective of older 
people themselves have been ignored. According to Anttonen and Sointu (2006: 80-81) 
important issues in care for older people in the future are institutional care and its organisation, 
quantity and quality of home care services, and support for the care provided by family members 
and other informal carers. Furthermore, the coordination, planning, and follow-up of the service 
packages are important questions. It is also important to recognise not only care needs and 
services of older people but also other forms of adult care. 
 
5.5. Social welfare services for children and families  
In this report, social welfare services for families are differentiated from social care services, 
paying special attention to services for children and families with special needs or in special, 
demanding life situations (e.g. interventions and services such as family support, parenting 
education, child welfare/child protection, social services for children with special needs, and for 
family members with disabilities). Width and indefiniteness of both the practical field and 
definition of social welfare services is probably one of the reasons why there are only very few 
cross-national studies available. Furthermore, these needs and services only meet a more limited 
number (and often a more marginalised group) of people compared with childcare or social care 
for older people, and are thus politically and academically less interesting.  
 
The Council of Europe (2009) Committee of Experts on Social Policy for Families and Children 
developed in 2008-09 a comprehensive questionnaire on national family policies and collected 
information from 40 European countries, which form a large database with detailed quantitative 
and qualitative data. There are two sections relevant to welfare services for families and children 
titled: Policies for dealing with family stress and difficulty; and Policies aimed at strengthening 
family life and personal development for parents and children. First one of these covers issues 
concerning violence in families, services helping family members to deal with problems (e.g. 
counselling services), child protection (legislative situation and the power of authorities in 
removing parental authority). The latter section covers issues of parental education and support 
(parenting programmes/parental counselling/training sessions) and possible obligations to attend 
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parenting programmes in cases of vulnerability (e. g. abused children, domestic violence, 
adolescent pregnant women, parents serving prison sentences, etc.). However, this data has not 
been systematically analysed but only a brief summary is provided on these sections (Council of 
Europe, 2009: 59-60). That already shows the great variety and complexity of these programmes, 
service provision, actions taken, and terminology used in this field in different countries. Still, 
the authors conclude that policies aiming at strengthening family life are an increasingly 
significant issue across the majority of European countries (ibid.: 59-60). There has been 
increasing concerns over changes in family structures and life and parents’ competence to take 
care of their children and thus, interest in family support in its different forms (see e.g. Kuronen 
& Lahtinen, 2010; also Walker, 2002).  
 
Child welfare services and child protection seem to be the area where there is an increasing 
interest in cross-national comparisons but existing research is done mainly in a small number of 
countries (e.g. Hetherington, 1998; Hetherington et al., 1997; Blomberg et al., 2010; Soydan et 
al., 2005). What is interesting is that quite many of these studies have been done in (and 
between) the Nordic countries. 
 
One of the pioneering and widest comparative studies in this area is Hetherington’s and her 
colleagues’ research (1998; Hetherington et al., 1997) on the working practices of child 
protection social workers. The study included six nations (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, and the UK) and eight child protection systems. As a general conclusion, the 
researchers summarise that the phrase “child protection” is given a wider meaning in continental 
Europe, and refer to matters such as employment legislation, protecting children against 
exploitation, and the protection of children outside the family rather more than within the family. 
They argue that in England - compared to continental Europe - children are primarily protected 
from their parents whereas elsewhere protecting children is a broader social issue.  
 
Many of these cross-national studies concentrate on working practices of social workers in child 
welfare (e.g. Blomberg et al., 2010; Forsberg & Vagli, 2006; Križ & Skivenes, 2010; Soydan et 
al., 2005), multi-professional co-operation (Glad, 2006), or on specific working methods like 
family group conference (Heino, 2009). Hardly any research is available on how children and 
parents experience the services provided, whether they receive help, or concerning the outcomes 
of the services provided. 
 
Soydan and his research team (2005) have also studied child welfare social work practices and 
assessment processes comparing Denmark, UK, Sweden, Germany, and the US (Texas) in 1999-
2003. A special emphasis was in the child’s place in the process, in multiprofessional co-
operation, and in how social workers work with service users from ethnic minority groups. The 
researchers conclude for example that the interventions differ between educational and 
psychological focus. In all countries, there is a lack of common understanding about when to use 
serious interventions, such as removing a child from the home, and there are no shared national 
or international concepts for different efforts and interventions. Although there are international 
agreements about children’s right to be heard and looked upon as full worthy citizens, they were 
not seen in these cases, especially young children (Soydan et al., 2005: 42-47). 
 
To summarise, it is difficult to find comparative research on social welfare services for children 
and families with special needs or in special challenging life situations. There were no cross-
national studies found concerning needs of and services for children (or adults) with disabilities 
and their families. The field most often studied is child welfare /child protection and to some 
extent family support. These studies cover a small number of countries, but still, they provide 
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interesting and important views into national and cultural differences in the role of professionals, 
service systems, and the state in the lives of families in situations that require more targeted 
support and intervention than what is possible with social care services. Lack of comparative 
research in this field is certainly a major gap in existing research on social care and social 
services for families. 
 
5.6. Local family policies 
Often family policies and services for families are implemented at the local level and thus there 
is local variation in services provision. Policies at the local level are however much more 
difficult to study in cross-nationally than national policies and service provision. Furthermore, at 
the local level the role of NGOs is important in complementing public services and providing 
support for families in almost all European countries (Council of Europe, 2009: 59). 
 
Mingione and Oberti have observed that “local systems must be evaluated in terms of a varied 
mix of institutional and individual actors where diversity and complexity play an increasingly 
important role within the development of active policies, based on partnership implementation 
and on shared responsibility between providers and recipients” (Mingione & Oberti, 2003). They 
have provided the following figure (Figure 17) on the structure of local welfare systems. 
 
Figure 17: Diagram of the structure of local welfare systems 
 
Source: Mingione & Oberti, 2003 
 
Different national welfare systems are far from being harmonised and thus lead to many different 
opportunities for developing local welfare policies. In countries such as France or the UK, there 
are many “local interventions” promoted by the State. In other countries, such as Germany, Italy, 
or Spain, local policies are directly promoted by Regions, or even Municipalities in a more 
flexible context. It is particularly because of this budgetary and administrative responsibility of 
the local government that one may speak of a distinct “local welfare state” (Wollmann, 2004) or 
of “welfare municipalities” (Kröger, 1997). The “local welfare state” is realised in Germany and 
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Sweden, while in UK and France, due to different reasons (political ones in the UK, “territorial” 
ones in France) the welfare system is highly centralised. The comparison among different local 
welfare systems highlights also the involvement and responsibility of non-public (voluntary as 
well as private) organisations and groups (Wollmann, 2004). 
 
Involvement of the community in the local welfare creation has been declared fundamental in a 
2004 European transnational project Equal-Tempora on work-life balance and care. According 
to it, services have to be “near to persons, families and their living environment”, also according 
to the principle of subsidiarity. In the provision of local welfare services “different actors have to 
participate in a concerted manner in the implementation of the local welfare services (different 
local administrative institutions, social players, professional, community, family)” (Equal 
Tempora 2, 2004: 14). Although there are almost no comparative studies on local policies for 
families (see however Kröger, 1997), the local level of welfare and political intervention in 
building new family policies has gained more recognition stated in the recent ESF Paper 
Partnership for more Family-Friendly living and working conditions. “European Structural Fund 
projects are now seeking the way to meet Lisbon targets and family policies are therefore seen in 
the context of enhancing employment and gender equality, starting specifically from the local 
level, where families and companies are.” (European Commission, 2008d: 9). 
 
The renewed interest in the local level is also linked to the interest in the so-called Good Practice 
Model that is an analysis on local projects from different nations and on different topics, to 
highlight the variety of approaches and experiences in local family policies. The European 
Alliance for Families (DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities) has therefore 
developed a platform for exchange of views and experiences on family friendly policies. The 
European Alliance for Families has developed a database on good practices, in which projects 
are presented, trying to build a sort of family mainstreaming in local family policies. 
 
5.7. Conclusions 
The diversity of European welfare systems and family policies exceeds existing country 
categories and welfare regime typologies. Most researchers today agree that the main differences 
in family policies and social care policies can be found between Southern and Northern parts of 
Europe, but there is no agreement on whether these can be called as separate regimes. There is 
also significant national variation within these categories; even within the Nordic countries that 
are usually classified as a joint Nordic model (see e.g. Mahon, 2002; Rauch, 2007). Furthermore, 
in these comparisons and classifications most recent EU member states are usually missing 
(mostly Central and Eastern European Countries). Still, there are some indicators that European 
countries turn more similar in their social care systems and family policies, and in what comes to 
the problems related to them. There is a need for a more up to date and reliable family policy 
typology. Such a typology, however, cannot be “carved in stone”, but must pay attention to 
dynamics, policy changes, and, in the consequence, changing country positions and/or clusters. 
 
In family policies and social care policies in the European, national and local levels, some major 
trends can be identified: 
 
 the field of family policies has gained increasing importance and expansion during the 
recent years and while traditionally only few countries had explicit family policies and 
designated family ministries, there is a trend of growing institutionalisation; 
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 in terms of re- and defamilialisation in family and care policies across Europe, a mixture 
of re- and defamilialising measures can be identified; 
 leave policies have in many countries aimed at activating fathers and reaching a more 
equal share of employment and family responsibilities between both parents;  
 childcare services have been one of the most important family policy issues and reform 
areas and especially in this field, the trend of “care going public”, defamilialisation, 
institutionalisation and professionalisation of care work and services is likely to 
continue;  
 social care remains a combination of formal and informal care where the role of families 
and especially women in families is remarkable in providing care for children, old people 
and other dependent family members; 
 globalisation and internationalisation of care with its various forms and consequences 
will be one of the future trends e.g. care relations cross national boarders, global care 
chains and transnational care, increasing numbers of migrant care workers both in 
formal and informal care work, and international market of care services; 
 growing importance of local governments with more responsibilities and autonomy 
regarding many politically relevant issues for family policies and service provision; 
 increasing role of local NGOs and networks of different actors (e.g. public sector, NGOs, 
private companies and families themselves); 
 increasing intercultural dimension of the local communities facing the challenges linked 
to migration. 
 
The expansion of childcare facilities is high on the agenda in many European countries, and so is 
the expansion or reduction of child/family allowances and parental leave policies, often 
including elements of “active fathering”. Care issues seem to leave behind social benefits in 
family policy agenda even if those have crucial importance e.g. in reducing poverty and 
diminishing social inequalities. A common trend all across Europe - although to differing 
degrees and with different policy preferences - is reconciliation and work-life balance. It seems 
quite evident that even if the ageing of population has been recognised as one of the biggest 
future challenges all over Europe, childcare will remain in the core of policy. That is because it is 
so closely related to the needs of the economy, labour market, and gender equality policy (see 
e.g. Mahon, 2002; Haataja, 2005; Leira & Saraceno, 2008: 14-16; León, 2009; Knijn & Smit, 
2009). The main emphasis has been on the coverage levels of childcare services that would allow 
the reconciliation of work and family life. There are some indications that the educational aims 
and contents of formal childcare services will gain more political interest in the future (e.g. 
Jensen, 2009). This new kind of an interest in children and childhood can be seen a part of the 
“politicisation of childhood”, meaning increasing public interest and intervention into problems 
of children and parents, new social risks, early childhood education and care, child poverty, 
childcare as investment into future, and social capital perspective (e.g. Jenson, 2008).  
 
All over Europe, the field of childcare can be described as “care going public” (e.g. Anttonen & 
Sipilä, 2005; Geissler & Pfau-Effinger, 2005). This trend is less clear in social care for older 
people, where the trend seem to be more twofold: on the one hand privatisation and 
marketisation of formal, professional care, and on the other, (re-)familialisation of care either 
with or without financial compensation. In several countries, there has been a move towards 
“direct payments” or “personal budgets”. These changes represent a tendency where the user of 
care services is given considerably more say on the way her/his needs are being met (see e.g. 
Glasby & Littlechild, 2009). Social care, both childcare and care for older people and other 
adults, remains a combination of formal and informal care where the role of families and 
especially women in families is still remarkable. This raises an increasing political and academic 
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interest in different combinations of formal and informal care including intergenerational care 
relations. Several researchers have been interested in whether formal care replaces (crowd-out) 
informal care or whether those rather complement (crowd-in) each other. There seem to be no 
strong evidence for the crowding-out hypothesis (e.g. Brandt et al., 2009). 
 
In addition to the state, there are other important actors, local governments, NGOs, and 
especially companies and employers with their occupational family policies, which are of major 
importance for the reconciliation of work and family life (e.g. family-friendly working hours, 
workplace childcare facilities). On these policies, there are almost no international comparisons 
(except the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 
2007). 
 
Globalisation and internationalisation with its various forms and consequences is becoming more 
and more important issue in the future also in family and social care policies. It means that care 
relations cross national borders in the forms of global care chains and transnational care, and in 
increasing numbers of migrant workers both in formal and informal care work. Furthermore, it 
means that caring is increasingly becoming an international business where multinational 
companies are providing care services (Anttonen et al., 2009). The EU is now both in its policy 
and research funding investing on migration issues, but relations between family policy, care, 
gender and migration are not yet clearly emphasised (see Moving Europe: EU research on 
migration and policy needs, 2009).  
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6. Gaps in existing research 
 
 
This report is substantially divided into four main themes and research areas:  
 
1)  family structures, forms and demographic processes;  
2)  current conditions of European families;  
3)  genders and generations in families;  
4)  family policies and social care policies in Europe. 
 
This chapter points out major gaps in existing comparative research in these fields based on the 
Existential Field Reports written by the partners of the FAMILYPLATFORM project. These 
research gaps are divided into substantial and methodological gaps. The former are discussed 
first. 
 
The first general notion is that in all the fields the existing research is rather nuclear family 
oriented largely ignoring the increasing diversity in family forms and family relations, except 
when studying statistically changes in family structures, and even then, data and research on 
more recent and rare family types are missing. Existing research has concentrated on families 
with young children widely ignoring other stages of family life and the life-course approach, 
which is highly important in family research. Moreover, most of the research does not recognise 
that family is a dynamic entity, but implicitly assumes that family forms are static. From this 
point of view the family should be seen also as a result of partnership and childbearing 
processes, from the life course development of all its members (including children). Thus, future 
research should recognise the dynamic character of families, and should be able to understand 
these dynamics, the transitions within traditional and new types of family forms. We need also 
more research about the daily and biographical practices of “doing family” (in relation to new 
family forms, new forms of intergenerational solidarity and interactions between family 
members).  
 
Secondly, existing research is adult centred and children’s perspective (and views of old people) 
into their family life, policies and services are largely missing, which is certainly one of the 
major challenges for future research. Overall, experiences of families and individual family 
members within families and as policy “targets” and service users are largely ignored in existing 
research, e.g. perspective of old people in social care research. What is also emphasised in many 
of the Existential Field Reports is the need for more research on the changing role of men in 
families (e.g. men as fathers and carers, as members of migrant families, as victims of family 
violence). 
 
What comes to family structures, forms and demographic processes (Chapter 2), knowledge on 
fertility and demographic trends has been most extensive in terms of the availability of indicators 
as well as the countries and time span covered. We also know quite a lot about the major changes 
and trends in family structures (e.g. changes in marriage, birth, and divorce rates, numbers of 
lone parent families across Europe etc.). Still, the consequences of the increasing life 
expectancies and the causes of low fertility should be analysed further. The increasing life 
expectancy point to the problems of households of older people, to loneliness, coping with 
decreasing biological, physical and psychological resources, and to the need for care, suitable 
environment etc. Macro-social reasons and individual rights also points to the research of 
developments of childbearing behavior. The sustainability of the social system is questioned by 
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the low fertility; therefore it is essential to understand the processes behind them. From an 
individual perspective, the growing gap between the intentions and reality should be studied, 
especially when low fertility has tangible negative consequences.  
 
Future research should also focus more strongly of the causes and consequences of family 
dynamics (change). Regarding the causes, structural and individual factors should be considered. 
Among structural factors, institutional arrangement, family related policies, labor market, 
housing, the unequal distribution of resources should be considered. Regarding individual 
factors, value orientations, attitudes, happiness should be studied further. Considering 
consequences also both the material and immaterial dimension should be understood. These are 
such as material situation, time pressures, satisfaction, mental health, etc.  
 
So called “new and rare” family types are understudied and data available is very fragmentary. 
For example, both the quality and quantity of data on gay and lesbian (rainbow) families differs 
highly between the European countries. Similarly, even though many European research projects 
exist on intergenerational transfers and support, the knowledge about multi-generation 
households as a specific family form and arrangement is rather scarce. Patchwork/reconstituted 
families are another central and increasing family form that has been much debated in political 
and public discourse, but comparative research and data are virtually non-existing at the 
European level. Living apart together and commuter families are relatively new research subjects 
in Europe. Again, the database is fragmentary, partly because it is rather difficult to collect 
(statistical) data from families that do not share common household and because of the fact that 
they are not stable phenomena. This is the case also with divorced and reconstituted families 
keeping in mind that in those situations, family members (especially children) have family 
relations both within and outside the household. Increasing mobility within and between 
countries (incl. migration outside Europe) will make different family forms and arrangements 
issue that is even more crucial in (comparative) family research.  
 
This first state of the art on new and rare family types in Europe clearly points out that broader 
and more specific research is crucially needed. We should know more about choices people 
make in their family life, but also about social and economic forces and processes that might 
enforce people to certain decisions and arrangements. We would also need to know more about 
the decision-making processes in family formation of different kinds. Moreover, we need more 
in dept knowledge of how people live as families in different family forms, and of different 
family cultures. More research is also needed of the consequences of changes in family 
structures and arrangements both at the macro and micro levels. There is a lack of comparative 
longitudinal studies on the dissolution of couple relationships. Research on divorce has focused 
on the economic consequences on ex-partners (in particular on women), especially concerning 
the risk of falling into poverty. There are very few comparative studies concerning changes in 
the relations within and outside the family in situations of marital instability. For example, about 
the consequences of parents’ divorce/separation for the children economically, legally, socially 
and psychologically, and how parents organise their post-divorce family life and parenthood as 
sharing of parenthood after divorce has become the current ideal in many European countries. In 
addition, life course perspective into family life is important to take into account with more focus 
on different cultural and ethnic groups, values, behaviour, and political issues. 
 
Current conditions of European families (Chapter 3) cover a variety of topics from housing and 
physical living environment into migration, from poverty into influence of media and technology 
in family life. What connects these themes is the question of social inequality, which penetrates 
all the themes. Analysis of social inequalities and class structures in European societies has not 
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been high on the research agenda over the past decade. More research is needed on how social 
inequality impacts on family life and how it is reproduced within the family.  
 
Given the major role of the family in the reproduction and transmission of social inequality, it is 
essential to have more information on social inequalities and social mobility; how they are 
evolving in European societies and what are the best measures to be used in order to capture and 
describe social inequalities today (income, education, occupational status, social mobility life 
chances, etc.). Secondly, there is very little research comparing types of family interactions and 
functioning; how they relate to social and economic inequalities across the different EU 
countries. A third research gap is related to the lack of research on the inequality “strategies” and 
“processes” whereby families reproduce as well as deepen social advantage. Given the 
overriding importance of educational attainment, it would be important to focus in greater depth 
on the nexus between families’ inequality strategies and their relationship to the educational 
context and systems (including childcare and pre-schooling), in the EU countries. It is also 
important to recognise the differences between families and children living in rural or peripheral 
and urban areas in terms of education levels, educational opportunities, and attainment. Review 
of existing research points to the need to take into account the complexity and non-linearity of 
the connections between social determinants and family life.  
 
What comes to families and poverty, the dominant focus in comparative research on income 
poverty provides a very specific outlook, ignoring the experience of poverty and how it affects 
family life and individuals within families (e.g. loss of dignity, choice, and control; limited 
access to social capital and to assets of other kinds; poor health; poor housing; few opportunities; 
and an uncertain future). Social analysis of families and poverty would also benefit from a 
reinforcement of the household/family as a unit of analysis. This does not imply that the 
individual should no longer be the main unit of reference, otherwise the risk of rendering 
invisible the specific vulnerabilities of specific groups (e.g. children) within families would 
increase. However, it would be extremely important to go into greater depth in the analysis of the 
individual in the context of a particular household/family. Furthermore, there should be more 
research on the origins, experiences, or consequences of poverty and material deprivation within 
families. Production and transmission of poverty and material deprivation should deserve 
particular attention in future research. 
 
Housing, neighbourhood, and physical environment are closely linked with questions of social 
inequality. It would be also important to study those components of living environment as a 
whole as they are closely connected and influential in the everyday life of families. Even though 
there has been European research projects dealing with living environment, most of them have 
been done before the enlargement of the EU excluding a large proportion of countries, and do 
not connect with a family perspective. There are also differences not only between but also 
within countries e.g. between urban and rural areas having their own specific problems. This 
should gain more attention in future research with specific commitment on the development of 
the local communities in different areas. 
Research on immigration in Europe is extensive and plural. Gaps in current research are still 
many; here we take up especially those referring to family and integration issues. Many of the 
research gaps identified above also concerns migrant families but in addition, there are specific 
questions to be mentioned. It may be argued that family migration has been much less studied 
than other related issues. 
 
The changing patterns of international migration at the turn of the century add further challenges 
for future research. New forms of mobility are becoming common (incl. work-related migration 
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within the EU, student migration and retirement migration, female-led migration), surpassing the 
traditional settlement migration known until recently. Areas also deserving better scrutiny are the 
impact of family reunification on immigrants’ strategies (settlement, integration, and 
participation); the impact of specific legislation on family life; the consequences of recent policy 
restrictions for family reunification and formation; and the use of irregular channels by family 
members for immigration and integration. At the family level, more research is needed on 
immigrant families and changes resulting from migration. Some of them are related to family 
strategies, e.g. the role of families in migration decisions; the constraints exerted by the 
economic and policy framework on collective strategies; and the role of the family in promoting 
the overall integration of its members. Others are related to family structures (e.g. transnational 
families, marriage migration and mixed marriages), and the impact on couple relationships and 
children. Finally, changes within the family resulting from immigration should also be further 
analysed (incl. the role of migrant men in families and changes in masculinity). With regard to 
the second generation, research is needed especially on educational performance, mobility within 
the labour market; and the impact of irregular immigrants’ conditions over their children’s life 
chances. 
 
Based on a review of the available research linking family wellbeing and media environments, 
there are some recommendations for the future research. Research in this area needs to better 
converge family studies literature within sociology and media and communications literature. 
Much of the research done so far is from media and communications studies, although all 
questions at the heart of family priorities (generational communication, parenting, child-raising 
practices, and relationships within the family) are intensely mediated questions. While a number 
of projects on media consumption have been conducted, more research is needed on a pan-
European comparative level. Rather little is known concerning different age groups, especially 
the media consumption of older people. While media use, especially digital media use of young 
people, is being heavily researched, little research distinguishes or compares “youth” or 
“children” by age and other sociological variables. Furthermore, findings across Europe on 
social class, ethnicity, and cultural differences remain scarce in terms of media literacy, 
education, and civic participation. There is little research taking into account media 
environments as a whole and produces results on the entire media diets of individuals and 
families. More research is also required on the opportunities, skills, and risks related to media 
and new technology, and how these are divided between social classes and educational levels in 
society. 
 
Genders and generations in families (Chapter 4) is also a wide research area, which has mainly 
concentrated on the gender division of paid and unpaid work in families and reconciliation of 
work and family life. These studies have assumed, explicitly or implicitly, a heterosexual couple 
with young children and thus, there is urgent need to study these issues also in other family 
phases (e.g. families with school age children), family types, and situations. Family research and 
labour market research should be better linked, and the role of the labour market, companies and 
employers should be analysed in relation to the decision-making within families. Also links 
between economic constrains and family decisions are important in future research. Furthermore, 
research would be needed not only about the division of paid and unpaid work but also about the 
division of resources in families. 
 
Gender is highly influential in partnering and parenting and gendered practices within families 
seem to change very slowly. Still, we can talk about “new parenthood” and a more active role of 
men in families can be recognised. Thus, we would need research from a male perspective on 
partnership, parenting and caring work within families, on the “child effect” on men in paid 
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work, and concerning (de-)gendering strategies of young parents, who struggle with or adapt to 
the re-traditionalisation of gender roles after the birth of the first child.  
 
In general, transitions to parenthood still seem to be a white spot, especially in comparative 
research, and future research should concentrate on illuminating the decision-making processes, 
including practices and self-concepts of young women and men in the process of becoming (or 
not) mothers and fathers. This means exploring simultaneity different transitions and trajectories, 
situated within multi-faceted contexts, and how they intersect, e.g. educational trajectories, 
transitions into parenthood, youth cultural transitions, gender transitions, developments in 
important policy contexts etc. Obviously, this calls for interdisciplinary approaches, as well as 
for a perspective on intersecting social inequalities according to gender, ethnicity, educational 
levels etc. Research on transitions into parenthood has to bring together macro-, meso- and micro 
levels of research. There is need for multi-level approach and research design, that integrates the 
individual/household level, (national) policy level and company/work organisational level. 
 
What comes to generations within families, the recent focus has been on the care relations 
between generations, but further research is also needed in this area. However, generational 
relations are not only a care issues. There is a need for future research on the relations between 
parents and children, young people and their parents, especially concerning the trend that young 
people are leaving home later than before and its consequences to their transitions to adulthood, 
on the role of grandparents, and on multigenerational family as a family form. 
 
Violence in families is highly gendered but also a generational issue. It is important to implement 
cross-national comparative prevalence studies in order to compare particular features of violence 
against women, men, children, and older people. There is little research studying the experience 
of family violence, and the types of families and social conditions associated with violence; there 
is a need for more in-depth knowledge on the meanings of violence for victims and perpetrators 
for a better understanding of the contexts of violence. There are still very few studies on violence 
against older people in Europe, and on how violence is related to family and care relations. It is 
also important to analyse the impact of different legislations and specific policies and 
interventions in reducing (or not) family violence.  
 
Family policies and social care policies in Europe (Chapter 5) have been studied more that 
other family related issues on the European comparative level. That is most likely because of the 
crucial political and economic importance of these policies on the labour market, work-family 
reconciliation, and on gender equality. Probably, it is also easier to gather data from policy level 
phenomena rather than issues and processes at the family level. 
 
The diversity of family policy measures poses the challenge to comparative research while 
systems and situations are often very country-specific. Furthermore, because of the crosscutting 
character of family policy and the impact of other policies on families, family dimension in the 
whole policy-making process (e.g. employment, health, urban development) should be further 
studied. For example, housing policy has not been considered as a family policy issue in 
comparative research even if in many countries it has a crucial importance. Thus, research on the 
connections of family policies with other (social) policy measures and family mainstreaming 
would be fruitful. As in other fields of family research, different family types (e.g. same-sex 
couples and their families, reconstituted families) and different family stages (e.g. families with 
school age children, families of older people) should be recognised in family policy research.  
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In political terms, there are three important fields and questions: countries learning from each 
other, reactions to the current economic crisis, and responding to future challenges. Learning 
from each other depends on understanding why a certain measure was introduced in another 
place, why it worked there or why it did not – also negative lessons are helpful. With regard to 
the current economic crisis, it is important to research the (long-term) consequences for national 
family policies. An area interesting for policy-makers is international benchmarking: often, only 
international comparison can show, how family-friendly a country is in a specific area, e.g. 
childcare or cash benefits. Another field of interest is of course the situation of families, their 
current and future challenges. For this, family policy reporting in the member states is important. 
Furthermore, the evaluation of policies has gained more importance; but the necessary tools to 
investigate the effects of a certain policy are underdeveloped in many countries (Hantrais, 2009: 
56). An important question for policy analysis is not only what governments do but also why 
they do it. This is however, even more difficult to analyse. For example, why did some countries 
obviously manage to modernise their family policies and adapt them to current challenges, while 
others seem not willing or able to do so? More in-depth, qualitative comparisons are needed to 
understand and explain the family policy reforms and the policy processes. 
 
Furthermore, in addition to the state, the inclusion of other important family policy actors is 
highly relevant in comparative research. This concerns the role of NGOs, local family policies, 
and occupational family policies, which is of major importance for the reconciliation of work 
and family life (e.g. family-friendly working hours, workplace childcare facilities, organisational 
cultures). As regarding to local policies, a new methodological elaboration of the Good Practice 
Policy model would be useful; an evaluation system is needed to define and share good 
practices.  
 
A further challenge for future research is to improve the understanding of the implications of 
social inequalities for policy-making. If the structure of occupational and educational derived 
class inequalities remains unchanged, then economic support and cash benefits for families is not 
likely to change the shape of social inequalities between families. Thus, it is also important to 
study other policies important for addressing family-related class inequalities. Research on the 
impact of current family policies on gender and social inequalities across and within families, 
including the use and take-up of entitlements and benefits by families from different social 
groupings, would also help to improve evidence-based policy-making.  
 
What comes to the existing gaps in comparative social care and social services research, 
privately (commercially) provided care is still largely ignored in comparative studies, even if its 
importance is clearly increasing. In the care of older people administrative, organisational, and 
professional boundaries, especially between health and social care still make it difficult to study 
the whole range of services, and even research in this field diverges between disciplines. One of 
the future issues is certainly the use of technology both in formal and informal care. 
Furthermore, outcomes of services and care policies are highly important to study. There is also 
need for more comparative local studies and recognition of local actors and local differences in 
social care and social services. On the other hand, there is a need to study globalisation of care 
(e.g. transnational relations of care), to put Europe in the world, but also the role of EU; what 
does EU integration mean for care policies and for service provision. 
 
Informal care and the role of families are crucial and should be studied more as the 
overwhelming majority of care is (and probably will be) provided in families. It is important to 
notice that reconciliation of work and care is not only a childcare issue, but should include adult 
care. For example, spousal care and men as caregivers are widely ignored in existing research. 
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Abuse in care relations is still an understudied issue. Furthermore, family members are not only 
care providers but also decision-makers concerning formal care arrangements and purchasers of 
private services. There is very little comparative research on social care for family members with 
disabilities, both children and adults. Furthermore, lack of comparative research in the field of 
social welfare services for children and families is certainly a major gap in existing research. 
Research would also be needed on care inequalities, e.g. who has access to services, care rich 
and care poor individuals and households, variations depending on life situations. A further 
important issue is the consequences of formal support of informal care (e.g. cash-for-care -
schemes). What have been widely missing in existing research are the perspectives of the care 
receivers and service users themselves, and what kind of expectations citizens have towards care 
and how these expectations will change in the future.  
 
In addition to substantial gaps in existing research, most of the Existential Field Reports pointed 
out gaps in methodology and data in European comparative research. Within the field of cross-
national, comparative research, there are different methodological orientations as can be found 
also from this research review. The main division goes between macro-level multi-national 
comparisons using quantitative data and micro-level, small-scale studies using qualitative or 
mixed methods. Most of the large multi-national projects reviewed in this report have used either 
national statistical information, statistics provided by Eurostat, and/or large multinational 
surveys and databases, such as The European Community Household Panel (ECHP)37, Gender 
and Generations Surveys38 (GGP), Survey of Health and Retirement of Europe39 (SHARE), and 
the European Social Survey40 (ESS). Even if the situation has been improved in last decade, the 
need for comparative, harmonised, and often longitudinal data has been identified in most of the 
reports, as well as the need for more in-depth qualitative research.  
 
Conducting research on families is often a difficult endeavour, especially when undertaken on an 
international scale. Family life and related processes make up a rather intimate sphere of life, 
which is only to a limited extent accessible to either social survey research or administrative data 
collection. Data restriction laws might legitimately protect the integrity of the family, but at the 
same time make it difficult to arrive at a representative overview of relevant family forms and 
processes. In comparative family research, the mere number of available indicators thus often is 
inherently restricted. 
 
                                                 
37 The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) is a panel survey in which a sample of households and 
persons have been interviewed year after year. These interviews cover a wide range of topics concerning living 
conditions. They include detailed income information, financial situation in a wider sense, working life, housing 
situation, social relations, health, and biographical information of the interviewed. The total duration of the ECHP 
was 8 years, running from 1994-2001 (8 waves). 
38 Generations and Gender Survey is a panel survey from the member countries of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE). It consists of a nationally representative sample of 18-79 year-old resident 
population in each participating country with at least three panel waves and an interval of three years between each 
wave. The contextual databases are designed to complement micro-level survey data with macro-level information 
on policies and aggregate indicators.  
39 The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) is a multidisciplinary and cross-national panel 
database of micro data on health, socio-economic status and social and family networks of more than 45,000 
individuals aged 50 or over. 11 countries contributed data to the 2004 SHARE baseline study. The second wave of 
data collection took place in 2006–07. The survey’s third wave collected detailed retrospective life histories in 
sixteen countries in 2008–09 (see http://www.share-project.org/). 
40 The European Social Survey (the ESS) is an academically driven social survey designed to chart and explain the 
interaction between Europe's changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of its diverse 
populations. Now preparing for its fifth round, the survey covers more than 30 nations and employs the most 
rigorous methodologies. A repeat cross-sectional survey, it has been funded through the European Commission’s 
Framework Programmes, the European Science Foundation and national funding bodies in each country. 
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Most survey and administrative analyses largely focus on the household as the main statistical 
unit. More differentiated family relationships, e.g. those in commuter families, patchwork 
families or in divorced families, are often difficult to grasp. Family relationships that go beyond 
the mere household unit thus remain a “blind spot” in contemporary family research, and new 
methodologies and data collection methods should be developed to get a hold of the flexibility of 
family forms and relations. Only very few surveys specifically focus on the family unit, and 
often they are not repeated at regular intervals and thus are inadequate to establish meaningful 
time series.  
 
Even if indicators are available, cross-national comparability of data on families frequently 
proves to be a problem due to the frequent need to employ data from different statistical sources. 
Administrative data initially often originates from various nation-specific statistical offices that 
frequently differ in the definition of central terms and concepts due to the application of different 
“statistical traditions”. In data gathering and collection even the seemingly straightforward 
categories, e.g. such as women’s involvement in paid work might be measured in a range of 
different ways, and even more the definition and measurement of unpaid work is varying. Survey 
research, e.g. through direct interview with respondents on a representative scale, occasionally 
represents a methodological alternative to overcome these restrictions of administrative data, but 
this form of data collection again is inherently faced with own problems, such as desired 
response behaviour or difficulties in access to specific target groups. There would be a need for 
oversampling with some specific groups (e.g. immigrant families). Even if on an international 
scale, data are available using similar or cross-nationally comparable concepts; their availability 
might differ significantly between countries as well as between time periods. This problem is 
especially pronounced for the new member states of the Central and Eastern Europe, where data 
are not or only scarcely available for the period before the system transformation in the 1990s.  
 
One of the problems in existing comparative research is the country coverage. Overall, some 
countries have been more popular than others in the existing European comparative research, 
while other countries are understudied. Today, large survey-based studies already cover a large 
number of member states (often twenty or more), but in more detailed and focused comparisons 
there are still some “favourite” countries like Germany, the UK, Sweden, France, quite often also 
the Netherlands, Italy and Spain. Often the countries studied have been chosen to represent some 
welfare (or care) regime typology (usually Esping-Andersen’s), which have been shown in this 
review to be rather inaccurate starting point for country selection because of the diversity and 
exceptions within the country clusters. Regional comparisons are mostly based on geographical 
closeness: Northern Europe, Southern Europe/ Mediterranean countries, Western Europe/ old 
member states, and Eastern Europe/ CEE countries/ new member states. The last group is 
covered the least, especially in those studies dated before the enlargement of European Union in 
2005. These kinds of groupings seem to have varying usefulness, depending on the issues 
studied. For example, for economic issues and housing the groups based on geography are useful 
since differences between regions are evident and countries in each group have quite a lot in 
common. Such groups are however not very helpful e.g. in comparing family policy systems. 
 
What comes to availability of data in specific issues, unpaid work and time use in families 
provide an example. Main methods of collecting information about household labour have been 
survey questions and time diaries, but other methods such as qualitative in-depth interviews, 
direct observations, and discourse analyses have also been used. Low cost and high response 
rates are the main advantages of survey instruments. However, in different time use surveys (e.g. 
European Social Survey (ESS), European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) or the 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)), direct questions vary considerably in their 
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wording. Time diaries provide an alternative instrument (e.g. Harmonised European Time Use 
Survey, Multinational Time Use Study – HETUS). Despite some drawbacks, like low response 
rates, and the problems of accounting for parallel activities time diary methodology provides 
reliable estimates of time use patterns in households. Because time-use survey (TUS) methods 
have not been harmonised for a long time, nationally produced data are not comparable. Eurostat 
started to support projects with the goal to harmonise time use statistics in the EU in the early 
1990s and was mandated to develop guidelines for Harmonised European Time Use Surveys 
(HETUS) in order to ensure that the surveys of the member states are comparable. Most recent 
guidelines were published in 2009 (Eurostat, 2009b). Most European national statistical institutes 
have taken them into account since the late-1990s. Some countries, however, differ from the 
recommendations to a varying degree, national time use surveys are therefore only comparable 
to a certain level. Currently the online HETUS database contains comparable data from fifteen 
countries.  
 
The variety of ways domestic work is measured limits the comparability of the results of 
different studies. Research in the field of both paid work and unpaid work could benefit from 
applying longitudinal survey data. Such information however is rare. The only comparative 
research programme that makes an effort towards this end is the Generations and Gender 
Programme41 with several EU member states producing panel survey data on demographic but 
also social developments – including information on the division of work. The great variability 
of methods and approaches applied puts serious restrictions also on establishing trends over time. 
Findings from two or more distinct studies, carried out on data from different points of time are 
rarely comparable. Only a very small number of comparative studies exist that attempt to explore 
changes over time.  
 
There are slightly different problems in studying specific groups of individuals or families e.g. 
immigrant families. Again, there is a need for more complete and comparative data. Concepts 
and sources vary, and several areas are badly captured. Beyond the description of some major 
variables, an in-depth comparative study of immigrants’ characteristics, families and the second 
generation is barely possible under the current datasets. Longitudinal studies, which enable us to 
understand the mobility experience, are also generally not available.  
 
One of the problems with the existing databases is that the data available is not necessarily suited 
to the specific research interests, and such data gets old rather quickly, especially what comes to 
family policies or formal service systems in individual countries. Quite often comparative studies 
rely on national expert reports from individual countries, expertise of the research team and/or 
previous research available. Methodological problem with these kinds of data sources is first of 
all its reliability and coverage. Expert reports might vary depending on who the expert is. There 
might be also problems in finding previous research and other written documents, especially 
from smaller language areas. 
 
Above, mainly problems with large databases and quantitative comparative studies have been 
discussed. There is also need more qualitative comparative research that would allow analysing 
e.g. decision-making processes within families and perspectives of individual family members to 
provide more inside view of the family life. Many research questions concerning families and 
family policies cannot be answered by using quantitative methodology. In the field of family 
policy research, qualitative designs allow investigating specificities of individual cases while 
keeping the comparative advantages. Meso (or even micro) level analyses are much less 
                                                 
41 See http://www.unece.org/pau/ggp/Welcome.html. 
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frequent, though they have many insights to offer. In policy analysis, more in-depth, qualitative 
comparisons are needed to understand and explain policy reforms and processes, i.e. speaking in 
terms of the policy cycle: how problems are defined, the political agenda set, policies 
formulated, the political decisions made and implemented, possibly evaluated and finally either 
terminated or re-formulated. Small-scale qualitative comparisons can also advance theory 
building while large-scale comparisons mainly test existing theories. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
 
Findings of the Existential Field Reports provide a heterogeneous picture of European families 
and family policies with regional, national, and local variations, as presented in the existing 
comparative research since the mid-1990s. Still, some general conclusions and major trends can 
be drawn. 
 
Most prominently, the overall size of families has declined, following a general decline in total 
fertility rates. This development has taken place all over Europe since the 1960s and 1970s. In 
addition, decisions for both marriage and family formation have shifted to ever-later ages. The 
presence of young people within the family of origin has prolonged. This is connected to so-
called extended adolescence, with increased importance of individualised and personalised 
media and communication technologies in the lives of young people. Due to the postponement of 
family decisions, fertility rates all over Europe lie below the “net production level” of around 
2.1. In some countries, fertility levels are even below 1.5. The aging of population is closely 
related to this and effects on all generations. 
 
The importance of marriage as a social institution has declined. Especially in the Northern 
Europe, marriage and family formation have become decoupled, as an increasing share of 
children is born out-of-wedlock. Europe is also facing decreasing marriage rates, increasing 
divorce rates and conjugal instability, and increasing rates of remarriages – in other words, 
increasing diversity on family forms and family relations. Consequently, a variety of different 
alternative family types is weakening the idea of a standard “nuclear family model”. However, 
couples still often institutionalise their relationship after the birth of the first child. Besides, 
European couples still intend to have at least two children. Therefore, it is possible to claim that 
in most European countries the nuclear family model still makes up the prevailing form of family 
life, and the dominant idea of a “proper” family. Of special concern should be - if we think of 
family policy - the rising number of lone-parent families, which are mostly families of lone 
mothers with their children, considering their high risk of poverty as existing research has shown 
the current and future consequences especially for children growing up in poor families. 
 
Not by accident, sociologists have characterised current cultural and societal condition with 
concepts such as individualisation, subjectivisation of norms, and the erosion of the so-called 
normal biography. Quite often media, with its new representations of family models, identities, 
and authority models, has a connection to both the growing individualism and the rise of new 
kinds of social worlds. It is a well-known fact that children’s use of the internet and other 
modern media products continues to grow, and education systems from primary school through 
university are increasingly reliant on digital culture and modern information and communication 
technology. The voice of authority no longer resides merely in the spheres of industrial time 
traditions, such as the school or the family. In family research and on a larger scale in the whole 
sociological theory, it is believed that there is a slow but sure erosion of both the traditional 
form of work, based on full-time employment, clear-cut occupational assignments, and career 
pattern over the lifecycle, and the traditional nuclear family, as a self-evident model and the only 
right way of being a family. 
 
Despite the existence of some general trends across Europe mentioned above, we are still 
observing a large variety of different, nationally or regionally specific patterns. Opposing cases 
are represented by the Nordic countries, on the one hand, with their considerable move away 
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from traditional family model, and Southern European countries on the other hand, where family 
patterns are still much in line with the traditional model.  
 
The most marked change in the field of division of paid work is the increasing level of female 
employment. Female participation at the labour force across the EU is constantly increasing in 
virtually each member state. Therefore, the male-breadwinner model is being increasingly 
replaced by alternative models. The most powerful challenger is the two full-time earner model, 
but it is not yet and probably will not be the dominant one in the near future. In addition, a great 
variety of coexisting models can be observed, even a female-breadwinner patterns is not 
completely unknown. Therefore, it is possible to argue that although the dominance of the male-
breadwinner solution has diminished, no prevailing model has emerged so far. 
 
The increasing level of female employment is connected to some re-arrangements in the division 
of domestic work at home, though we can see only limited changes. Employed women do less 
housework than non-employed women do, but in overall women continue to take a remarkably 
bigger share of domestic work even in dual-earner families. Therefore, it is possible to say that 
some basic patterns of family management have remained intact in Europe, although again, 
cross-country differences are remarkable and changes are constantly in motion. Most 
importantly, the division of paid and especially unpaid work continues to be gendered. 
Furthermore, it seems to be quite resistant to policy interventions.  
 
There are also some changes in the field of parenting and care. The existing research provides 
evidence that there are new representations of parenthood especially among young people. The 
crisis of the father as the authority of the family has led to new models of fatherhood, and there 
are signs of a new motherhood as well. EU policy is also interested in fathers as carers and is 
encouraging men’s caring role and fatherhood. In this sense, we can talk about “father-sensitive” 
policies. However, it appears that a conservative vision of gender roles still prevails and the 
actual distribution of domestic work still penalises women. Traditions are still strong in this 
sense. The “dual carer–dual earner” society seems to remain an empty or only a theoretical 
concept in most of the Europe and the “dual earner/one and a half earner-female carer” models 
are the most common ones across European Union. 
 
We can recognise some changes in family life and in family relations, such as the new role of 
grandparents as supporters of their children and grandchildren, the growing meaning of new 
representations of parenthood, and the modern family as a negotiation and affection based 
family. Still this new reality, if it can even be called “new”, has its contradictions and 
ambivalences. 
 
European countries have broadly valued social equality and solidarity. However, in 
contemporary thinking, it has been argued that the question of social equality has become more 
problematic and complex. The classic social structure - peasants, working-class, middle-class, 
upper class - has given way to a heterogeneous divisions and the traditional concept of social 
class is not any more seen very useful in social sciences. Social inequalities are not anymore 
clearly and solely class based. Instead of a class society, social scientists more often talk about 
individualisation, agency, biographical choice, reflexivity, and diversity. This does not mean that 
the social fabric in Europe has become or is becoming uniform or that social inequality would be 
decreasing.  
 
In the new complex social structure there are at least two distinctive trends, on the one hand a 
growing uniformity of life-styles (caused by consumption and the media), and on the other, the 
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emergence of a dual, polarised society. The winner is a professionally mobile and qualified 
“super-class”, including most middle-class people. It seems, according to the existing research, 
that middle-class families, if they have two earners, well-educated parents, and no more than two 
children, have all possibilities of making a good living. Perhaps even the contemporary family 
policy in the European Union favours these families. Educational expansion we are witnessing in 
the EU, advantages couples with higher education and allow them to give their children more 
resources, cultural and social capital. The loser is a poorly integrated “underclass” including a 
majority of non-EU immigrant people, unemployed people, and unskilled people. Their families 
are vulnerable to economic hardship, poor housing, health, educational opportunities and 
attainment, and social mobility. 
 
In many European countries, family policies have gained tremendous importance in recent years. 
Reasons for this are certainly the increased awareness of the challenges of family life and family 
relations, decrease in fertility rates and ageing of the population, labour shortage caused by these 
demographic trends, and thus questions concerning childcare, and reconstruction processes of 
welfare states, just to mention few. 
 
Childcare services have been one of the most important family policy issue and reform areas 
during the last years, including leave policies and activation of fathers. It seems that the Nordic 
countries act here as pioneers. In most countries, there are trends of expansion of childcare 
services. EU policy strongly promotes the labour market participation of women and mothers 
and therefore public childcare provision. An important or even a general trend has been named 
by many researchers as “care goes public” or “defamilisation” of childcare. This means 
institutionalisation and professionalisation of care, especially in the field of childcare and early 
childhood education. It is important to notice that also educational aims have recently gained 
more attention. Still, social care remains a combination of formal and informal care. More 
research should be directed to different forms of informal care, including growing globalisation 
of care. The role of families and especially women in families is and will be remarkable in 
providing care for children, old people, and other adults needing care. In spite of strong 
defamilialising processes, there are also trends of re-familialisation, especially in adult care.  
 
Increasing number of European countries has established family ministries emphasising the 
growing importance of family (policy) issues. However, institutionalisation does not necessarily 
mean strengthening of the welfare state. Without doubt, its role is crucial, but there are other 
important actors, such as the third sector, NGOs, and the civil society, the market and private 
sector, labour market actors, and families themselves.  
 
For the time being, there are 27 member states in the EU. There are differences and variations 
between countries and within countries. Europe is rich in differences. On the other hand, based 
on the existential field reports, there are certain general trends discussed above, some weak and 
some stronger, running through all European Union countries. We are probably heading into 
more similarities in many areas of family life, family relations, and family policy. Often asked 
question against existing empirical findings pointing at diversity is, if it is still possible to 
identify country clusters or welfare regimes. To some extent, it is possible to recognise the 
division into three regimes; liberal, conservative, and social-democratic identified by Esping-
Andersen, or a more nuanced division into five regions; Nordic (or Northern) countries, Southern 
(sometimes Mediterranean) countries, Continental countries, the UK, and Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries. Although these groupings work in some respects, there are always 
exceptions and “howevers”. Most researchers agree that the main differences can be found 
between Southern and Northern parts of Europe, other countries locating in-between. 
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